THE FIFTH COLUMN IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

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LUIS A. LOSADA

THE FIFTH COLUMN IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

LUGDUNI BATAVORUM E. J. BRILL MCMLXXII

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BY

LUIS A. LOSADA

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION, TERMINOLOGY

On a rainy spring night in 431 B.C. a group of some three hundred armed Thebans entered the Boeotian town of Plataea, an ally of Athens, in order to get control of the town before the impending war with Athens actually broke out. Their entrance into Plataea was accomplished through the connivance of certain Plataeans who hoped to come to power themselves and do away with their political opponents. Therefore they opened the gates of their city and admitted the enemy and in so doing opened the gates of war for the Greek world (2.2.2).[1] The war was to last off and on for twenty-seven years and throughout its long duration this opening scene was reenacted many times in many cities. Thucydides comments on the tendency of oligarchic and democratic factions in the various Greek cities to invite in the Peloponnesians or the Athenians respectively. The war provided these factions with the opportunity for their treasonable activities in that either could get military aid for the asking in order to gain power themselves and destroy the opposition (3.82.1). Loyalty to the state provided no check; party loyalty, Thucydides tells us, became a stronger tie than even blood (3.82.6). So this keynote of treason, struck at the very outset of the war, repeated itself with variations in time, place and circumstances until, in the historian's words, πᾶν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη (3.82.1).

The modern world has fallen heir to a term which describes the action of those Plataean traitors of 431 B.C. They were what we today call a "fifth column".[2] It is this phenomenon, its manifestations, causes, workings and overall importance which we propose to study in the context of the Peloponnesian War. No monograph has expressly dealt with this subject in detail for any period of Greek history. Many scholars have concerned themselves with the phenomenon of betrayal with respect to specific situations or campaigns and their contributions will be discussed in the relevant

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[1] All references in the text are to Thucydides unless indicated otherwise.

[2] For the origin and definition of this term see below under Terminology.

place.[1] However, a number of authorities have commented on the recurring betrayals of cities throughout Greek history; e.g., Calhoun succinctly described the Greek proclivity toward this type of treason: "To the Greek, to be ruled by his political opponents was an intolerable humiliation, to be averted at any cost, even if it became necessary to deliver his state into the hands of its foemen. The beginnings of this practice of introducing foreign forces are to be traced far back into legendary times, and examples are numerous in every period of Greek history. In nearly every instance in which an attack upon a city is described there is some allusion to a party within the walls who are making preparations to betray the city into the hands of the enemy, and numbers of captures testify to the success of such plots." [2] Statements similar to Calhoun's have been made by others such as Martin [3] and Chroust [4] and describe a situation familiar to anyone who has looked into Greek history. Scholars who have concerned themselves with the history and techniques of Greek warfare have also called attention to this method of capturing a city. Köchly and Rüstow, writing in the middle of the last century, noted with respect to sieges: "Bei den Schwierigkeiten, welche die Belagerung selbst der kleinsten festen Stadt immer darbot, suchte der Angreifer derselben sich zunächst durch Ueberfall oder Einverständniss mit einer städtischen Partei zu bemächtigen." [5] In the standard modern handbook on Greek

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[1] Here we mention R. Legon's recent study, *Demos and Stasis: Studies in the Factional Politics of Classical Greece* (Cornell University, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 1966). Legon's study is primarily concerned with showing the effect of *stasis* on the great majority of citizens who took no part in it and usually remained loyal to the state.

[2] G. M. Calhoun, *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* (Austin 1913) 141.

[3] A. Martin, "Proditio, Prodosia," *D.S.* 4^1 (1907) 668. Martin's article is a survey of treason in general with particular reference to Athens. His emphasis is on legal questions dealing with the charge of προδοσία.

[4] A. H. Chroust, "Treason and Politics in Ancient Greece," *JHI* 15 (1954) 280-88. Chroust is mainly concerned with showing that party loyalty took precedence over loyalty to the state.

[5] H. A. Köchly and W. Rüstow, *Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesen von der ältesten Zeit bis auf Pyrrhos* (Uarau 1852) 198. The authors go on to mention some examples of "Ueberfall oder Einverständnis" including Plataea and Megara (424 B.C.). They then turn to an exposition of defensive and security measures based on Aeneas Tacticus, whom they edited with a German translation in *Griechische Kriegschriftsteller* 1 (Leipzig 1853). Aeneas Tacticus is an important source for the techniques of fifth columns (*infra*, ch. 6).

warfare we find Schramm following Köchly and Rüstow very closely: "Um den Schwierigkeiten einer Belagerung zu entgehen, suchte man die Stadt durch List, Überfall und durch Einverständnis mit einer Partei im Inneren zu nehmen." [1] More recently Adcock in describing the means of strategy of Greek wars has written the longest comment to date specifically dealing with our subject: "There was another side of strategy which finds a place in Greek warfare, and that is the mobilization of what is nowadays called a fifth column. It was sometimes true in the fifth century, and more often true in the fourth century, that the strife of factions within a state afforded its enemies a hope that they would get help from what may be called the opposition. For when strife was bitter, Greek politicians or partizans might rather see their cities in the hands of an enemy than in the hands of their political opponents." [2] Adcock goes on to cite examples including the betrayal of Plataea, Argos after the Peace of Nicias and Brasidas' operations in Thrace and then adds: "When Greek cities were hard to take, the besiegers were apt to trust, and often with justice, to treachery or at least defeatism in a city they could not capture otherwise. In his book on defence of cities Aeneas Tacticus seems almost as much preoccupied with dangers from within as with dangers from without." [3]

Our subject then is both frequently attested in our sources and has been noticed by different scholars, yet a full study of it remains to be done. There are many questions one might ask which deserve more detailed investigation. Just how often did this type of treason occur and what do our sources tell us as to the details of dates and places? Who were the fifth columnists and were they as successful as Calhoun implies? The authorities cited, following Thucydides, stress the political factor of civil strife in accounting for these betrayals. Are there other explanatory factors which have been

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[1] E. Schramm in J. Kromayer and G. Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer* (Munich 1928) 223. Schramm continues with a short presentation of security measures based on Aeneas Tacticus and then turns to the mechanics of sieges.

[2] F. E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley 1957) 72-73.

[3] Adcock, *War*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 2) 73. Adcock concludes with remarks on Philip of Macedon and later Greek history (73-74). As we shall see, "sometimes true in the fifth century" is not an accurate description of the occurrences of fifth columns in the Peloponnesian War.

overshadowed by the political? A proper discussion of the causes ought to include an exposition of these other elements which are constants in Greek warfare; i.e., the technical limitations of military operations and the economics of warfare. Then, by studying the political factor in more detail can we discern distinctions among the various fifth columns in terms of their causes and can we see any process of development? Were there differences in the activities undertaken by the fifth columns and, if so, why? Intriguing and by no means unimportant questions are how the fifth columns worked, the techniques involved and, conversely, what specific precautions were taken to guard against them. Finally, what role did the fifth column play in strategy and how did this affect the outcome of the war? This study attempts to answer these questions and to show the importance of this much noticed but little investigated phenomenon in the Peloponnesian War.

Terminology

Before turning to the examination of our subject as outlined above, it will prove useful to define exactly what constitutes a fifth column and, since the term is modern, consider the ancient terminology for the phenomenon.

For the purposes of this study, a fifth column is defined as a group or faction in a state which acts traitorously or subversively in cooperation with the enemy. The term is a modern one. It originated in 1936 during the Spanish Civil War in a statement that the insurgents had four columns under General Mola advancing on Madrid and a fifth column of sympathizers in the city ready to rise and betray it.[1] The basic idea is that of treason from within, especially overt action in support of the enemy inside the defense line during an attack.[2] To take a classic example from an earlier

[1] Whether or not Mola coined the term is uncertain. H. Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (New York 1961) 317, n. 5, notes "Lord St. Oswald (at the time a reporter on the Republican side) has a claim to have coined the phrase some weeks before." During World War I Mussolini declaimed against the "*quinta arma*" which Germany fostered within the nations, "that vast, oblique, subterranean, terrible organization . . . which threatens to paralyze—from behind—the nations of the Quadruple Entente;" see E. Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York, Mentor 1969) 229; for the quotations from Mussolini, *Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini* 10 (Florence 1951) 136, 158.

[2] The term fifth column is relatively new and definitions in recent dictionaries tend to vary. They all share, however, the essential meaning of the term; that is, treason from within. See *The Random House Dictionary of*

period of Greek history, when the Persians were besieging Eretria in 490 B.C., a party within Eretria wanted to betray the city to the Persians for private gain; on the seventh day of the siege, led by Euphorbus and Philargus, they did so (Hdt. 6.100-101). In this study we will begin with fifth-column activities of this type; i.e., the overt betrayal, actually attempted or contemplated, of a city to the enemy by a group from within.

As indicated by the definition, the term fifth column generally has a wider application including any group which in support of an enemy undertakes treasonable or subversive activities within a state. The precise nature of these activities ultimately depends upon the ingenuity of the particular fifth columnists. An example with which we will be concerned is giving strategic information to the enemy. At 3.2.3 Thucydides reports that the Athenian *proxenoi* at Mytilene sent information to Athens concerning the revolt of Mytilene. Another example is entering into collusion with the enemy to accomplish the overthrow of the government. This is subversion and not quite the same thing as introducing enemy forces to capture the state. Actual enemy arms may be introduced but the emphasis is on subversion, the overthrow of the government, not the overt capture of the city by the enemy. Thus at 5.76.2 Thucydides describes the activities of a pro-Spartan group at Argos whose ultimate aim was τὸν δῆμον τὸν ἐν Ἄργει καταλῦσαι, to overthrow the democracy in Argos. Treason from within need not necessarily involve a little group of willful men opening the gates in the dead of night and admitting the enemy, although this remains the most frequent and characteristic form of the phenomenon.

There is no single term in Greek which is the equivalent of our "fifth column." What we have in our sources are descriptions of groups which by reason of their actions fall within our definition. It is necessary therefore to inquire as to what words our sources, primarily Thucydides,[1] use in their descriptions of what we today call a fifth column. In the investigation of this question a beginning

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the English Language (New York 1966) 529 and Margaret Nicolson, *American English Usage* (New York 1957) s.v. fifth column.

[1] In our investigation we will concentrate on the vocabulary of Thucydides, our major source for the greater part of the Peloponnesian War. References to other sources will appear in the notes. The text is the Jones-Powell Oxford edition of 1942.

was made by Calhoun long before the term "fifth column" entered our vocabulary. Calhoun, writing in 1913, said "the betrayal of a city is προδοσία, and the traitors are said προδιδόναι, παραδιδόναι, ἐνδιδόναι; other words occasionally appear in this sense." [1] With Calhoun's brief note as a starting point we proceed to a fuller study of the terminology.

Προδοσία: the word προδοσία means "treason" [2] and since the betrayal of a city or a fifth-column operation is a species of treason, it is not surprising that our sources often call the phenomenon προδοσία. However, many other activities constituted προδοσία and it seems that the charge of treason was rather liberally applied at Athens in the latter part of the fifth and all of the fourth century; [3] e.g., a proposal was made to try the generals who failed to recover the bodies of the men lost at Arginusae under a law relating in part to traitors; [4] the fourth century orator Lycurgus tells us that

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[1] Calhoun, *Clubs*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 2, n. 2) 141, n. 5.

[2] *LSJ*, s.v. προδοσία.

[3] For the most recent complete survey of προδοσία see E. Berneker, "Προδοσία," *RE* 23[1] (1957) 90-95. An older survey is given by Martin, "Proditio," *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 2, n. 3) 668-72. For legal questions see J. H. Lipsius, *Der Attische Process* 1 (Berlin 1883) 419ff. and *Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* 2[1] (Leipzig 1908) 374ff.; J. Schreiner, *De Corpore Iuris Atheniensum*, (Bonn 1913) 65ff.; more recently E. Berneker in "Hochverrat und Landesverrat im griechischen Recht," *Eos* 48 (1956) 105-37, has shown that προδοσία was a separate charge in Attic law from κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου (see esp. 108 ff.). In this connection see the discussions of the νόμος εἰσαγγελτικός (in which the two separate charges, προδοσία, treason and κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου, subversion, are clearly distinguished) by R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle* 1 (Chicago 1931) 302 ff. and M. Ostwald, "Athenian Legislation Against Tyranny and Subversion," *TAPA* 86 (1955) 103-128, especially 115-19. For the older view that they were not clearly distinguished see Lipsius, *Attische Process* 1, 419-20 and Berneker's article for further bibliography. In this study we shall be concerned with κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου when it is accomplished with enemy aid and therefore constitutes a fifth-column operation.

[4] Xen., *Hell.* 1.7.22. At 1.7.33 Euryptolemus, who is arguing for the generals, asks the Athenians not to find them guilty of *prodosia.* Although Euryptolemus proposed that the generals be tried under the decree of Cannonus (1.7.20-21), the fact that the proposal was actually made to try the generals specifically as traitors is our point. It shows how widely the charge might be applied. It is also noteworthy that the decree of Cannonus applied generally to anyone who harmed the state, ἐάν τις τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ἀδικῇ (1.7.20). In Thucydides (8.50.2) Phrynichus argues in his treasonable letter to Astyochus that it is pardonable for him to counsel something harmful for his city, μετὰ τοῦ τῆς πόλεως ἀξυμφόρου κακόν τι βουλεύειν. In the first decree preserved in Ps. Plu., *Vitae Decem Orat.* 833E-834B, charging Antiphon and others with treason, the basis of the charge was "serving as envoys

desertion to the enemy at Decelea during the Peloponnesian War constituted treason and the Athenians passed a decree to this effect (*In Leoc.* 120); the Athenian general Anytus embarked on an expedition to relieve Pylos in 409 B.C. and had to turn back on account of storms. He was tried for treason because of this by the enraged Athenians (D.S. 13.64.6). Athenian generals were very conscious of the fact that failure or defeat might well leave them open to a charge of treason, whether justified or not, on their return.[1] Just how widely the charge of προδοσία was applied in

to Sparta for the harm of the city of Athens," ἐπὶ κακῷ τῆς πόλεως τῆς 'Αθηναίων. This is apparently the closest we can come to any definition of treason in Athens. It is a very vague definition, "harming the state" (cf., Martin, "Proditio," 670), and consequently many offenses were held to be treason.

[1] Nicias voices this fear in Thucydides 7.48.4; cf. Plu., *Nic.* 22.2-3. As the passage in Thucydides makes clear, the charge often, but not always, involved the alleged acceptance of bribes from the enemy. K. J. Dover, *Thucydides Book VII* (Oxford 1965) 41, notes on this passage that "accusations of this kind were made very freely in a Greek state." Adeimantus was charged with betraying the fleet at Aegospotamoi (Xen., *Hell.* 2.1.32). Conon judiciously elected not to return to Athens. For further references to generals charged with treason see Bonner-Smith, *Justice* 1, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 6, n. 3) 307, n. 3.

A particularly interesting piece of evidence for the wide application of the charge of προδοσία with respect to the generals is provided by an Attic inscription, *I.G.* I². 105; M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* 1 (Oxford 1947) 91; R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 1969) 91 (both these works will henceforth be cited as *G.H.I.*, with references to the numbers of the inscriptions unless indicated otherwise). The inscription was dated by B. Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents of the Fifth Century* (Ann Arbor 1932) 109, to 407/6. The decree provides for an expenditure of money as a loan for shipbuilders to be sent to Macedon to construct ships. The στρατηγοί are enjoined to take charge of the operation and to "expedite the sailing of those responsible for building the ships, or be liable to a charge of treason" (Tod's translation, *G.H.I.* 1, 91, p. 223). The text is admittedly restored and W. Bannier in "Zum neuen ersten Bande der attischen Inschriften," *Rh M* 77 (1928) 281, objected to Wilhelm's restoration of προδοσίας in l. 12: "Da die stereotype Formel οἱ (δὲ) δεῖνες ἐσαγόντων (Aktiv) ἐς (τὸ) δικαστήριον lautet und προδοσίας sachlich und sprachlich nicht sehr wahrscheinlich ist, halte ich die Ergänzung ἐσαγό[ντων hοι πρυτάνες ἐς δ]ικαστέριον für näher liegend als ἐσαγό[σθον προδοσίας ἐς τὸ δ]ικαστεριον." Meritt, Tod and Meiggs-Lewis read προδοσίας but offer no comment on Bannier's objections. First, while Bannier is correct in asserting that εἰσάγω usually appears in the active voice in this "stereotyped formula," it is not unknown in the passive; cf., Plato, *Gorgias* 521 c. Furthermore, the change to the active requires the introduction of a new subject and Bannier offers "hοι πρυτάνες." This involves real difficulties. Who are these πρυτάνες and into what court are they supposed to bring the στρατηγούς who, we assume, are now to be understood as the object of the verb? A charge against the generals would certainly be a serious

Athens is aptly illustrated by the prosecution of Leocrates by Lycurgus in 331/0.[1] Leocrates' "treason" involved apparently nothing more than leaving his country during wartime. Lycurgus tried very hard to equate this with προδοσία and, most important for the question of what was understood as προδοσία in Athens, missed getting a conviction by one vote.[2]

If we turn now to our major source for the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, we note that προδοσία occurs fourteen times in the text.[3] Bearing in mind the facts that προδοσία was a term of quite wide application and the fifth column was not the only form of treason which occurred in the Peloponnesian War, it is noteworthy that in twelve of these instances of προδοσία Thucydides uses the term to describe fifth-column activities.[4] That eighty-six percent of the time the noun προδοσία in Thucydides refers to fifth-column activities is a strong indication of the prevalence of this form of προδοσία in the war. Even more significant for our study is the fact that the two instances of προδοσία which do not refer to fifth columns occur before the Peloponnesian War begins. At 1.110.3 the fate

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political issue and such cases at this period would doubtlessly come before a popular court or the assembly; see G. Busolt and H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* 2 (Munich 1926) 793. We should therefore expect *thesmothetai*, epigraphically impossible, as the most likely subject of the verb; cf. Ps. Plu., *Vit. Decem Orat.* 833e, D. 21.47, and Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 59.2. The *prytaneis* would hardly appear here in 407/6. Finally, with respect to προδοσίας we would add that the genitive of the charge is easy enough without a preposition and that the charge of treason against the generals is not "improbable" when we bear in mind how many generals were so charged in such various circumstances.

[1] For the date see F. Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit* 3^2 (Berlin 1898) 111 and n. 8, 111-12.

[2] Aeschin. 3.252. The lack of a precise definition of treason in law and consequent broad and often abusive applications of laws against treason may be paralleled in other periods of history. The problem is well known in Roman history; see, e.g., H. F. Jolowicz, *Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law* (Cambridge 1932) 323-24; during the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, Madison considered it extremely important: "As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgement, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime . . . ." *Federalist* 43.

[3] The fourteen instances are: 1.110.3, 1.138.6, 4.49.1, 4.52.3, 4.81.2, 4.101.3, 4.103.5, 4.121.2, 5.3.6, 5.116.3, 6.103.4, 8.31.1, 8.33.3, 8.60.1.

[4] The two which do not refer to fifth columns are 1.110.3 and 1.138.6.

of Inaros, King of the Libyans, is described: προδοσίᾳ ληφθεις ἀνεσταυρώθη. At 1.138.6 Thucydides refers to Themistocles as ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φεύγοντος. Thus once the account of the war begins in Book Two, προδοσία exclusively refers to fifth-column activities.[1]

Προδιδόναι: the verb means to betray, deliver up, give up [2] and naturally, therefore, describes the actions of the fifth columnists. It occurs thirty-one times in Thucydides, of which sixteen instances, or a little more than fifty percent, refer to fifth-column activities.[3] Of course the word is often used where it does not specifically refer to the act of treason. It is possible to "betray" one's friends, expectations or the memory of one's ancestors; e.g., at 6.69.1 Thucydides explains that the Syracusan soldiers at Syracuse were not inferior to the Athenians in courage but, because of their lack of experience, τὴν βούλησιν ἄκοντες προυδίδοσαν. If we look more closely at the fifteen instances of προδιδόναι in Thucydides which do not refer to fifth columns, we find that only two refer to other acts of treason.[4] This confirms our findings with respect to προδοσία: when Thucydides mentions treason, he is almost always talking about fifth columns. In the case of προδιδόναι the participle is especially used as a substantive [5] to denote the fifth columnists; e.g., οἱ προδιδόντες τῶν Μεγαρέων (4.67.3) describes the Megarian democrats who arrange to betray their city to Demosthenes and Hippocrates; at 4.103.2 we are told that Brasidas drove on toward Amphipolis at night in a snowstorm βουλόμενος λαθεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ἀμφιπόλει πλὴν τῶν προδιδόντων.[6]

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[1] For other writers who use προδοσία in descriptions of fifth columns, cf. Hdt. 6.88, 6.100.2, Ps. Xen., *Ath. Pol.* 2.15, Aen. Tact. 31.8 (Casaubon's emendation), Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.19, D.S. 12.66.2, 12.69.2, 13.66.4, Plu., *Alc.* 31.5.

[2] *LSJ*, s.v. προδίδωμι II.

[3] The sixteen instances referring to fifth columns are: 2.5.7, 3.18.1, 4.7.1, 4.25.7, 4.67.3, 4.68.2 *bis*, 4.76.3, 4.77.1, 4.103.2, 4.104.4, 5.17.2, 6.61.2, 6.74.1, 8.33.4; in addition, at 5.65.5 the alleged treason of the Argive generals at Mantinea is described. If they really were betraying the army, then they were probably involved in the pro-Spartan oligarchic fifth column (*infra*, ch. 5 on Argos). The fifteen which do not are: 2.74.1, 3.55.3, 3.63.3, 4.123.2, 4.125.1, 5.30.2, 5.30.3, 5.106, 6.4.1, 6.69.1, 6.80.3, 6.86.5, 7.69.2, 8.51.2, 8.54.3.

[4] At 8.51.2 and 8.54.3 the references are to acts of treason of Phrynichus.

[5] The agent noun προδότης is relatively rare, occurring only three times, 3.9.2, 3.40.7 and 4.114.3. Of these only 4.114.3 describes fifth columnists. The other two do not refer to acts of treason at all.

[6] For other references to fifth columns with προδιδόναι, cf. Hdt. 3.45.4, 6.101.3, 6.124; Ar., *Aves* 766, *Vespae* 288; Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.16, 18, 19; Aen.

Παραδιδόναι: the verb basically means to give up or hand over and then to surrender; *LSJ* adds citations "with a collateral notion of treachery." [1] Thucydides so uses it to describe the treason of fifth columnists; e.g., at Torone, the party which invited Brasidas in is described as ἕτοιμοι ὄντες τὴν πόλιν παραδοῦναι (4.110.1).[2]

'Ενδιδόναι: the verb means to give in and can mean give up to or surrender, *LSJ* notes "especially by treachery." [3] Thucydides uses it fairly often in the context of fifth-column activities; e.g., at 4.66.3 the leaders of the Megarian democrats are described as entering into negotiations with the Athenian generals Demosthenes and Hippocrates βουλόμενοι ἐνδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν.[4] That the verb is sometimes used synonymously with προδιδόναι in Thucydides' descriptions of fifth columns is demonstrated by 4.76.3 where Siphae and Chaeronea are to be betrayed to the Athenians: Σίφας μὲν ἔμελλόν τινες προδώσειν . . . Χαιρώνειαν δὲ . . . ἄλλοι ἐξ 'Ορχομενοῦ ἐνεδίδοσαν.

Προσποιεῖν and other verbs: as Calhoun observed "other words occasionally appear" [5] in the sense shown above for παραδιδόναι and ἐνδιδόναι. Προσποιεῖν, to make over to,[6] is used of the Plataean traitors who open the gates to the Thebans βουλόμενοι . . . τὴν πόλιν Θηβαίοις προσποιῆσαι (2.2.2).[7] The pro-Athenian Chian fifth columnists are described at 8.24.6: ἐνεχείρησάν τινες πρὸς 'Αθηναίους ἀγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν. The verb προσχωρεῖν, which can mean to go over to,[8] is used once in Thucydides with reference to a fifth column. The Athenians march on Spartolus because ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ προσχωρήσειν ἡ πόλις ὑπό τινων ἔνδοθεν πρασσόντων (2.79.2).

So far we have been concerned with instances in which the fifth-

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Tact. 11.3, 18.20, 22.7, 31.9; D.S. 12.66.1, 12.68.6, 12.72.9, 13.66.6, 13.67.3; Plu., *Alc.* 31.6.

[1] *LSJ*, s.v. παραδίδωμι I. 2.

[2] Cf. 3.27.3; 8.86.3 where the envoys of the Four Hundred to the democrats at Samos maintain that the revolution was carried out for the safety of the state not ἵνα τοῖς πολεμίοις παραδοθῇ. Also cf. Hdt. 9.41.3; D.S. 12.41.3, 12.57.1; Plu., *Alc.* 31.2.

[3] *LSJ*, s.v. ἐνδίδωμι I.

[4] Cf. 4.76.3, 4.89.1, 4.103.4, 4.104.5, 5.62.2, 7.48.2. For other authors using ἐνδιδόναι in fifth column contexts, cf. Aen. Tact. 22.19, D.S. 13.67.1; Plu., *Alc.* 22.2.

[5] Calhoun, *Clubs*, 141, n. 5.

[6] *LSJ*, s.v. προσποιέω.

[7] Cf. 3.70.1 where the ransomed prisoners from Corinth return to Corcyra Κορινθίοις Κέρκυραν προσποιῆσαι.

[8] *LSJ*, s.v. προσχωρέω II.

column activities are called προδοσία, treason, and the verbs used to describe the action of the traitors are either προδιδόναι or other verbs used synonymously or in a sense very close to προδιδόναι. We now turn to other words used by Thucydides to characterize the various aspects of fifth-column activities.

'Επιβουλή and related words: ἐπιβουλή and ἐπιβούλευμα mean a plot or scheme and the verb ἐπιβουλεύω to plot.[1] At 4.68.6 the plan to betray the upper city of Megara to the Athenians is termed an ἐπιβούλευμα and the fifth columnists are called τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύουσι. The fifth-column activities of the pro-Athenian Chians are referred to as τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν at 8.24.6.[2] Since these words are commonly used in Greek authors for all kinds of plots there is nothing remarkable in finding fifth column activities at times so described by Thucydides.[3] Aeneas Tacticus, whose surviving work dealing with the defense of a city emphasizes throughout the danger of betrayal, uses ἐπιβουλή very frequently to refer to activities of the enemy within.[4]

Πράσσω: this verb in its general meaning of transact, negotiate, manage is used according to *LSJ* "especially of secret practices and intrigues." [5] Johansen has shown that with the dative where it "does not actually imply downright treason, it does at least suggest a kind of disloyal action not in harmony with the rules of political decency." [6] Thucydides uses πράσσω with the dative in this sense with reference to fifth columns both in the active and passive voices;

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[1] *LSJ*, s.v. ἐπιβούλ —.

[2] Cf. 4.77.1, 4.89.1.

[3] ξυνωμοσία, the usual term for conspiracy, and ξυνωμότης, conspirator, are not used by Thucydides to refer to fifth column activities *per se*. ξυνωμοσία is associated with δῆμον καταλύειν, subversion (*supra*, p. 6, n. 3). Of course there are times when the δήμου κατάλυσις either involves collusion with the enemy or later advances to the stage of betraying the state to the enemy but in neither case is it then described as a ξυνωμοσία. Plu., *Alc.* 30.2 uses συνωμότης of the fifth columnists at Selymbria.

[4] Aen. Tact. 1.6, 2.7, 10.3, 10.15, 11.2, 11.9, 11.10, 17.2, 17.4, etc. L. W. Hunter, *Aeneas on Siegecraft* (Oxford 1927) xiii, notes that the passage at 11.2 led Schöne to suggest that Aeneas wrote a separate ἐπιβουλῶν βίβλος. Hunter simply calls it a book "the name of which has unfortunately been lost, dealing especially with the circumvention of treachery, a subject which occupies a large part of the πολιορκητικὴ βίβλος." See also W. A. Oldfather, *Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander* (Cambridge, Mass. 1917) 8; A. Dain and A.-M. Bon, *Énée le Tacticien Poliorcétique* (Paris 1967) xvi.

[5] *LSJ*, s.v. πράσσω III.6.

[6] H. F. Johansen, "A Political Term in Thucydides," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 24 (1963) 25.

e.g., at 4.110.2 the fifth columnists in Torone are called οἱ δὲ πράσσοντες αὐτῷ (sc. Βρασίδᾳ);[1] at 4.121.2 the existence of pro-Spartan fifth columns in Mende and Potidaea is described καί τι αὐτῷ (sc. Βρασίδᾳ) καὶ ἐπράσσετο ἐς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας προδοσίας πέρι.[2] As Johansen points out, "there is only a short step from this to the use of οἱ πράσσοντες without a dative in the meaning of collaborators." [3] Thus the fifth columnists in Torone are called οἱ δὲ πράσσοντες at 4.113.1.[4] In the passive voice similarly we find the verb used without the dative with reference to fifth column activities; e.g., at 6.74.1 the Athenians sailed to Messina ὡς προδοθησομένην, but because Alcibiades had informed the pro-Syracusan faction in Messina as to the impending betrayal ἃ μὲν ἐπράσσετο οὐκ ἐγένετο; at 4.68.6 Thucydides refers to the plot to betray the upper city of Megara to the Athenians simply as τὰ πρασσόμενα. Of course πράσσω used without the dative does not invariably imply treasonable action.[5]

The enemy within: the essence of a fifth column is the idea of treason from within. Thucydides often describes the fifth columnists simply as "those" or "some in the city;" e.g., at 3.30.3 Teutiaplos proposes that the Spartans retake Mytilene μετὰ τῶν ἔνδον; at 4.76.2 the proposal to the Athenian generals Demosthenes and Hippocrates for the betrayal of Siphae and Chaeronea comes ἀπό τινων ἀνδρῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν; at 5.62.2 the fifth columnists at Tegea are called τινες . . . ἐν τῇ πόλει.[6] It is important to note that in so describing fifth columnists Thucydides distinguishes their actions from the acts of the state or the legitimate government of the state. An act of the government of a state is usually indicated by the ethnic adjective in the plural as a substantive, less frequently by a phrase such as "those having the rule" (6.95.2), or "those in office" (3.36.5).

Miscellaneous terms: Thucydides uses various other expressions

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[1] Cf. 4.106.2, 5.76.3.
[2] Cf. 4.76.2, 5.83.1.
[3] Johansen, "Political Term," *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 11, n. 6) 22.
[4] Cf. 2.79.2, 4.89.2. In 4.103.3 and 8.60.1 the compound verb ξυμπράσσω is used absolutely in this sense.
[5] See Johansen, "Political Term," 22, n. 4.
[6] Cf. ὑπό τινων ἔνδοθεν πρασσόντων (2.79.2), οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει Μεγαρῆς (4.74.2), the remark that Brasidas took cities by the treason of the inhabitants, προδοσίᾳ εἷλε τῶν χωρίων (4.81.2), and the fifth columnists in Cythera (*infra*, ch. 5) described as τινας τῶν Κυθηρίων (4.54.3).

in his descriptions of fifth-column activities. The verb ἐπάγειν particularly in the middle can mean "bring in to one's country, bring in or introduce as allies" [1] and Calhoun noted that it means "to invite foreign intervention." [2] Thucydides uses it in this sense of the fifth column at Torone: καὶ αὐτὸν (sc. Βρασίδαν) ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι ἐπήγοντο ἕτοιμοι ὄντες τὴν πόλιν παραδοῦναι (4.110.1).[3] The verb ἐπικαλεῖν in the middle in a similar sense [4] is used of the pro-Spartan Parrhasian faction at 5.33.1.[5] Other expressions describe the negotiations or arrangements between the fifth columnists and the enemy: at 4.54.3 we are told that the capitulation of Cythera was accomplished more speedily and advantageously because during the siege some men of Cythera had been in communication with Nicias, ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ γενόμενοι τῷ Νικίᾳ λόγοι πρότερον πρός τινας τῶν Κυθηρίων.[6] The leaders of the Megarian democrats ποιοῦνται λόγους . . . πρὸς τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγούς (4.66.3) to betray their city. The fifth columnists at Torone are described as οἱ δὲ τῶν Τορωναίων ἔνδοθεν παρασκευάζοντες μετὰ τῶν ἐσεληλυθότων (4.111.2).[7] Finally, at 4.130.5-6 the Peloponnesians mistakenly assumed that a pro-Athenian fifth column had acted in Mende: ᾠήθησαν γὰρ ἀπὸ προειρημένου τινὸς αὐτοῖς (sc. Ἀθηναίοις) τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν γενέσθαι. A little further on Thucydides varies the word for prearrangement saying that the city was not opened ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως.

The study of the terminology of the descriptions of fifth-column activities in Thucydides reveals that while προδοσία and the verb προδιδόναι are the words most used to describe this particular kind of treason the vocabulary is nonetheless extremely varied. This holds true not only in a survey of the entire text but also if we look at the description of one fifth column alone. The plan to betray Siphae and Chaeronea simultaneously affords a good example (4.76 ff.).[8] The

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[1] *LSJ*, s.v. ἐπάγω II.2. [2] Calhoun, *Clubs*, 141, n. 5.

[3] Cf. 2.2.2, 3.82.1.

[4] *LSJ*, s.v. ἐπικαλέω II.

[5] Cf. παρακαλεῖν at 3.82.1 used of the general tendency of factions to call in either the Spartans or the Athenians.

[6] Whether or not these Cythereans were actually planning to betray the city to Nicias is not stated by Thucydides; *infra*, ch. 5.

[7] Cf. the beginning of the actual operation of the Megarian betrayal: ἐπειδὴ ἀπό τε τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν λόγων παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφοτέροις (4.67.1); cf. also 4.77.1 and Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.20.

[8] Cf. also Megara, 4.66.3 ff., Amphipolis, 4.103 ff., Torone, 4.110 ff., Chios, 8.24.6 and 8.31.1.

first we hear about these fifth-column activities is at 4.76.2 where Thucydides says τῷ γὰρ Ἱπποκράτει καὶ ἐκείνῳ (sc. Δημοσθένῃ) τὰ Βοιώτια πράγματα ἀπό τινων ἀνδρῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐπράσσετο. A little further on at 4.76.3 we are told that Σίφας μὲν ἔμελλόν τινες προδώσειν . . . Χαιρώνειαν δὲ . . . ἄλλοι ἐξ Ὀρχομενοῦ ἐνεδίδοσαν. At 4.77.1 Thucydides refers to the operation as ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιβουλή τοιαύτη παρεσκευάζετο and then reports that Demosthenes made preparations to sail ἐπὶ τὰς Σίφας ὡς προδοθησομένας. Next, at 4.89.1, the betrayal is called τὰ ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς ἐνεδίδοτο but, unfortunately for the Athenians, the plot is made known, μηνυθέντος τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύματος, and the fifth columnists fail to move, οἱ πράσσοντες . . . οὐδὲν ἐκίνησαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν (4.89.2). Finally, at 4.101.3, Thucydides, referring to the failure of the operation says τὰ περὶ τὰς Σίφας τῆς προδοσίας πέρι οὐ προυχώρησεν.

This variety of expression reflects a well known aspect of Thucydides' style. J. Ros has demonstrated the importance of μεταβολή (*variatio*) as an element that tends to ease the overall symmetrical, antithetical style of Thucydides' prose.[1] A good example of the principle of *variatio* with respect to the vocabulary of fifth columns is the sentence at 4.76.3 opening Σίφας μὲν ἔμελλόν τινες προδώσειν paralleled by Χαιρώνειαν δὲ . . . ἄλλοι ἐξ Ὀρχομενοῦ ἐνεδίδοσαν. Variety of expression is achieved by the use of the synonym ἐνδιδόναι for προδιδόναι and here by a variation in construction as well; i.e., the imperfect indicative answering to the imperfect indicative complemented by the future infinitive.[2] With respect to the passages dealing with fifth columns the variety of synonymous expressions is a most striking element. In addition to being in accord with the general tendency of Thucydides' style to exhibit *variatio*, the varied terminology of the descriptions of fifth-column activities reflects the frequency of occurrence of these activities in the war and, perhaps, the author's concern with them. The broad vocabulary avoids excessive repetition in the accounts of a phenomenon which the historian found that he had to describe again and again in the course of the war.

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[1] J. Ros, *Die* μεταβολή (*Variatio*) *als Stilprinzip des Thukydides* (Paderborn 1938).

[2] For the use of synonyms to achieve variety see Ros, *Variatio des Thuk.*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 1) 75 and 96ff.; for varying constructions in parallel clauses see 387ff.

CHAPTER TWO

THE OVERT BETRAYALS

The most frequent and characteristic action of fifth columns was the overt betrayal of a city to the enemy.[1] Under the heading "overt betrayal" we include instances when the betrayal was actually carried out and those in which it was only planned. In this chapter we will concern ourselves with the basic evidence for overt betrayals in the Peloponnesian War. As was noted above,[2] fifth-column activities are well documented in our sources and often alluded to in scholarly publications. No collection, however, of the ancient sources for these activities has yet appeared. These sources tell us the number of instances, the dates and places of occurrence, which side, Peloponnesian or Athenian, the fifth columns were in league with, who the fifth columnists were and whether they succeeded or failed.

With regard to the dates, we employ the usual Thucydidean method of dating by season which allows us to fix the year of occurrence by the Julian calendar except in the case of winters. There is no doubt, for example, that the Theban entry into Plataea occurred in the spring of 431 B.C. But difficulties in the text of Thucydides involving the mss. reading ἔτι δύο μῆνας (2.2.1), emended by Krüger to ἔτι τέσσαρας μῆνας, and what Thucydides meant by "the beginning of spring" (2.2.1), "the end of the month" (2.4.2) and "when the corn was ripe" (2.19.1), have led to a great deal of discussion as to exactly when in the spring of 431 B.C. the attack occurred. Beloch [3] and Gomme [4] preferred early March while Busolt [5] dated the "überfall Plataias" to early April. More recently

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[1] *Supra*, ch. 1.

[2] *Supra*, ch. 1.

[3] K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* 2², 2 (Berlin 1931) 232.

[4] A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 2 (London 1956) 2. See also J. A. R. Munro, "The End of the Peloponnesian War," *CQ* 31 (1937) 32. B. D. Meritt, *The Athenian Calendar in the Fifth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928) 88, 110-11, defended Krüger's emendation, δ̃ instead of δύο, on the grounds that Pythodorus' year was not intercalary and therefore March to July gives four months.

[5] G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* 3² (Gotha 1904) 907, n. 2.

Hammond [1] has argued for late March and Thompson [2] for early April. The question admits of no certain solution and therefore we date the attack simply to spring, 431 B.C. For the purpose of this study the problem of exact dating of any particular instance is not of great importance. We proceed, then, to offer a summary of the basic evidence for the overt betrayals in the Peloponnesian War arranged in chronological order employing the seasonal dating system.

1. 431 B.C., spring, Plataea. A group of oligarchic Plataeans, led by one Naucleides, agreed to betray their city to the Thebans in order to gain power for themselves. The actual betrayal and entry of the Theban troops succeeded, but the Thebans failed to follow up their advantage and the loyal Plataeans rallied and overcame them by the next day (2.2-4; 3.65.2; Hdt. 7.233.2; Aen. Tact. 2.3-6; D. 59.98-106; D.S. 12.41.3-6).

2. 429 B.C., summer, Spartolus. The Athenians marched on Spartolus expecting that the town would be betrayed to them by a party from within. The fifth columnists are not identified by name or as a particular political faction. All Thucydides tells us is that the city was supposed to be delivered over to the Athenians ὑπό τινων ἔνδοθεν πρασσόντων, and "those who did not wish these things" sent word to Olynthus for troops to garrison the town. The betrayal never materialized (2.79.2).[3]

3. 428 B.C., summer, Methymna. During the revolt of Mytilene the Mytileneans marched on Methymna which was supposed to be betrayed to them. The Mytileneans assaulted the town but the betrayal did not occur and they withdrew. The traitors are not identified by Thucydides (3.18.1).

4. 427 B.C., summer, Mytilene. After the revolt of Mytilene had been put down by the Athenians, Teutiaplos the Elean proposed to Alcidas the Spartan nauarch that the Peloponnesian forces ought to try a sudden night attack on Mytilene. Teutiaplos' idea was that with the help of those within still friendly to their cause they

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[1] N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (Oxford 1959) Appendix 5, 660.
[2] W. E. Thompson, "The Chronology of 432/1," *Hermes* 96 (1968) 216-232.
[3] Diodorus mentions the Athenian defeat here but is silent on the betrayal (12.47.3).

would recapture the city. The fifth columnists whose support was the principal ingredient in Teutiaplos' scheme were undoubtedly pro-Spartan Mytileneans who had participated in the revolt. The proposal was turned down by Alcidas (3.30).

5. 425 B.C., summer, Eion. Simonides the Athenian general captured Eion by betrayal. The traitors are not identified by Thucydides. The capture was short lived as Chalcidian and Bottiaean forces soon drove Simonides out (4.7).[1]

6. 425 B.C., summer, Camarina. The Athenians sailed to Camarina to forestall its betrayal to the Syracusans. The pro-Syracusan fifth columnists are identified as Archias and his party. The betrayal never occurred (4.25.7).[2]

7 425 B.C., late summer, Anactorium. The Athenians and their Acarnanian allies captured Anactorium, a Corinthian town on the Ambracian Gulf, by treachery. The traitors are not identified by Thucydides, but they were probably members of a pro-Corcyrean faction in Anactorium. Anactorium was originally a joint foundation of both Corinth and Corcyra and the hostility of the parent cities led to a factional division in the colony. After the battle of Sybota, in September 433 B.C., the Corinthians had captured Anactorium with aid from within and now, in the late summer of 425 B.C., the Athenians and their allies successfully played the same game (4.49).[3]

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[1] This is an episode about which we know very little. Simonides is only mentioned here and the location of the town is unknown. It is not Eion on the Strymon; see Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 15, n. 4) 441-42.

[2] Archias, the leader of the pro-Syracusan party in Camarina, is unknown except for this passage.

[3] For the earlier capture of Anactorium by the Corinthians see 1.55.1 where Thucydides says they took it ἀπάτῃ and adds parenthetically ἦν δὲ κοινὸν Κερκυραίων καὶ ἐκείνων. Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 195-96, noted that "Strabo, x.2.8, says it was founded by Corinth only when the whole of the gulf and Amprakia itself were settled; but this was done by Kypselos, that is, at a time when Corinth had established her ascendancy over Kerkyra, and Kerkyraians may well have joined in the settlement under his auspicies." Gomme continues pointing out that Anactorium had helped the Corinthians at Sybota with one ship (Th. 1.46.1), "showing the division of parties within the town which now led to the ἀπάτῃ and full Corinthian control."

For the date of the battle of Sybota see Beloch, *G.G.* 2^2, 2, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 15, n. 3) 217-18; Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 15, n. 5) 769, n. 2; 783; Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 196-99; Tod, *G.H.I.* 1, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 7, n. 1) 55; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 7, n. 1) 61.

8. 424 B.C., early summer, Antandrus. Mytilenean and other Lesbian exiles, now operating on the mainland, marched on Antandrus and took it προδοσίας γενομένης. Thucydides gives us no further information concerning the betrayal (4.52.1).[1]

9. 424 B.C., summer, Megara. The leaders of the Megarian democratic party under pressure from their oligarchic opponents, particularly because a proposal was under consideration to restore oligarchic exiles, arranged to betray their city to the Athenian generals Demosthenes and Hippocrates. The betrayal of the Long Walls was accomplished but the plot to betray the upper city was forestalled. Subsequently Brasidas' arrival resulted in the total defeat of the Megarian democrats and the Athenians withdrew leaving a garrison at Nisaea (4.66-74; D.S. 12.66-67.1).

10. 424 B.C., summer—fall, Siphae and Chaeronea. During this summer certain men in the Boeotian cities planned to betray Siphae and Chaeronea to Demosthenes and Hippocrates in conjunction with an Athenian attack on Delium, thereby generating revolutions in other Boeotian cities. The fifth columnists were led by Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile, and included parties in Siphae and Chaeronea, exiles of Chaeronea, and some Phocians. The aim was to set up democracies in the cities. The operation misfired that autumn as the plot became known and the betrayals were never attempted (4.76-77, 89, 101.3).[2]

11. 424/23 B.C., winter, Amphipolis. A party existed within Amphipolis which planned to betray the city to Brasidas. The fifth columnists were natives of nearby Argilus residing in Amphipolis and others, presumably Amphipolitans. Perdiccas and the Chalcidians supported the fifth column. The revolt of Argilus and the seizure of Amphipolitan territory outside the city walls were achieved by Brasidas with the aid of the fifth columnists but the betrayal of the city walls was checked by the majority party who then sent to the Athenians for help. Brasidas then accomplished by diplomacy what he had partially succeeded in through treachery. Amphipolis went over to him (4.103.2-106).[3]

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[1] Diodorus, 12.72.2-3, wrongly dates the capture to 423/2 and mentions no betrayal. The Athenians recaptured Antandrus later in the same summer (Th. 4.75.1).

[2] Diodorus knows of the plot but does not name the cities involved (12.69.1-2).

[3] Polyaenus, 1.38.2-3, confused Thucydides' accounts of the capture of

12. 424/23 B.C., winter, Torone. Brasidas captured Torone which was betrayed to him by a small group from within. The fifth columnists are described by Thucydides only as ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι (4.110-112; D.S. 12.68.6).

13. 423 B.C., summer, Mende. Mende revolted to Brasidas during the early summer of this year as news of the year truce was being disseminated. Thucydides tells us that, before the revolt, a fifth column in Mende was working for the betrayal to Brasidas. Next we learn that Mende revolted and, although Thucydides does not describe the mechanics of the revolt, he says that the fifth columnists, who were few in number, refusing to abandon their intended designs and fearing that their plot was already known, forced the multitude to go over to Brasidas (4.121.2, 123.2).[1]

14. 423 B.C., summer, Potidaea. Brasidas also had designs on Potidaea during this summer and Thucydides says that a fifth column existed there which was in touch with Brasidas concerning the betrayal of the city. The betrayal was never attempted (4.121.2).[2]

15. 422 B.C., summer, Panactum. The Boeotians captured this fortress town on the Attic-Boeotian frontier by treachery. No further details are given by Thucydides (5.3.5.).

16. 421 B.C., summer, Parrhasia. A pro-Spartan faction in Parrhasia, which was an ally of Mantinea, called in the Spartans under Pleistoanax to "liberate" the town from Mantinean control. Thucydides says that these pro-Spartans acted κατὰ στάσιν, but we know nothing more about this civil unrest in Parrhasia (5.33.1-3).

17. 418 B.C., summer, Tegea. Just before the battle of Mantinea some Tegeans were preparing to betray their city, an ally of Sparta, to the allied forces of Argos, Athens and Mantinea. The allies therefore prepared to march on Tegea but the pro-Spartan Tegeans found

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the territory outside the walls and the subsequent diplomatic success of Brasidas. In Polyaenus Amphipolis itself is captured first by treachery, then again by negotiation.

[1] The Athenians recaptured Mende later this same summer when the Peloponnesian garrison mistakenly thought that the gates were being opened in a plot with the Athenians (4.130.5-6).

[2] For Brasidas' attempt to surprise Potidaea one night early in 422 (4.135), *infra*, ch. 6.

out and managed to get news of the impending betrayal to Sparta. Aid was sent from Sparta and the betrayal was not attempted (5.62.2, 64.1).

18. 416/15 B.C., winter, Melos. The surrender of Melos to the Athenians was accomplished γενομένης καὶ προδοσίας τινὸς ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν (sc. Μηλίων). Thucydides gives us no further information concerning the betrayal in Melos (5.116.3).

19. 415/14 B.C., winter, Messina. The Athenian force based at Catana sailed to Messina which was to be betrayed to them. However, Alcibiades, when he had been dismissed from his command and summoned home, had informed the pro-Syracusan party of the plot. These then put to death the leaders of the fifth column and, at the time of the Athenian expedition against Messina, took arms against the remaining pro-Athenians and prevented the betrayal. The Athenian force waited thirteen days at Messina and then, the betrayal not materializing, sailed on to Naxos (6.74.1-2; Plu., *Alc.* 22.1).

20. 414 B.C., summer—413 B.C., fall, Syracuse. Throughout the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians a fifth column existed within the city which was in contact with Nicias concerning, at times, the capitulation or the actual betrayal of the city. We have no definite information as to who these fifth columnists were, but it is possible that some men of Leontini residing in Syracuse were involved. No overt betrayal was attempted (6.103.4, 7.48.2, 49.1, 73.3, 86.4; Plu., *Nic.* 18.4, 6,21.3-4, 22.4, 26.2).[1]

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[1] A. Holm, *Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum* 2 (Leipzig 1874) 62, and G. Grote, *A History of Greece* 6 (London 1904) 145, n. 1, accept the theory that Leontines were in the fifth column. E. A. Freeman, *History of Sicily* 3 (Oxford 1892) 699-701, leaves the question open, but is doubtful. Dover, *Thuc. VII, op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 7, n. 1) 40, says "the identity, strength, and motives of this fifth column are unknown to us." Dover then notes the possibility that Leontines were involved. The case for Leontine involvement primarily rests on Diodorus' statement (13.18.5) that the Athenians believed that the messengers Hermocrates sent to them after the defeat were men of Leontini who brought them the news (sc. that the Syracusans had already blocked the passes) out of goodwill. Thucydides (7.73.3) and Plutarch (*Nic.* 26.2) also report Hermocrates' stratagem to foil the Athenian retreat, and in both the messengers are associated with the fifth column; however, there is no evidence in either Thucydides or Plutarch that the messengers were Leontines. While Diodorus may represent "a genuine bit of Philistus" (Freeman, 700), his passage does not connect the Leontines with the fifth

21. 412 B.C., summer—412/11 B.C., winter, Chios. After the revolt of Chios a pro-Athenian party existed in Chios which aimed at betraying the city to the Athenians. The pro-Spartan Chian oligarchs found out and with the aid of Astyochus the conspiracy was quietly suppressed. Later on in the winter of 412/11 B.C. Pedaritus executed Tydeus, son of Ion, and his adherents on a charge of Atticism. The betrayal was never attempted (8.24.6, 31.1, 38.3).

22. 412/11 B.C., winter, Oropus. Late in this winter of the twentieth year of the war the Boeotians captured Oropus by treachery. The traitors included some men of Eretria as well as Oropians who were also active in plotting the revolt of Euboea (8.60.1).

23. 411 B.C., summer, Athens. Thucydides says that the purpose of the fortification of Eetioneia by the extreme oligarchs of the Four Hundred was to admit the enemy when they wished. Through the efforts of Theramenes and the moderates the fortification was dismantled and the betrayal never occurred (8.90.3-4, 91.3, 92.1-2, 94.1-2).

As Beloch said, "hier endet die Darstellung des Thukydides und es beginnen die ernsten chronologischen Schwierigkeiten." [1] For these final years of the war we cannot be as confident in the dating of events. It now becomes a question of the years themselves in which

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column in the city. In fact Diodorus nowhere mentions the fifth column in Syracuse. Although the Athenians hoped that the Leontines in Syracuse would support them (6.50.4), there is no certain evidence that the fifth column included any Leontines.

Recently, W. Liebeschuetz, "Thucydides and the Sicilian Expedition," *Historia* 17 (1968) 296, n. 65; 298, has suggested that the fifth columnists may have been Diocles' radical democrats in Syracuse. Thucydides says that the fifth columnists insisted on Nicias' execution because they were afraid that if he were examined under torture, he might expose them (7.86.4). Diodorus says that Diocles, the most notable democratic leader, pressed for the execution of the Athenian generals (13.19.14, 33.1). Diocles led a political revolution in the following year, 412, and set up a democracy with magistrates chosen by lot (D.S. 13.34.1; Arist., *Pol.* 5.3.6, 1304a). Liebeschuetz' suggestion receives some support from Thucydides' statement (7.55.2) that the Athenians failed to achieve a success in Sicily by introducing a change in constitution, their accustomed method of bringing over cities, because they were up against cities of similar character, democracies (cf., *infra*, ch. 7, on the Athenian strategy in Sicily). However, Liebeschuetz' suggestion remains only a possibility.

[1] Beloch, *G.G.* 2^2, 2, 241.

the instances occurred and, therefore, our summaries of the basic evidence must include more detailed consideration of the dates.[1]

24. 411/410 B.C., winter, Corcyra. During this winter the Corcyrean democrats found out that the oligarchs were preparing to hand the city over to the Spartans. The democrats sent to Athens for aid and the oligarchic faction was suppressed. Further internal strife then broke out but an eventual settlement was reached. The betrayal to the Spartans was not attempted (D.S. 13.48.5).[2]

25. 409 B.C. spring, or 408 B.C., spring, Selymbria. Alcibiades and the Athenians captured Selymbria with the aid of a fifth column. Our sources do not give us any information concerning the fifth columnists (Plu., *Alc.* 30.2-5; D.S. 13.64.4).[3]

26. 409/408 B.C., winter, or 408 B.C., late fall, Byzantium. Alcibiades and the Athenians captured Byzantium with the aid of a fifth column. Diodorus tells us that the motivation for the betrayal was Byzantine disgust with the severity of Clearchus, the Spartan harmost. From Plutarch and Xenophon we learn the names of the five chief conspirators and that they were working primarily in the interest of Byzantium and not in the interest of a

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[1] The problems of the dates will be dealt with in the notes to the particular instances.

[2] Date of Corcyra: for the date see Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1532 and 1533, n. 1. The date ultimately turns on the date of Cyzicus, March or April 410 B.C. (Busolt, 3^2, 1527, A. Andrewes, "The Generals in the Hellespont 410-407 B.C.," *JHS* 73 (1953) 2). As Busolt pointed out the *stasis* in Corcyra is reported by Diodorus to have taken place in the archonship of Glaucippus 410/09. However, this must be wrong for Diodorus also says that it happened περὶ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον as Theramenes' expedition which began around October of 411 B.C. Theramenes went on to join Alcibiades before Cyzicus. Thus the affairs in Corcyra must have occurred between the beginning of Theramenes' expedition to Euboea and other islands including Paros and his arrival at Cyzicus. Furthermore, Busolt notes that this fits with what is known about the generalship of Conon who commanded the Athenian relief force dispatched at the request of the Corcyrean democrats. Conon was elected general after the fall of the Four Hundred, but not again in 410/09. See Busolt, 1493, n. 1 and Beloch, *G.G.* 2^2, 2, 267. The fifth column activity in Corcyra is therefore best dated to the winter of 411/10. Beloch, p. 392, places it in the spring of 410 B.C., which is possible as long as it precedes Cyzicus. Beloch prefers a slightly later date, May or June 410 B.C., for Cyzicus, pp. 241-2, 245.

[3] Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.10, records the capture but does not mention any betrayal. The date of Selymbria will be considered with the date of Byzantium, *infra*, p. 23, n. 1.

political party (Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.16-22; D.S. 13.66.6-7; Plu., *Alc.* 31.2-6; Polyaen. 1.40.2, 47.2).[1]

27. 406 B.C., summer, Methymna. Diodorus tells us that Callicratidas captured Methymna with aid from within: μετ' ὀλίγον δέ τινων ἐνδόντων αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν παρεισέπεσεν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν. The fifth columnists who betrayed the city were undoubtedly the political opponents of the pro-Athenians who had control of the government and ruled with the aid of an Athenian garrison (D.S. 13.76.5).[2]

The betrayal in Methymna is the last one for which we have any evidence in the course of the war. Our sources give us no further examples through the final twenty or so months of the war down to the acceptance of the Spartan peace terms by the Athenian assembly

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[1] On Polyaenus Busolt noted "Polyain. I, 47, 2; ganz verwässert und unkenntlich gemacht I, 40, 2 = Frontin III, 11, e" (*G.G.* 3², 1559, n. 3). The chronological problems of the years 410 B.C., after Cyzicus, to 407 B.C. have been the subject of much scholarly discussion and disagreement. There is no doubt that the capture of Selymbria immediately preceded the beginning of the Athenian siege of Byzantium, but to what year does the assault on Byzantium belong? Grote, *H.G.* 6, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 20, n. 1) 356-58, placed the siege in 408 with the betrayal and capture coming late in the year. G. Glotz, *Histoire Grecque* 2 (Paris 1929) 741, Beloch, *G.G.* 2², 2, 250, 392, W. S. Ferguson, *The Cambridge Ancient History* 5 (Cambridge 1927) 347, and Andrewes, "Generals", *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 22, n. 2) 2, all date Byzantium in 408. On the other side Busolt, *G.G.* 3², xxxiii, 1551, 1556, dated the beginning of the siege to the summer of 409 and the Athenian capture to the following winter, 409/8. Ed. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* 4², 2 (Basel 1956) 326-27, G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Greci* 2 (Firenze 1939) 386, H. Bengston, *Griechische Geschichte* (Munich 1960) 242, and Tod, *G.H.I.* 2, p. 56, have all favored 409 for Byzantium. Thus we have two possible years for the siege and capture and the argument finds weighty authorities a year apart. The crux of the problem, which is succinctly treated by Beloch, p. 243 ff. and Ferguson, Note 10 to *CAH* 5, 483 ff., is whether or not a whole year has been left dateless by the ancient interpolator of archons, ephors and Olympiads in the text of Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1 and 2. For these questions of chronology in Xenophon see Busolt, 693-98 and especially 698, n. 4. For a refutation of Ferguson's "no real escape" argument, *CAH* 5, 484, that "the March of Notium was the March of 406" (which would put Byzantium in 408), see I. A. F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge 1967) 39; cf., J. Hatzfeld, "Alcibiades et les élections des stratèges athéniens en 406", *REA* 33 (1931) 111. We consider that both solutions are possible but, until some certain evidence comes to light, we incline to the chronology of Busolt for the period 410-407 primarily because it does not entail the gaps of 410-409.

[2] For the date see Busolt, *G.G.* 3², xxxiv, 1586-7. We know that Callicratidas succeeded Lysander as nauarch in this year (Xen., *Hell.* 1.6.1, D.S. 13.76.2, Plu., *Lys.* 5; see also Beloch, *G.G.* 2², 2, 288) and the capture of

and Lysander's entry into the Piraeus in the spring of 404 B.C. (Xen., *Hell.* 2.2.22; Plu., *Lys.* 15.1).[1] We turn, therefore, to the principal conclusions which may be inferred from the basic evidence for the overt betrayals. Figure I provides a summary in chart form of the basic evidence for the instances, dates, places, parties and results.

From the twenty-seven years of the war we have evidence of twenty-seven overt betrayals. These continued with regularity throughout the war. There are only three periods of two to three years in length for which we have no evidence of such betrayals. The first two of these periods, summer 421 to summer 418, three years, and summer 418 to winter 416/15, two and one-half years, coincide with the years of the Peace of Nicias during which hostilities in general occurred only sporadically.[2] The third period, winter 409/8 to summer 406, two and one-half years, is one for which our sources are somewhat scanty,[3] but it remains the longest period of relatively active warfare for which we have no instances of overt betrayals. Aside from these gaps we have no other cases of a two and a half year interruption in the instances of overt betrayals. If we consider the chronological distribution in terms of the usual historical divisions of the war we get the following breakdown:

Methymna, before Arginusae, surely belongs to this summer. Xenophon also records Callicratidas' capture of Methymna, but he says nothing about the fifth column. In Xenophon Callicratidas αἱρεῖ τὴν πόλιν κατὰ κράτος (*Hell.* 1.6.13). For the most part historians have accepted Xenophon's account without any discussion of the betrayal in Diodorus; e.g., Grote, *H.G.* 6, 387, Busolt, *G.G.* 3², 1587, Beloch, *G.G.* 2², 1, 418, Ferguson, *CAH* 5, 355, B. W. Henderson, *The Great War Between Athens and Sparta* (London 1927) 454, Lenschau, "Kallikratidas," *RE* 10² (1919) 1641. On the other hand Zschietzschmann, "Methymna," *RE* 15² (1932) 1394, records the alternatives "by storm" or "treason," and does not indicate any preference. There seems to be no reason to reject Diodorus' account preemptorily, especially since the political picture in Methymna as given by Xenophon implies opposition to the pro-Athenian regime. Furthermore, we know that in the summer of 411 exiles of Methymna joined in a Spartan attempt to capture the town (8.100.3); cf., the planned betrayal of Methymna to the Mytileneans in summer, 428 (No. 3).

[1] However, it must be remembered that our sources for this period are skimpy.

[2] For the possibility that a pro-Spartan fifth column in Argos planned an overt betrayal after the restoration of the democracy in 417, *infra*, ch. 5, on Argos.

[3] This is on the chronology of Busolt *et al.* placing the betrayal and capture of Byzantium in the winter of 409/8 (*supra*, p. 23, n. 1).

Ten Years War—Fifteen Instances
Peace of Nicias to Syracusan Expedition—Three Instances
Syracuse and Sicilian War—Two Instances
Allied Revolts and Ionian War—Seven Instances.

To break these figures down further, it is apparent that the period of most intensified activity with respect to overt betrayals was the Ten Years War and within this period the four year span 425-422 provides us with eleven of the total of fifteen instances. There are two points to bear in mind here: first, this is the period in which

Figure I

No.	*Date*	*Place*	*Pel.*	*Ath.*	*Suc.*	*Fail.*	
						I.S.	*N.A.*
1	431	Plataea	x			x	
2	429	Spartolus		x			x
3	428	Methymna	x				x
4	427	Mytilene	x				x
5	425	Eion		x	x		
6	425	Camarina	x				x
7	425	Anactorium		x	x		
8	424	Antandrus	x		x		
9	424	Megara		x		x	
10	424/3	Siphae-Chaer.		x			x
11	424/3	Amphipolis	x		x		
12	424/3	Torone	x		x		
13	423	Mende	x		x		
14	423	Potidaea	x				x
15	422	Panactum	x		x		
17	418	Tegea		x			x
18	416/15	Melos		x	x		
19	415/14	Messina		x			x
20	414-13	Syracuse		x			x
21	412-11	Chios		x			x
22	412/11	Oropus	x		x		
23	411	Athens	x				x
24	411/10	Corcyra	x				x
25	409	Selymbria		x	x		
26	409/8	Byzantium		x	x		
27	406	Methymna	x		x		
		Totals	15	12	13	2	12

Legend: Pel. = Pro-Peloponnesian Fifth Column
Ath. = Pro-Athenian Fifth Column
Suc. = The Betrayal Succeeded
Fail. = The Betrayal Failed
I.S. = The Betrayal Failed After Initially Succeeding
N.A. = The Betrayal Not Attempted

both sides greatly intensified hostilities. These are the years of the Athenian attempt on Megara, the Boeotian-Athenian conflicts in Central Greece and Brasidas' operations in the north. Second, during this period of intensified campaigning the geographical distribution of our instances is significant. Quite naturally a number of cities were the objectives of the respective armies on the offensive. Too, these are primarily land campaigns, and, as the as the writer of the Pseudo-Xenophontic *Athenaion Politeia* pointed out, danger from betrayal is greater for a land city than an island one (Ps. Xen., *Ath. Pol.* 15.2). For the next period, the Peace of Nicias, the theater of hostilities was primarily centered in the Peloponnese around the Argolid. Active campaigning was less intense and involved many less cities than the Ten Years War or the four peak years 425-22 and thus the instances of overt betrayals markedly declined to three. It is not surprising that two of the three periods of two or more years from which we have no instances of overt betrayals occur during this nominal "peace". For the Sicilian War we again have a smaller theater of war and a shorter period of duration. The action centered on Syracuse and, although we have evidence of a planned betrayal at Messina, the focal point of the war was one city, Syracuse, in which a fifth column was active. Messina provides a good example of an overt betrayal in naval warfare. It illustrates exactly what the "Old Oligarch" meant when he said that Athens would be freed from the danger of betrayal if it were an island state, for it controlled the sea. Island cities can be betrayed, but the attacking force must control the sea, as the Athenians did when they sailed against Messina, or at least be able to contest the control of the sea, as the Peloponnesians were able to do in the Ionian War. The Messenians' best defense was to forestall the betrayal, which was precisely what they did. In the Ionian War we return to a wider geographical area and campaigns involving a greater number of cities over a longer span of years. Consequently, the number of overt betrayals increases again to seven, but it does not reach the intensity of the peak years of the Ten Years War. Again, we are dealing here principally with naval warfare and the strategic considerations of naval warfare are not as conducive to overt betrayals as those of land warfare.[1]

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[1] See further on Spartan strategy in the Ten Years War, *infra*, ch. 7.

With respect to the basic evidence for the number of instances, the dates and places of the overt betrayals we conclude as follows:

Fifth-column activities which involved the overt betrayal of a city, whether actually carried out or only planned, occurred with regularity and in all periods and geographical areas throughout the course of the Peloponnesian War.

The frequency of instances varied proportionally with respect to increases or decreases in military action and with respect to the number of cities involved in the campaigns.

In general the frequency of instances was higher in land warfare than in naval warfare.

We now turn to the question of who was involved in the overt betrayals. For the identity of the fifth columnists the evidence is varied. In some cases we are told the names of the conspirators, e.g., Byzantium (No. 26), their political affiliations and motives, e.g., Megara (No. 9), and we find that in some cases exiles were active in the plots, e.g., Siphae-Chaeronea (No. 10). While politics played a significant role in a good many cases, what is most interesting here is that we have some instances, e.g., Byzantium (No. 26), in which we have little or no evidence that political affairs played a part in the motivation of the fifth columnists.[1] Finally in some instances we have no evidence whatsoever as to who the fifth columnists were; e.g., Eion (No. 5).

Of the twenty seven overt betrayals fifteen were pro-Peloponnesian and twelve were pro-Athenian. For the four main periods of the war the breakdown shows:

	Pro-Pel.	*Pro-Ath.*
Ten Years War	10	5
Peace of Nicias to Syracusan Expedition	1	2
Syracuse and Sicilian War	0	2
Ionian War	4	3

Both sides, then, were active throughout the war in plotting for overt betrayals with the Peloponnesians showing a 15:12 advantage. However, the higher total of pro-Peloponnesian instances stems from their activities in the Ten Years War, particularly the later

[1] A full discussion of who the fifth columnists were is intimately connected with the role of the political factor in the fifth columns. Accordingly this subject will be considered below in ch. 4.

years of Brasidas' campaigns. Down through the summer of 424 each side shows a total of five, but at this point Athenian activities cease until 418 at Tegea (No. 17). This may reflect Athenian wariness of the efficacy of betrayal operations after the failures at Megara (No. 9) and Siphae and Chaeronea (No. 10). In the meantime Brasidas began his offensive at Amphipolis (No. 11) in the winter of 424/3 and was subsequently quite successful in securing betrayals in the north. This was largely due to the fact that he was leading an offensive campaign. Similarly, the Sicilian War was basically an Athenian offensive and hence, in it, they were the ones who courted betrayals. In the final eight years of the war both sides were alternately on the offensive and the instances of overt betrayals were again more evenly divided (4:3 pro-Peloponnesian to Athenian).

These betrayals were successful slightly less than fifty percent of the time. The totals are thirteen successes and fourteen failures. By "failures" we mean those betrayals which were actually attempted and failed, and those which were planned but failed because they were forestalled. Of the fourteen failures twelve were never attempted and two, Plataea (No. 1) and Megara (No. 9), were initially successful as far as the actual entry of the enemy was concerned but later foundered.[1] Thus in the fifteen instances in which the betrayal was actually attempted, thirteen were successful and only two were not, and these two were initially successful in terms of the betrayal action itself. Once the actual betrayal began the incidence of success was extremely high. The fact that the overwhelming majority of failures were forestalled and never attempted suggests that security measures were rather efficient in dealing with the danger from the enemy within.[2]

As to which side was more successful, we find that of the twelve pro-Athenian instances only five were successful and one of these, Eion (No. 5), was short lived. In terms of importance the most notable Athenian captures by betrayal were Selymbria (No. 25) and Byzantium (No. 26). These helped to restore the Athenian position in the Ionian War, but overall the failures were more damaging. Megara (No. 9) and Siphae-Chaeronea (No. 10), particularly the latter which was connected with the Athenian defea-

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[1] Megara was not a total failure as the Athenians retained Nisaea, but the original objective was Megara itself.

[2] For security measures to thwart fifth columns, *infra*, ch. 6.

at Delium, marked the beginnings of the reversal of Athenian fortunes in the Ten Years War. The failure at Tegea (No. 17) came right before the allied loss at Mantinea. Messina (No. 19), which would have been an ideal winter base, and Syracuse (No. 20) in the Sicilian campaign were most significant failures for Athens. The Peloponnesians, on the other hand, had eight successes in fifteen instances. Those of Brasidas' campaign (Nos. 11, 12 and 13) were the most important for the Peloponnesian fortunes in the course of the war. The campaign restored the Peloponnesian position and put Sparta on the offensive after Sphacteria. The capture of Oropus (No. 22) was also of prime importance for the subsequent revolt of Euboea. The most notable Peloponnesian "failure" was probably in not attempting a landing at Eetionea in 411 (Athens, No. 23) before the fortification was dismantled, but this may have depended more on the situation in Athens rather than on Spartan lack of enterprise. The fifth columnists in Athens were being attacked by Theramenes and the moderates because of Eetionea (8.90.3, 91.1-2, 92.3). This certainly militated against any attempt at betrayal. In conclusion, then, the Peloponnesian side was more successful in this aspect of the war, and their successes, and the Athenian failures to some extent, reflect what Thucydides suggested was true of the war as a whole: the Athenians lost the war as much as the Peloponnesians won it (2.65.13).[1]

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[1] See further on the fifth-column strategy in major campaigns, *infra*, ch. 7.

CHAPTER THREE

CAUSES 1: THE ENEMY

We have now seen how widespread fifth-column activity was during the Peloponnesian War. In this chapter we will begin consideration of the causal factors which gave rise to the fifth columns. In the famous passage dealing with the *stasis* in Corcyra Thucydides comments on the proclivity of oligarchic or democratic factions in the various Greek cities to invite the intervention of Peloponnesian or Athenian forces (3.82.1):

> οὕτως ὠμὴ ἡ στάσις προυχώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. Καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἑτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἑκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥᾳδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο.

Thucydides stresses two points: the political strife in the cities and the fact that the war presented the warring factions with the opportunity of inviting armed intervention, an opportunity which, the historian carefully notes, was not available in peacetime. As we noted above,[1] scholars have emphasized political strife as a causal factor in discussing fifth columns. The political factor did play a major role and we shall consider it in due course. Here we point out that discussion of the political causes of fifth-column activities involves considering the question from the point of view of the fifth columnists. In any fifth-column operation, however, there are two sides involved, those within and the enemy. First, then, let us explore the reasons why "the enemy" was so often impelled to make use of fifth columns.

Thucydides' second point provides us with the beginning of our explanation. Thucydides says that in peacetime the factions would have not had any pretext for calling in foreign forces. This again is to consider the question primarily from the point of view of the fifth columnists. But the basic fact that armed troops were readily

[1] *Supra*, ch. 1.

available to the conspirators was a result of the war. As Gomme pointed out, Thucydides "takes for granted" a good deal that modern historians do not, particularly with respect to the conditions of warfare and economics.[1] If we look at these, we shall understand why the war itself was a precipitating factor in the courting of fifth columns by the enemy.

Scholars have noted that difficulties in capturing cities led attacking forces to seek out fifth columns.[2] We begin with a consideration of these "difficulties." As Adcock pointed out, "down to the first phase of the Peloponnesian War there is no certain record of a Greek city being stormed by Greeks." [3] It is true that in the course of the Peloponnesian War captures by assault did occur but in such cases poor or weak defense was usually the governing factor. The Boeotians and their allies captured Delium in the Winter of 424/3 with the use of a kind of primitive flame thrower; however, the section of the fortification which they attacked was not a wall but a barricade composed of wood and vines (4.100.1-4).[4] Later on in the same winter Brasidas brought a similar device up against Lecythus which had a poor wall, certainly not stone. The Athenian defenders hastily erected a wooden tower from which they intended to pour water on the enemy fire and hurl stones. However, the tower collapsed under their weight and Brasidas captured the town in the ensuing confusion without using the flame thrower (4.115). Cleon recaptured Torone in the summer of 422 (5.2.2-3.2). Gomme commented that the breaking of the wall and capture by the Athenians was "something rare in Greek warfare." [5] It should be noted, however, that Thucydides says that the town was poorly defended (5.2.3). Strombichides in the late spring of 411 captured Lampsacus, but, Thucydides tells us, it was without walls (8.62.2). Later on in the war Lysander recaptured Lampsacus by storm, but it was still unwalled (Xen., *Hell.* 2.1.19). Even more indicative of the superiority of defense over offense is the fact that attacking forces failed to take unwalled or minimally fortified cities. In the winter of 412/11 Astyochus assaulted Clazomenae but was unable to capture it although it was without walls (8.31.3). During the same winter the Athenians

[1] Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 1-24.
[2] *Supra*, p. 2, n. 5; p. 3, n. 1, 2, 3.
[2] *Supra*, n. 7, 8, 9, 10.
[3] Adcock, *War*, 57.
[4] Adcock, *War*, 58; Schramm, *Heerwesen*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 3, n. 1) 215.
[5] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 631.

attacked the town of Cnidus which was unwalled. Thucydides says that they almost captured it but failed. Overnight the Cnidians strengthened what defenses they had and the Athenians failed in a second attack on the next day (8.35.3-4). We do not know precisely what the Cnidians did on that night but Thucydides' ἄμεινον φραξαμένων (8.35.4) suggests that their fortification was hardly more than a fence erected out of whatever was at hand. One can easily understand, then, why, when the Spartans marched on Stratus in Acarnania in the summer of 429, their policy was to attempt an attack on the walls only if they failed in negotiations (2.81.2).

In addition to the overwhelming superiority of defense over offense, there is a second point to be kept in mind when we consider the problem of assaulting a city in fifth century B.C. Greece. We are dealing with citizen armies and, therefore, life is not cheap.[1] Plutarch says that Pericles preferred to undertake the siege of Samos, entailing a great expenditure of time and money, rather than risk the danger to his fellow citizens which an assault would have involved (*Per.* 27.1). Plutarch repeats this concern of Pericles for the loss of citizen lives in explaining why he opposed marching out to face the Spartans in the early stages of the Ten Years War (*Per.* 33.4). This same attitude is attributed to Pericles by Thucydides in the speech on the eve of hostilities (1.143.5). Contemporary literary references also reflect concern with the drain on manpower caused by the war; e.g., Trygaeus in the opening scene of the *Pax* produced in 421 rails at Zeus and begs him not to empty Hellas of her inhabitants (Ar., *Pax* 58-59).[2]

While we are less well informed about attitudes in other Greek cities, certainly the loss of citizen lives was not taken lightly. Thucydides applies the well known figure, "the flower of them had perished," to the Thespians who had fallen at Delium (4.133.1). It must be remembered that, while Athens could afford to abandon the land and live from the sea, most Greek states could not, and citizen manpower was vital to productivity.[3] Campaigns abroad and casualty lists were to be avoided on economic grounds as well as on the natural reluctance of any people to lose fathers, brothers, sons and fellow citizens. For example, in the summer of 428 Thucydides tells us that the Peloponnesian allies did not wish to join in

[1] Gomme, *Thuc.* I, 14, 17. Adcock, *War*, 58.

[2] Cf. Euripides, *Hecuba* 647-50, *Troades* 376-79.

[3] Gomme, *Thuc.* I, 11, 18.

an invasion of Attica because they were busy with the harvest (3.15.2). This general Greek concern for citizen manpower may be illustrated by considering the Spartan expedition against Stratus (2.81.2-82). Throughout the narrative Thucydides carefully distinguishes the Peloponnesians and their Greek allies, whom he designates the Hellenic forces, from their barbarian allies marching with them. The Hellenic plan is to avoid an attack and succeed by negotiation. The Hellenes, forming the flanks of the army, advance in good order intending to camp near Stratus. It is the Chaonian forces in the center, the non-Hellenic, who recklessly rush on with the rest of the barbarian allies to attempt an assault on Stratus. They meet stiff resistance, panic, suffer heavy casualties and are driven off. After the survivors return to the Hellenic allies, the Spartan commander, Cnemus, since all chances of winning over Stratus by diplomacy are now lost, withdraws the expedition.

With regard to the Spartans, it is well known that the concern for citizen manpower was an important factor in shaping policy.[1] The necessity of holding under subjection a large dependent population made any decrease in the number of Spartiates a threat to the very existence of the Spartan state (Arist., *Pol.* 2.6.11-12, 1270a). The well known Spartan reluctance to send an army out of the Peloponnese reflects this constant concern of Spartan policy. In the sixties of the fifth century Sparta survived a serious helot revolt which broke out after an earthquake had destroyed many Spartiates. Ziehen and Porter have emphasized the effect of this earthquake in accounting for the preoccupation with manpower of Spartan policy in the generation which fought the Peloponnesian War.[2] During the Peloponnesian War the Spartans considered it axiomatic

[1] For the population problem as a factor in Spartan policy see G. B. Grundy, "Policy of Sparta in the Fifth Century," *JHS* 28 (1908) 77-96, esp. 80-82; G. Dickins, "The Growth of Spartan Policy," *JHS* 32 (1912) 1-42. Dickins held that the population factor became important in policy making only in the fifth century. E. Cavaignac, "La population du Péloponnèse aux Ve et IVe siècles," *Klio* 12 (1912) 261-80, is primarily concerned with statistical evidence for Spartan population and not with its effect on policy. L. Ziehen, "Das Spartanische Bevölkerungsproblem," *Hermes* 68 (1933) 218-37, is concerned with both statistics and the effect on policy, and particularly emphasizes the effect of the earthquake of 464 B.C. (for the date of the earthquake see Pausanias 4.24.5 and Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 402-03) on subsequent Spartan policy. H. Michell, *Sparta* (Cambridge 1964) 228-32.

[2] Ziehen, "Spart. Bevölk.," *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 1) esp. p. 31. W. H. Porter, "The Antecedents of the Spartan Revolution of 243 B.C.," *Hermathena* 49 (1935) 1-15.

that the danger of revolt increased proportionally with any decrease in the number of Spartiates. This point is clearly illustrated by Spartan activities after the capture of Sphacteria down to the Peace of Nicias. In the summer of 424 Brasidas set out for Thrace with 1700 hoplites (4.78.1) of whom 700 were helots (4.80.5). The remaining 1000 were hired for pay by Brasidas in the Peloponnese (4.80.5) and undoubtedly consisted mainly of Corinthian, Phliasian and Sicyonian troops (4.70.1).[1] Few, if any, Spartiates marched north with Brasidas and the reason for this is made clear by Thucydides' explanation of Sparta's motives for Brasidas' campaign. Thucydides says that the Chalcidians and Perdiccas had less difficulty in persuading the Spartans to send a force north, an allusion to the traditional Spartan reluctance to send troops out of the Peloponnese, because the Spartans, hurt by the Athenian incursions into the Peloponnese, particularly Pylos, hoped to divert the Athenians from their own territory (4.79.3-80.1). What is noteworthy here is that the Spartans did not send a Spartan army. Thucydides goes on to explain that at the same time the Spartans were glad to get rid of the 700 helots sent with Brasidas because they feared a possible helot revolt, especially because of the occupation of Pylos. He then makes the general statement that Spartan affairs were always guided πρὸς τοὺς Εἵλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι and goes on to describe the massacre of some 2000 helots (4.80.2-4). The Spartan fears of a helot revolt had become serious the previous summer with the Athenian victory at Sphacteria (4.41.3), and had led them to take, earlier in the summer of 424, the unusual step of raising auxilliary forces of cavalry and archers (4.55.2). Later on, in the winter of 422/1, Thucydides mentions the fear of a helot revolt as a factor in the Spartan desire for peace (5.14.3), and later in the war the Athenians hoped to raise the same threat when Demosthenes fortified a position on the Laconian coast opposite Cythera (7.26.2). The expedition of Brasidas, then, in its composition and motivation reflects the Spartan concern with Spartiate population which is inherently connected with the subjection of the helots. This concern is also apparent in the fact that the Spartan desire for peace from 425 on was strongly motivated by their wish to recover the 120 Spartiates captured at Sphacteria.[2] In the spring of 423 Thucydides says that the Spartans desired the one year truce

[1] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 532.
[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 299.

τοὺς γὰρ δὴ ἄνδρας περὶ πλέονος ἐποιοῦντο κομίσασθαι (4.117.2). The return of the prisoners is again mentioned as a prime factor in the Spartan wish for peace at the time of the Peace of Nicias (5.15.1). Most indicative, however, of the Spartan concern for 120 men is their refusal to send Brasidas any reinforcements during the winter of 424/3. Thucydides tells us that one reason why the Spartans refused was that they wanted to recover the prisoners and end the war (4.108.7).[1]

Since a city could not ordinarily be captured by direct attack, and since direct attacks involved a high incidence of casualties, a factor unacceptable to states with primarily citizen armies, the only conventional method of taking a city during the Peloponnesian War was reduction by siege.[2] Aside from the fact that sieges were not always successful, as the Athenians learned at Syracuse, the two basic drawbacks to this method were time and money.[3] Thucydides, who was well aware of the importance of the economic factor in warfare,[4] puts into the mouth of Archidamus on the eve of hostilities the statement that ἔστιν ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὅπλων τὸ πλέον ἀλλὰ δαπάνης (1.83.2). As Gomme noted,[5] Thucydides emphasized this dictum throughout his history; e.g., in the first speech of Pericles (1.141.3, 142.1), in Pericles' assessment of Athenian resources at the beginning of the war (2.13.2), and in the speech of Hermocrates at the beginning of the Sicilian War (6.34.2); Alcibiades tells the Spartans that the fortification of Decelea will have serious economic consequences for the Athenians (6.91.7); finally, the opening chapters of the eighth book deal with financial questions on both sides, including the Persian subsidizing of the Peloponnesian navy in the Ionian War (8.1-5). With regard to sieges we are reasonably well informed as to the high costs involved. The siege of Samos, which Pericles preferred to undertake to save lives, cost 1276 talents.[6] The siege of Samos lasted eight months (1.117.3) and, in view of

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[1] The other reason was jealousy of Brasidas on the part of leading men in Sparta. Gomme, *ad loc.*, commented that "Sparta was ever suspicious of her able men, more so than Athens—not to our surprise, when we think of the careers of Kleomenes, Pausanias, and Lysandros."

[2] For a brief historical survey of siegecraft down to 400 B.C., see Schramm, *Heerwesen*, 213-216.

[3] Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 18; Adcock, *War*, 57-58.

[4] Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 9, 26.

[5] Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 248.

[6] B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* 3 (Princeton 1950) 327, n. 7, 334-35. Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 356.

this, the expense is even more striking. In eight months the Athenians spent a sum which exceeded their total annual revenue at the beginning of the war—1000 talents—[1] by more than 20 percent. And sieges were long, as well as expensive. Ithome held out against the Spartans for ten years (1.103.1), Scione fell to the Athenians after two years (5.32.1), and even the massive Carthaginian attack on Acragas in 406 B.C. resulted in an eight months siege (D.S. 13.90.7). Siege warfare thus tied down a number of men, valuable at home for productive reasons [2] or in another theater of war. To some extent this difficulty could be mitigated by leaving a smaller force to carry on the siege while the rest of the army moved on, as was done, for example, at Scione (4.133.4), but the drain on revenues and manpower was still there. At Scione the casualties were high (D.S. 12.72.10) and the cost of the siege necessitated a loan from the reserve fund.[3]

From all this, it is not hard to understand why armies would seek to avoid the difficulties and expenses involved in attacking or besieging a city and would prefer to take it by treachery. The consequences of this preference can be illustrated from the cases of some cities where fifth columns were active during the war.

Plataea (No. 1). The Theban attempt on Plataea ultimately failed, but the actual betrayal operation was initially successful. If we consider the siege of Plataea which began two years later, the desirability of capturing it by the aid of Naucleides and his party becomes apparent. Plataea was not a large town but it held out against the Peloponnesians for two years before capitulating in the summer of 427 (3.52.1). Plataea, as Gomme noted, "is the extreme instance in Greek history" of a successful defense carried on by a small force or by the older and less active citizens.[4] Furthermore, the besiegers employed elaborate techniques described at length by Thucydides (2.75-77), perhaps because they were being used for the first time.[5] The Peloponnesians first tried building up a mound or ramp to the walls, then employed μηχανάς (2.76.4),

[1] Xen. *Anab.* 7.1.27; *A.T.L.* 3, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 35, n. 6) 333, 345. This figure breaks down to 600 talents from foreign sources, including the tribute (Th. 2.13.3, *A.T.L.* 3, 118-132, 333, 345) and 400 talents from domestic sources (*A.T.L.* 3, 333, 345).

[2] *Supra*, pp. 32-33.

[3] *I.G.* 1^2, 324; Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 630.

[4] Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 17.

[5] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 209; Schramm, *Heerwesen*, 213-14.

perhaps some kind of battering rams, and finally attempted a primitive fire assault, but all failed. We are specifically told that the Peloponnesians tried the fire, which was dependent on favorable winds that never materialized, because they wanted to exhaust every possibility rather than undergo the expense of a protracted siege (2.77.4).

Potidaea (No. 14). Brasidas was in communication with a fifth column in Potidaea in the summer of 423. Although the betrayal was never attempted it is reasonable to assume that Brasidas, with his relatively small and poorly financed army, could hardly have captured Potidaea any other way. The Athenians had spent almost three years besieging Potidaea when it finally capitulated on terms in the winter of 430/29 (1.64.1, 2.70.1). The Athenians invested it in the summer of 432 and kept 3000 hoplites there, an unusually large number, throughout the siege (1.64.1, 2.31.2, 2.58.3, 3.17.4).[1] The hoplites and their servants cost the Athenians two drachmas a day which proved a great drain on Athenian finance (3.17.4). References to the great expense of this siege are frequent (2.13.3; D.S. 12.40.2); by spring 431, it has been estimated at 400 talents[2] and as high as 800 or even 1000 talents.[3] In the summer of 430 the Athenians sent Hagnon with a force of 4000 hoplites and 300 cavalry to try and force the issue at Potidaea (2.56.2, 58.1). Hagnon employed μηχανάς against the walls and both Thucydides and Diodorus report that he tried in every way to take the city but that, in spite of the fact that his expedition was fully outfitted and supplied for the assault, he failed (2.58.1-2; D.S. 12.46.1-2).[4] Both historians report the outbreak of the plague which Hagnon's troops had brought with them from Athens, and place the number of Athenian casualties at over 1000, with Thucydides emphasizing the plague as the main cause of death while Diodorus adds that many perished in the assaults as well (2.58.2-3; D.S. 12.46.2-5). By this time the Athenians had spent more than 1000 talents on Potidaea (D.S. 12.46.4) and Hagnon withdrew

[1] The last chapter (3.17) has been suspected as an interpolation. Gomme follows Adcock in accepting it. For the whole question, see Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 272-77. We follow Adcock and Gomme and assume that the figures refer to 430.

[2] *A.T.L.* 3, 340, 342 n. 73.

[3] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 22; *I.G.* 1^2, 296 gives expenditures for campaigns in Macedonia and Potidaea for 432/1, and Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 144-45, concluded that the large payments in the last four prytanies reflect the costs of the siege.

[4] Diodorus also mentions the superiority of the walls (12.46.3).

leaving the 3000 original hoplites to continue the siege (2.58.3). The siege dragged on into the following winter when the Potidaeans, reduced to extreme hardship including cannibalism, offered to capitulate on terms (2.70.1). Thucydides says that the Athenian generals accepted the terms because the army was suffering in its exposed position and because 2000 talents had already been spent on the siege (2.70.2). Isocrates (25.113) gives the cost at 2400 talents and the authors of *A.T.L.* wrote "this diversion of money and energy perhaps did nearly as much as the great plague to upset Perikles' calculations and falsify his hopes of victory." [1] The siege cost twice the total annual revenue of Athens at the beginning of the war.[2] It is not surprising, therefore, that the Athenian generals, Xenophon, Hestiodorus and Phanomachus, chose to accept the Potidaean terms, that Thucydides gives the cost of the siege as one of their motives (2.70.2), and records the amount (something relatively rare for him [3]), and that, although the Athenians later complained about the generals' action assuming that they could have achieved a surrender on Athenian terms (2.70.4), the generals were not recalled (2.79.1; D.S. 12.47.3).

Finally, the generals' other motive, the suffering of the army, illustrates yet another difficulty in lengthy siege operations. The siege must be maintained, regardless of unhealthy or unseasonable conditions, and the army must be supplied, sometimes from home. Winters are particularly difficult because neither can the country around the besiegers feed them nor can supplies from home be sent easily by sea. At Potidaea although the plague was introduced by Hagnon's force, Thucydides gives the winter as the main reason for the army's suffering (2.70.2). Disease added to the difficulties of the Athenian forces encamped in the marshy areas outside Syracuse in the summer of 413 (7.47.2). Syracuse (No. 20) also demonstrates the problem of supplies. Nicias' letter dispatched to Athens late in 414 dwells at some length on the lack of supplies and the consequent decline in morale (7.13-14.3). This same problem

[1] *A.T.L.* 3, 323.

[2] *Supra*, p. 36, n. 1; furthermore, we know that the strain on Athenian finances during the Ten Years War resulted in new assessments of the tribute in 430/29, 428/7 and 425/4 (*A.T.L.* 3, 68-69), and that by 422 the Athenians had succeeded in increasing their total annual revenue to 1750-2000 talents (Ar., *Vespae* 656-60; *A.T.L.* 3, 345). Thus the cost of the siege of Potidaea exceeded the total annual revenue of the Athenians even after they later doubled it to reduce the financial strain of the war.

[3] Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 26; 2, 432.

had been a major concern of the Athenians in the summer of 424 with respect to their army at Sphacteria. The fact that the country around Pylos could not support the army and the fear that the Spartans could hold out into the winter led to serious concern at Athens for a force which was, in effect, in the same circumstances as an army besieging a city (4.26.1-3, 27.1). One is reminded of the herald's speech in the *Agamemnon* where we get a soldier's view of an army's suffering in a siege (A., *A*. 551-67).

Mytilene (No. 4). In the summer of 427 Teutiaplos proposed that the Peloponnesians retake Mytilene with the aid of a fifth column. Just as Brasidas could not hope to capture Potidaea without fifth-column aid, the Peloponnesians could hardly have undertaken any conventional assault or siege of Mytilene. They lacked control of the sea and money.[1] The Athenians had just subdued Mytilene after a siege of 7-8 months.[2] Although we do not know how much the siege of Mytilene cost, we do know that, like Potidaea, it was a great strain on Athenian finance. Thucydides tells us that because the Athenians needed money for the siege in the summer of 428 they levied a special tax on their own citizens to raise 200 talents and they sent out Lysicles with twelve ships to collect money from the allies (3.19.1). The 200 talents is a large amount if we consider that the total annual revenue from domestic sources some three years before was 400 talents.[3] In addition to these measures they also raised the tribute.[4] When the Athenians found that a sea blockade was not sufficient they sent Paches with 1000 hoplites to reinforce the original force of 40 ships under Cleippides and shut off Mytilene by land as well (3.2.2, 18.3-5). The unusual point here is that Paches' hoplites had to row the ships themselves. Busolt saw the financial strain as the reason.[5] Certainly the economic motives were powerful, but, as Gomme noted, considerations of manpower played a role too.[6] Earlier in the same summer the Athenians had found it necessary to raise a special force of citizens and metics to man 100 ships as a show of force against a possible Peloponnesian invasion of Attica (3.16.1).

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[1] Alcidas was probably engaged in fund raising at the time (*infra*, ch. 5 on Chios); for Alcidas' refusal of the fifth-column proposition, *infra*, ch. 7.

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 252, 287.

[3] *Supra*, p. 36, n. 1.

[4] *A.T.L.* 3, 70, 343.

[5] Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1015.

[6] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 277.

Again we have these two basic necessities of warfare, manpower and money, clearly demonstrated as pivotal factors during the siege of Mytilene.

The surrender of Mytilene came early in 427 (3.25.1), and in the debate between Cleon and Diodotus on the fate of the Mytileneans the question of the cost of sieges is raised again. One argument Diodotus uses against the destruction of the Mytileneans is that then they would not be able to pay back to Athens the expense incurred in subduing them (3.46.2). It is true that the cost of a siege could be somewhat mitigated by forcing the besieged city to pay back the expense after it had been captured. The Athenians had imposed such an indemnity on Samos (1.117.3), but we know that the Samian debt was liquidated at the rate of 50 talents per year for 26 years.[1] With regard to Mytilene the Athenians did not demand an indemnity, nor did they impose tribute (3.50.2). Rather, the Lesbians agreed to pay an annual rent on allotments of their land made by the Athenians (3.40.2). The sum of these annual rentals amounted to only 100 talents.[2] Unfortunately we do not know the total cost of the siege but in light of the 1276 talents which the eight month siege of Samos cost and the known strain Mytilene placed on Athenian finance a conservative estimate would be that it would take at least ten to twelve years for Athens to recover the expenditures through the income of the rentals. Schemes of repayment were hardly an adequate solution for the financial strain of a siege during wartime.

A brief consideration of some other cities where fifth columns were active will suffice to complete our demonstration of all the difficulties attacking armies faced. Brasidas certainly could not have hoped to capture the walled town of Amphipolis (No. 11) [3] without fifth-column aid. One need only look at the site of the imposing fortress of Panactum (No. 15) to understand how fruitless and suicidal any assault would have been.[4] It took the Athenians more

[1] *A.T.L.* 3, 335.

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 327.

[3] For the defense works and topography of Amphipolis see W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* 1 (Berkeley 1965) 30-36. Pritchett is concerned with the topography as relevant to the battle of Amphipolis.

[4] For the probable identification of Panactum with Gyphtókastro see Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 633. For photographs of the site see W. Wrede, *Attische Mauern* (Athen, Deutsches Archäologisches Institut 1933) plates 83-86. Plate 83 gives some idea of the topographical defensive advantages as well as the walls. On the chronology of R. L. Scranton, *Greek Walls* (Cambridge,

than half a year to subdue the small island of Melos (No. 18), and they at last did so through treachery (5.116.3).[1] The siege of Byzantium (No. 26) lasted longer than half a year and the Athenian success was finally due to the betrayal. Their attempts at assault had little effect and starving out the city was a slow and expensive process. We know that the Athenians engaged in a good deal of fund raising about the time of the siege of Byzantium which undoubtedly reflects the financial strain of that operation as well as their other campaigns.[2] At Methymna (No. 27) Callicratidas made repeated assaults without success before he succeeded in taking the city with fifth-column aid. What is noteworthy too is that, although Callicratidas spared the population of Methymna and returned the city to them, he did not hesitate to replenish his war chest and plundered the wealth of Methymna (Xen., *Hell.* 1.6.14; D.S. 13.76.5). Finally, the siege of Syracuse (No. 20) made clear the difficulties of offense, the hardships, casualties and supply problems of the besiegers, and the severe financial burden which such operations entailed.[3] Syracuse is an extreme case which magnifies the difficulties because of the size of the undertaking. However, it reflects the basic fact of Greek warfare during the Peloponnesian War, that attacking armies sought fifth-column aid because the conditions of warfare were so highly unfavorable for the offense.

There is one more fact of warfare which was an important element in the widespread courting of fifth columns by attacking forces. Developments in the use of light-armed troops and smaller fighting units, a natural result of the limitation of traditional hoplite battles, contributed to the tendency to attempt fifth-column captures. Scholars have long noted that down to the Peloponnesian War Greek land warfare was primarily an issue of hoplite armies fighting a short pitched battle on relatively level terrain, "ein Massenduell"

Mass. 1941) 33-44, 162, Gyphtókastro was walled long before the Peloponnesian War; however, Scranton leaves the identification of Gypthókastro open.

[1] The siege probably began in May of 416 (Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1267, n. 2). For expenditures and the makeup of Athenian forces sent to Melos see *A.T.L.* 3, 357; Tod, *G.H.I.* 1, 75, p. 190; 76, pp. 191-2; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, 77, p. 236.

[2] Plu., *Alc.* 30.5, D.S. 13.66.4 (Alcibiades at Selymbria); D.S. 13.66.3 (Alcibiades in the Chersonese); Xen., *Hell.* 1.8-9, Plu., *Alc.* 31.1, D.S. 13.66.3 (Athenians receive money from Pharnabazus and in a settlement with Chalcedon); Xen., *Hell.* 1.4.8 (Alcibiades collects 300 talents in Caria).

[3] For expenses relating to Syracuse see *A.T.L.* 3, 356-59; Tod, *G.H.I.* 1, 75, 77; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, 77, 78.

as Köchly and Rustöw called it.[1] However, in the Peloponnesian War the Athenian strategy was to avoid decisive land engagements and trust in their ships and walls, and, as Adcock points out, no battle of the traditional sort occurred until the eighth year of the war at Delium.[2] As a result light-armed troops, more maneuverable in smaller actions on different types of terrain, came into use to a greater degree than had previously been the case in Greek warfare.[3] For example, the Athenian general Demosthenes, who had learned the value of light-armed troops in his Aetolian defeat, employed them with great success at Sphacteria (3.94-98, 4.29-30).[4] Adcock concluded that "before the whole war ended it was clear to those who had eyes to see—among them Thucydides—that, though it was still true that hoplites mattered most in a set battle on a large scale, war on land now had a place for other arms and other methods than those of the hoplite phalanx." [5]

Just as light-armed troops began to play a more important role, so did the use of smaller tactical units in actual fighting. Like light-armed troops, such smaller units, regardless of whether they consisted solely of hoplites or light-armed troops or a combination of both, provided maneuverability impossible in traditional hoplite lines and could be very effective in gaining a tactical advantage, usually through a sudden surprise assault. For example, at Olpae in the winter of 426/5 Demosthenes successfully executed an ambush with a force of 400 men composed of both hoplites and light-armed troops (3.107-108.1). At Amphipolis in the summer of 422 Brasidas achieved a remarkable success with a sudden rush of only 150 picked hoplites against the center of the withdrawing Athenian lines (5.8.4-10.8). Before the battle Brasidas made a speech to his men to explain the advantages of the novel maneuver he was undertaking (5.9). As Bauer and Adcock note,[6] Thucydides

[1] Köchly-Rüstow, *Kriegswesen*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 2, n. 5) 145; Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 10; Adcock, *War*, 7.

[2] Adcock, *War*, 16-17.

[3] Kromayer, *Heerwesen*, 88; Adcock, *War*, 16-17.

[4] A. Bauer, "Ansichten des Thukydides über Kriegführung," *Philologus* 50 (1891) 405; Kroymayer, *Heerwesen*, 88-89; Adcock, *War*, 17-18.

[5] Adcock, *War*, 18-19; Bauer, "Thuk. über Krieg.," *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4, 405. Thucydides, in his account of the battle of Delium, says that Athens never had a regular light-armed force and that the mostly unarmed levy of citizens and metics which had marched out on the campaign returned home before the battle (4.94.1). The Boeotians had more than 10,000 light-armed troops at Delium (4.94.3).

[6] *Supra*, n. 4.

himself was conscious of the new developments in warfare taking place in the Peloponnesian War and this speech of Brasidas serves to emphasize the innovative nature of his action. At the beginning of his speech Brasidas says τὴν δὲ ἐπιχείρησιν ᾧ τρόπῳ διανοοῦμαι ποιεῖσθαι, διδάξω, ἵνα μὴ τῳ τὸ κατ' ὀλίγον καὶ μὴ ἅπαντας κινδυνεύειν ἐνδεὲς φαινόμενον ἀτολμίαν παράσχῃ (5.9.2). The important phrase is τὸ κατ' ὀλίγον καὶ μὴ ἅπαντας κινδυνεύειν. Brasidas has to explain to men used to traditional hoplite fighting the advantages of the unorthodox use of a small striking force separated from the whole army.[1]

Let us now consider the typical fifth-column situation. An attacking army wishes to capture a city, but without the cost in lives of an assault or the difficulties, economic and other, of a siege. The defenders within will not risk everything on a battle outside their defenses and put their trust in their walls and the superiority which the defensive position affords. Naturally they are on guard, but the bulk of the armed force of citizens, save under very unusual circumstances,[2] will not sleep under arms together in a central location ready for action. A small group of armed men introduced into the city at night by traitors can overcome the watches and open the gates to their main force before the majority of the inhabitants has time to organize for effective resistance. The best proof that this was the case is the fact that, in the fifteen instances in which the actual betrayal was attempted, thirteen were successful, and only two failed, and these two were initially successful.[3]

The role of the small striking force in fifth-column operations can best be illustrated by considering some particular examples.

At Plataea (No. 1) the insurgent party of Thebans consisted of a little more than 300 hoplites (2.2.2).[4] They had the added advantage of making their attack in what was still peace time and hence no guards were posted (2.2.3). Their ultimate failure was due to their conciliatory attitude which allowed the loyal Plataeans to organize effective resistance and to the late arrival of their main force, slowed down by spring rain, which was to have come up while it was still night (2.2.4-5.1).

[1] In his comments on Brasidas' speech Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 644, noted "the Spartans were the chief upholders of the conventional hoplite battle."

[2] In the summer of 415 the Athenians slept one night under arms in the Theseion because they feared the city was about to be betrayed (6.61.2).

[3] *Supra*, ch. 2.

[4] That the number of Thebans was not considered large is confirmed at 2.3.2.

At Megara (No. 4), while Hippocrates with a larger force of 600 hoplites waited in a nearby quarry, Demosthenes with a force of Plataean light-armed troops and Athenian *peripoloi*, probably at this time a "special mobile force," [1] waited in ambush close to the long walls (4.67.2). When the traitors acted, Demosthenes' unit ran in first, subdued the opposition of some Peloponnesians who came up after the entrance had been accomplished and secured the gates for Hippocrates' approaching troops (4.67.5). The capture of the long walls of Megara was thus accomplished, but the plot to betray the city itself was forestalled when it was betrayed by one of the traitors (4.68.6).

At Torone (No. 12), Brasidas first sent only 7 men armed with daggers to be admitted by the fifth columnists. These butchered the guards in the highest point of the city and then let in a second striking force of 100 peltasts who had been sent on ahead by Brasidas (4.110.2-111). Finally, when these forces had accomplished their missions Brasidas rushed in with the rest of his army and completed the capture of Torone before most of the Toroneans realized what had happened (4.112-113.1).

At Selymbria (No. 25), the traitors acted earlier than planned and Alcibiades, reluctant to let the opportunity slip by, rushed in with a force of 50 men, 20 of whom were peltasts. Once inside Alcibiades realized that he was no match for the Selymbrians whom he found armed and advancing against him. The reason why the traitors had acted earlier than planned was that they had feared the defection of one of their group. The fact that the Selymbrians were armed and ready for Alcibiades suggests that the fears of the traitors were justified. However, Alcibiades then achieved a diplomatic settlement without any fighting. One reason why the Selymbrians were willing to discuss terms was that they supposed that the Athenians were all already inside the walls. While the discussion was going on the rest of Alcibiades' army came up and the settlement was reached. In this case the small striking force failed to achieve a surprise, but its presence combined with the boldness of Alcibiades and the fears of the Selymbrians resulted in a successful operation (Plu., *Alc.* 30.2-3).[2]

In conclusion, the developments in the use of light-armed forces

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[1] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 529.

[2] Cf. Brasidas at Amphipolis (No. 11) for the use of diplomacy after the betrayal operation has run into difficulty.

and smaller tactical units, which came about in response to the limitations of traditional hoplite fighting imposed by the war itself, were also a significant factor in the emergence of fifth-column operations. Considered along with the economic and technical difficulties attacking armies faced we can understand how the facts of warfare themselves were the principal motivating force in the courting of fifth columns by the enemy. We have dwelt upon this point at some length because, although scholars have noted the "difficulties" in capturing cities, the military factors have not been considered in any detailed fashion consonant with their importance. Attention has been focused on the political conditions within the cities; that is, with respect to fifth columns scholars have generally emphasized what Thucydides says and summarily treated what he "takes for granted."

CHAPTER FOUR

CAUSES 2: THE FIFTH COLUMNISTS

We now turn to the motivating forces behind the treasonable activities of the fifth columnists. Externally, the war itself provided the traitors with their opportunity, but now we must consider the internal conditions in the particular cities which impelled the fifth columnists to try to take advantage of the opportunity which the war offered. The political factor has been stressed by scholars because of Thucydides' comments on the *stasis* in Corcyra. When Thucydides says that the leaders of the democrats and oligarchs in the Greek cities took advantage of the opportunity of wartime to invite in the Athenians or Spartans (3.82.1), he has just described the bloody civil disorder in Corcyra and continues commenting on the applicability of this example to all of Greece. He clearly makes the connection between *stasis* and foreign intervention. As we have seen, on 27 occasions during the Peloponnesian War foreign intervention, whether it actually occurred or was only planned, was connected with the betrayal of a city to the enemy. In some of these betrayals the fifth columnists acted during a state of *stasis* in their cities.

Stasis as used by Thucydides in the passage under discussion means factional strife or civil war in the state; it is not merely political opposition between parties, but the condition resultant when the parties no longer feel bound to operate within constitutional limits.[1] In *stasis* the parties resort to illegal and violent means; e.g., open fighting, assassination, and expulsion of their

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[1] This is not intended as a complete definition of *stasis*. The word is used in other ways; e.g., at 4.71.1 and 7.50.1 where it means a party, not the state of civil discord. What we wish to point out here is its meaning in the passage in which Thucydides connects it with foreign intervention. It is distinguished from the normal divisions and conflicts of a state. It is the condition resultant when these conflicts are aggravated to the breaking point. Thucydides saw the war as the principal factor which aggravated these conflicts (3.82.2). As a "condition," it was commonly thought of as a disease of the state (Hdt. 5.28; Euripides, *HF* 34; Plato, *Mx.* 243e), and C. N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History* (Oxford 1929) 133-34, has pointed to the similarity between Thucydides' accounts of the plague and the *stasis* in Corcyra. See further on Megara and Athens in this chapter.

opponents. As Thucydides so vividly describes it, all law breaks down, religious and moral restraints cease to operate, the meanings of words are twisted to suit the needs of the occasion, and party loyalty becomes the strongest loyalty (3.82.2-8). The word *stasis* had been so used before Thucydides' time, notably by Solon (4.19) who had distinguished it from *polemos,* a distinction which Plato (*R.* 470b) was later to repeat. So in Thucydides *polemos* describes the war between Greek cities, *stasis,* civil war between the parties in Greek cities (3.82.1-2).

Some specific examples will make it clear that to explain the motivation of the fifth columnists solely in terms of political ideology, oligarchs *vs.* democrats, is to give an incomplete picture. Some were politically motivated only in the broadest sense of the term "political." We shall see that social class distinctions, racial and civic loyalties, economic and even psychological forces played a role in the activities of the fifth columnists. The subject is a difficult and complex one, because such motivating factors naturally tend to occur together. This chapter will attempt to identify them for some specific instances, as far as the evidence permits. Thucydides once again provides our starting point. We begin with cases in which the political opposition between the oligarchs and democrats had reached the state of *stasis.*

A. *Corcyra, Megara and Athens: politics and stasis. Social and economic class distinctions. Psychological factors*

The case of Corcyra (No. 24) affords a clear example of a planned betrayal growing out of factional strife between oligarchs and democrats. In reporting this incident Diodorus emphasizes the intense animosity between these parties in Corcyraean history (D.S. 13.48.1). In winter 411/10, the oligarchs were planning to hand the city over to the Spartans (D.S. 13.48.5). Unfortunately we have no further details concerning the plotting of these pro-Spartan oligarchs. Perhaps they considered that the time was ripe because of Athens' recent reversals and difficulties; such reasoning played an important role in the allied revolts during this period (8.2.2). If so, their expectations proved unsound. Corcyra had remained democratic and loyal to the Athenian cause since the bloody *stasis* of 427 had been resolved in favor of the democrats.[1]

[1] Corcyra provided a base of operations for the Sicilian expedition, for Demosthenes' relief force, and we know that Corcyraean troops fought with

When the oligarchic plot of 411/10 was discovered (how we do not know) the Corcyraeans sent to Athens for aid. The Athenians responded by sending Conon with 600 Messenian troops. These 600 troops in concert with the democrats then massacred the oligarchs and their supporters and more than 1000 were driven into exile (D.S. 13.48.5-7).

Diodorus' account suggests a social distinction between these Corcyraean factions as well as the purely political one. At the outset, while emphasizing that the present *stasis* had the deep rooted hostility between the parties as its primary cause, Diodorus says that it was due to other causes as well (D.S. 13.48.1). He does not elaborate on these other factors except for the war itself, but the pro-Spartan oligarchs are described as προέχοντες τοῖς ἀξιώμασι τῶν Κορκυραίων (D.S. 13.48.3) and τοὺς δυνατωτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν ὄντας (D.S. 13.48.5). The fact that their supporters numbered 1000 suggests that, although they did not command a majority, many citizens of some standing and, presumably, property adhered to their party. To some extent this is confirmed by the fact that, after expelling the oligarchs and their supporters, the democrats enlisted slaves and foreigners as citizens to strengthen the city, a precaution they believed necessary because of their exiled opponents' numbers and, Diodorus adds, their *dynamin* (D.S. 13.48.7). It is probable that by *dynamin* Diodorus means the power or influence resultant from the wealth of upper class citizens.[1] Their influence was confirmed by the sequel; for they still had supporters in the city who managed to seize the *agora* and call back the exiles (D.S. 13.48.8). These social and economic class distinctions were of course common in the political division between oligarchs and democrats in the Greek cities; e.g., that the democratic leaders relied on the support of the poorer and "lower" classes was the main theme of the Old Oligarch (Ps. Xen., *Ath. Pol.* 1.1-5); this same class prejudice clearly played a role in the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens.[2] The Old Oligarch also noted that

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the Athenians at Syracuse (6.30.1, 32.2, 34.6, 42.1, 43.1; 7.26.3, 31.5, 44.6, 57.7).

[1] For *dynamis* meaning the power of money, cf. Th. 2.97.3, 6.46.3.

[2] Thucydides describes the oligarchs as τοὺς βελτίστους (8.47.2), οἱ δυνατώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν (8.48.1, the reading of B followed by Jones-Powell), τούς τε καλοὺς κ' ἀγαθοὺς (8.48.6). The democracy is πονηρίᾳ (8.48.2). At 8.70.2 the democracy is ἀπίστῳ in the eyes of the oligarchs. The language is very reminiscent of the Old Oligarch. For the fifth-column activities of the extremists in the Four Hundred, see below in this chapter.

the Athenian democracy allowed a great deal of freedom and economic opportunity to slaves and foreigners (Ps. Xen., *Ath. Pol* 1.10-12). The action of the Corcyraean democrats in trying to bolster their regime provides an exact parallel for the role of these class distinctions in political divisions.

Any assessment of the motives behind fifth-column activities which considers only the purely political factor is incomplete. This is not to say that Thucydides, when he says that the leaders of the democrats or oligarchs called in the Athenians or Spartans, is giving us an oversimplified view. For, as Gomme, following Wilamowitz, pointed out, Thucydides wrote a history of the war, not a political history of Athens or Greece.[1] We have already seen that with regard to economics and military conditions Thucydides takes much for granted and does not elaborate on conditions which were known to his readers.[2] Similarly, when he speaks of democratic and oligarchic leaders, the ramifications in terms of social and economic factors would be known to his readers. When such factors are particularly relevant to his discussion we find them described in more detail; e.g., the description of the oligarchs at Athens in 411 noted above,[3] or the characterization of the fifth columnists in Plataea (No. 1) as οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει (3.65.2).

In the case of Corcyra, Diodorus' account clearly indicates a combination of factors in the motivation of the fifth columnists. Unfortunately, aside from Diodorus' brief narrative we know nothing about the internal affairs of Corcyra at this time.[4] What is important here is that Diodorus emphasizes a psychological factor, the longtime hatred born of *stasis*, as the most significant, but says that "other causes" played a role too. These other causes are probably best understood by the fact that the fifth columnists were oligarchs, which implies social and economic motives as well as political.[5]

Megara (No. 9). When the Megarian democratic leaders formu-

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[1] Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 25; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Greek Historical Writing*, tr. G. Murray (Oxford 1908) 8.

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 9. Cf. *supra*, ch. 3.

[3] *Supra*, p. 48, n. 2.

[4] Corcyra seems to have remained neutral for the remainder of the war (Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1530). Perhaps this is another indication of the power of the oligarchs.

[5] *Infra*, ch. 5, on the social and economic factors (slaves and wealth) in the *stasis* of 427.

lated their plan to betray their city to Demosthenes and Hippocrates, they did so because of pressure resulting from *stasis* in Megara.[1] Thucydides says that these democratic leaders elected to betray their city because they feared the adoption of a proposal to allow the oligarchic exiles, who were harassing the city from Pegae, to return. These oligarchs had been driven out by the populace during a state of *stasis*. The democratic leaders now realized that the populace would not continue to support them (4.66.1-3). We know very little about this earlier *stasis* in Megara, for Thucydides records nothing concerning it except the expulsion of the oligarchs by the majority. Nor do we know whether Megara was an oligarchy or a democracy at the time of the expulsion of the oligarchs. It is usually assumed that Megara was oligarchic because of her association with the Peloponnesian League, but there is no conclusive evidence on this point.[2] The date of this earlier *stasis* was probably about 427, as in that year we hear of Megarian exiles who were given the right to live in Plataea for one year (3.68.3). It has been suggested that these are the same exiles we find at Pegae in the summer of 424.[3]

The pressure by the exiles made the sufferings of the Megarians more acute. The Athenians had captured Minoa in 427 (3.51.1-4), closing Megara's outlet to the sea. This and the yearly Athenian forays into the Megarid had severely curtailed Megarian food supplies. As Gomme noted, the wartime sufferings of the Megarians are often alluded to in Aristophanes.[4] Grote suggested that Pegae had become more important to Megara after the Athenian capture of Minoa because it was the only remaining port through which food could be brought into the city.[5] The occupation of Pegae by the exiles also undoubtedly adversely affected Megarian links with Boeotia.[6] Therefore, the proposal to receive back the exiles had the attraction of relieving one source of the Megarians' difficulties (4.66.1).

[1] The most recent full treatment of this betrayal is by R. Legon, "Megara and Mytilene," *Phoenix* 22, 3 (1968) 200-225.

[2] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 1) 212-214; Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1136.

[3] J. Classen, *Thukydides* 4, bearbeitet von J. Steup (Berlin 1900) 132 (hereafter Steup, *Thuk.*); Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1136; Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 215.

[4] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 528; cf. Ar., *Ach.* 760, *Pax* 246-9, 481-3, 500-2.

[5] Grote, *H.G.* 5, 287. Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 528, thought that most imports came overland from Corinth and Boeotia.

[6] So Legon, "Meg. and Myt," 214; cf. Gomme, *supra*, n. 4.

Furthermore, there was a Spartan garrison in Nisaea (4.66.3). H. W. Parke noted that "Thucydides in an ambiguous phrase says that the limitation (sc. of the garrison) to Peloponnesian guards was βεβαιότητος ἕνεκα τῶν Μεγάρων. Evidently he means that they were nominally to protect Megara from Athens; but actually to guard against just such disloyalty to Sparta as did occur in this year." [1] Legon follows Parke in pointing to Spartan mistrust of the Megarian democracy and further points out that this garrison in Nisaea added to the fears of the democratic leaders, "for the return of the exiles would certainly lead to renewed civil strife, and there were now Spartan troops just a few miles distant from Megara which could be used to shift the balance of power in favour of the oligarchs." [2]

We now turn to the fifth columnists, the leaders of the Megarian democrats. As Gomme noted, Thucydides calls them οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται, "the leaders of the popular party, not the leaders of the majority of the people; for they clearly did not carry the majority with them." [3] In his examination of this fifth-column betrayal Legon has put forward a view which has an important bearing on any assessment of the motives of these democratic *prostatai*: Legon says "there is a serious problem in this tale of intrigue which has been ignored by all modern commentators. Why did the leaders of the Megarian democracy have to resort to treachery to achieve their ends? Why could they not openly propose a change of alliance to the Megarian *demos* gathered in assembly?" As Legon himself admits, "the most persuasive answer is that they did not believe that the *demos* would approve an alliance with Athens under any circumstances." Although he admits there is "no certain evidence" as to why the democratic leaders were of this opinion, Legon says "we may more easily agree than disagree with their judgement." [4] Legon then tries to explain this judgement. To avoid any misunderstanding, we quote in full: [5]

> The ordinary people of Megara seem to have been unable to view this political crisis in the same context as it was viewed by either the democratic leaders or their oligarchic counterparts. To the

[1] H. W. Parke, "The Second Spartan Empire," *JHS* 50 (1930) 39-40.
[2] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 216.
[3] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 528.
[4] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 219-221.
[5] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 221.

> *demos* Megara was a sovereign state whose freedom was jeopardized by Athens. Any concession to the Athenians would have diminished Megara and exalted her enemy, and no Megarian patriot could allow this to happen. Even when the issue at stake was the democracy for which it had fought a few years earlier, the *demos*' attitude toward Athens was unchanged. Thus the common people of Megara adopted an inflexible stance which ultimately resulted in their loss of an effective franchise and any voice in their own government.
>
> This noble, if somewhat unrealistic, attitude on the part of the *demos* was not shared by any other group. The democratic leaders realized that continued association with the Peloponnesian League would destroy democracy in Megara, and they took steps to preserve it, even at the cost of treating with Athens, Megara's old enemy. It is equally clear that the exiles and their friends in Megara relied upon the sympathy and even the intervention of the Peloponnesian states for their ultimate triumph. The responses of the great powers to the designs of the Megarian factions conform to this pattern. The Spartans had already befriended the Megarian oligarchs by allowing them to occupy Plataea, and there is little doubt that Sparta would have continued to use her influence on their behalf. Furthermore, the purpose of the garrison at Nisaea indicates that the Peloponnesians expected, or feared, some move toward Athens on the part of the Megarian democrats, made in the interests of preserving democracy and themselves. No more need be said regarding Athens' readiness to assist the Megarian democrats in their enterprise. In sum, all parties involved, with the sole exception of the Megarian *demos*, saw an inexorable link between Megara's international alignment and her internal government. Leaving aside the moral aspect of this issue, it is plain from the sequel that the *demos* was mistaken, and suffered for it.

Legon would have us believe that the Megarian democratic *prostatai* acted to preserve democracy, and that the lack of political awareness and inflexible patriotism of the Megarian *demos* forced them to use treason rather than attempt an open proposal of an Athenian alliance. Thus in his conclusion we read:[1]

> These observations cast a new light on what might otherwise appear as treasonous or subversive activity on the part of eminent politicians—democrats and oligarchs—in the smaller *poleis*. In reality, in the cases treated above, and in numerous other instances, such apparent deviousness was the only course of action open to political factions with even legitimate aspirations.

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[1] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 223.

Legon's analysis and conclusion offer us a rather sympathetic view of our fifth columnists, the beleaguered Megarian *prostatai*. Let us examine it in some detail.

First, his explanation of why the *demos* could not be expected to support an open proposal of an alliance with Athens is, at least, questionable. Although he follows Gomme in offering patriotism as an explanatory factor,[1] he tells us that Gomme's explanation is insufficient and adds his own theory of the political *naïveté* of the demos. While there may be some truth to this—in the sense that the majority of the people in any state is often unaware of all the implications of a particular policy—there is no evidence in Thucydides which supports it. It remains an ingenious but speculative hypothesis.

Second, regardless of why the *demos* would not support the *prostatai*, the fact remains that they did not, and, on Legon's argument, this in turn forced the *prostatai* to commit treason. We would agree that the loss of the support of the *demos* was the main incident in the political situation which caused the *prostatai* to turn to treason; but we also note that Legon's hypothetical explanation of the *demos*' failure to support the *prostatai* has an important bearing on any assessment of the motives of the *prostatai*. On his argument, the *prostatai*, in betraying the city, were defending the best interests of the *demos* which did not understand that the survival of the democracy was at stake. Thus we read in his conclusion that "what might otherwise appear as treasonous or subversive activity on the part of eminent politicians" was "in reality . . . the only course of action open to political factions with even legitimate aspirations." We do not deny that this is plausible; yet in Thucydides their action does not "appear as treasonous," it is treason. To allege that their treason is mitigated, as Legon maintains, because it was their "only course of action" which would secure their "legitimate aspirations" is to attribute to them motives more honorable than the evidence in Thucydides indicates they held. This is the basic difficulty in Legon's position: his hypotheses lead to a plausible conclusion; but the conclusion is not necessarily correct, and it is difficult to accept because of what Thucydides says about the *prostatai* at 4.66.3.

Legon advances reasonable arguments why an Athenian alliance

[1] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 220.

would have been advantageous to Megara,[1] but there is no evidence either in 4.66.3 or anywhere else in Thucydides' narrative of the Megarian affair, that the *prostatai* ever considered the question in these terms. Rather, Thucydides says explicitly that in *fear* they wished to hand over the city to the Athenians, thinking that this would be less dangerous for themselves than the return of the exiles (4.66.3). This is hardly a description of men who in making their plans were motivated primarily by considerations of the best of their city.

Legon does not deny that the *prostatai* acted to save themselves, but he also maintains that, more than this, they acted to "preserve" the democracy. Of course one implies the other, but in Thucydides (4.66.3) the emphasis is on preserving themselves, not the democracy. We are told that they knew that the *demos* would not hold out μετὰ σφῶν, Gomme translates "under *their* (italics are Gomme's) leadership." [2] It is their own power which has been threatened by the withdrawal of the support of the people. Their reaction is fear, δείσαντες, and they plot to betray the city. Their thoughts, νομίζοντες, are for their own personal security, ἐλάσσω σφίσι τὸν κίνδυνον ἢ τοὺς ἐκπεσόντας ὑπὸ σφῶν κατελθεῖν, and Thucydides' wording implies no concern for the democracy or their fellow citizens, the *demos*.[3]

Moreover, it could be argued that these democratic *prostatai* were not motivated by concern for democracy or the democratic process, for democracy meant the rule of the majority of the *demos*. The majority in fact were no longer supporting the *prostatai*. Preservation of their regime meant, therefore, not the rule of the majority,

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[1] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 216-17.

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 528.

[3] It is difficult to understand σφίσι as meaning anything other than the *prostatai* themselves, the leaders of the democratic faction as individuals, for the return of the exiles would threaten them particularly. As the sequel showed, their fears were justified (*infra*, p. 56, n. 1). For this interpretation of σφίσι, see Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 528. Busolt earlier so understood it: "Die Bewegung drohte den Volksführern über den Kopf zu wachsen, sie hielten aber in Bezug auf ihre persönliche Sicherheit die Verbannten für schlimmere Feinde als die Athener" (*G.G.* 3^2, 1136). On ὑπὸ σφῶν, Gomme, *loc. cit.*, says that "ὑπὸ σφῶν, to be taken with κατελθεῖν, is 'by their fellow citizens.' (We could take ὑπὸ σφῶν with τοὺς ἐκπεσόντας, so that it again means themselves, the leaders; but this is less effective than the contrast with the Athenians, who would be safer for them than their own countrymen)." We think it is less strained to take it with τοὺς ἐκπεσόντας, but in either case the point is the same: it is their own personal safety which is at stake.

but, as Thucydides tells us, preservation of their own power and safety. In fact, disregard for the common people and preservation of their own lives characterized the actions of the fifth columnists throughout: in the betrayal of the Long Walls they killed the guards (4.67.4) and their plan for the betrayal of the city called for sending their fellow citizens into a trap while providing for their own safety (4.68.4-5). As Gomme said, "the extremists on both sides were unscrupulous." [1]

While Legon's hypothetical argument presents the fifth columnists as working to "preserve" the democracy, Thucydides' narrative does not describe them as men motivated by political ideology. This is not to deny the political factor; rather, it indicates that to assess their motives solely in terms of politics results in an incomplete and misleading picture of the *prostatai*. What Legon has failed to take into account is that Thucydides has presented an example of the leaders of a political faction who were moved to betray their city under the pressures of the war and *stasis*. In so doing he illustrated those psychological forces common to human nature, lust for power and fear, which he tells us, characterized the unhesitating illegal and violent actions of both democratic and oligarchic factions in *stasis* (3.82.2-83.4). If we accept what Thucydides says about the *prostatai*, then any supposed ideological concern for democracy on their part, or identification of their partisan cause with the best interests of the *demos*,[2] would be best understood as a further illustration of the behavior of the leaders of a faction in *stasis*: Thucydides says that in *stasis* the leading men of both democratic and oligarchic factions in the cities "armed themselves with fine-sounding names, equality for all free citizens, or prudent government by the best, but all alike made a prize of the public interest which they pretended to be serving" (3.82.8).[3] We agree with Legon that the people of Megara were the ultimate losers,

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[1] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 528.

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 528, suggests that the *prostatai* would identify their party with the whole *demos*.

[3] Gomme's translation, *Thuc.* 2, 385. Of course it is still possible to suppose that some of the fifth columnists believed that they were truly acting in the best interests of their fellow Megarians by preserving the democracy. Thucydides, however, says nothing to indicate this. Furthermore, if a sincere belief in the legitimacy of their cause led them to commit illegal and violent acts, including treason and the killing of fellow citizens, then they illustrated an ideological fanaticism which would stop at nothing.

in that the democracy was replaced by an oligarchy. For the *demos* this was a serious loss, but the cause of this loss seems less likely to have been the failure of the plans of a body of idealistic politicians with "legitimate aspirations" (as Legon supposes) than the fact that neither the democrats nor the oligarchs put the public interests first.[1]

Athens (No. 23). Thucydides' emphasis on these psychological factors may be better understood by considering the motivation of the oligarchic fifth columnists at Athens in 411. In his narrative of the revolution of the Four Hundred, Thucydides has provided a detailed account of how a group of extremists were moved to commit treason under the pressures of the war and *stasis*; how, at the end, concern for their own personal survival overrode all other considerations and led them to seek to betray the city to the enemy.

The plot to overthrow the democracy was the first stage in the development of this fifth column. Instigated by the exiled Alcibiades in order to secure his return, it won the approval of oligarchic leaders, first in Samos, and then in Athens (8.47-49). There is no need here to elaborate on the political, social and economic motives of these oligarchs.[2] Militarily, the prospect of an alliance with Persia was also a prime motive. While Thucydides makes it clear that the Athenian oligarchs in Samos were bent on overthrowing the democracy on their own (8.47.2), Alcibiades' offer of a Persian alliance provided an acceptable reason why it was necessary to do so. This resulted in tacit support for the plan in Athens by the people, who were otherwise opposed to the dissolution of the democracy (8.48.3). It is also clear that the majority of the members of the political clubs went along with the scheme because they thought Alcibiades' proposal advantageous and trustworthy

[1] The immediate victims were the democratic conspirators themselves. In the 100 or so executions carried out by the oligarchs, Thucydides says (4.74.3) they singled out their enemies and those who had been most involved in the betrayal to Athens. The executions were in violation of solemn agreements against such reprisals made at the time of the restoration of the oligarchs (4.74.2). Such acts of revenge were another characteristic of *stasis* (3.82.7-8) and we can hardly doubt that, given the opportunity, the democratic leaders would have done the same.

[2] *Supra*, p. 48, n. 2; *infra*, p. 62, n. 3; for the most recent full survey of this affair, see C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1952); for specialized problems, particularly dealing with the sources, see Hignett's Appendix xii, 356-378.

(8.48.3-4). The oligarchs made no effort to conceal their plans (8.48.2-3). They openly proposed the scheme to the assembly and, not without some opposition, won its approval (8.53-54.2).[1] In this first stage, then, the oligarchs avoided an open break with the people and adopted constitutional procedure to secure their ends; thus a state of *stasis* did not occur, and this is here the most important fact.

The next stage began with what was for the oligarchs one of those incalculable chances of war which Thucydides often acknowledges.[2] Their negotiations with Tissaphernes failed (8.56.2-5), and they then became truly subversive. Since they were already in danger, they decided to go through on their own with their plans for an oligarchic revolution (8.63.4). Their *coup d'état* was to be concerted with a similar *coup* in Samos (8.63.3). Their attack on the democracy in Athens fully illustrates the characteristics of *stasis*: assassination, notably of Androcles the democratic leader, and intimidation (8.65.2, 66.1-2);[3] a "fine-sounding name," government by the Five Thousand, while in reality they intended to govern by themselves (8.65.3-66.1);[4] suspicion and mistrust of the citizen body (8.66.5).[5] Their political maneuverings culminated in their armed seizure of the *Boule* (8.69),[6] and in the aftermath of their *coup* they murdered, imprisoned or expelled those

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[1] It is clear that the proposal was adopted mainly because of the "safety of the state" argument. Furthermore, the oligarchs (Peisander) explained that the oligarchy could be changed later on. The people apparently believed this. To judge from the sequel, the oligarchs, particularly extremists like Peisander, never intended to allow any changes once they came to power. They had no reason to expect a breakdown in the negotiations with Tissaphernes. If their plans went as expected, they would achieve a significant success in the war, and probably could maintain support for their regime because of this.

[2] 1.78.1, 84.3; 4.18.4; 7.61.3; cf. Pericles' remarks about παρὰ λόγον τι and τὰ δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως (2.64.1-2) and 8.24.5 where the *paralogois* are not of war but of life.

[3] Cf. the assassination of Peithias and other democrats at the outbreak of the *stasis* in Corcyra (3.70.6); the assassination of Hyperbolus at Samos (8.73.3).

[4] Thucydides describes the proposal of the Five Thousand with the same adjective, εὐπρεπὲς, he uses in 3.82.8 to describe the specious pretexts used by oligarchic and democratic factions in *stasis*. For Gomme's translation "fine-sounding name," *supra*, on Megara, p. 55 n. 3.

[5] Cf. 3.83.1, τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν.

[6] The oligarchs in Corcyra made a similar armed attack on the *Boule* (3.70.6).

whom they thought it suitable to have out of the way (8.70.2).[1] Thus precisely that danger against which Phrynichus had warned, *stasis* (8.48.4), had occurred.

The Four Hundred had changed their foreign policy. Their aim now was to negotiate a peace with Sparta, thinking that the Spartans would more readily deal with them than a democracy (8.70.2). The Spartan King, Agis, decided to march on the walls of Athens, hoping either that the city would now submit on terms favorable to the Spartans, or that his forces as a result of the Athenians' confusion and panic would be able to capture the walls (8.71.1). But Agis was disappointed. The Athenians did not submit, there was no panic, and they even made a successful foray against Agis' forces (8.71.2). Agis returned to Decelea, and the Four Hundred renewed their efforts to negotiate a peace (8.71.3). What is noteworthy here is that there is no hint of disloyalty on the part of the Four Hundred. Their original resolve to hold out in the war (8.63.4) was maintained; at least they were not ready to surrender, but were aiming at a negotiated settlement. Later on their envoys to the army at Samos maintain, with justice, that the revolution was not carried out in order to betray the city to the enemy, for that could have been done when Agis marched on the city (8.86.3). In this second stage, then, the oligarchs had moved from legality to subversion of the democracy by force, but they were not yet ready to commit treason.

The third stage began with the failure of the oligarchs in Samos (8.73). The subsequent negotiations between the democrats in Samos and the Four Hundred resulted in a split within the oligarchs' ranks. The moderates, led by Theramenes and Aristocrates, decided they wanted to extricate themselves from the unhappy situation (8.89.1). They were afraid of Alcibiades and the army at Samos, and of some of the Four Hundred who were negotiating with Sparta. The latter, they feared, might do "something harmful" to the city. Thus they began to call for the establishment of the Five Thousand (8.89.2).

The extremists, led by Phrynichus, Aristarchus, Peisander and Antiphon, became desperate; for not only was the majority against them, but now members of their own party were changing their minds (8.90.1). In *fear* they sent Antiphon, Phyrnichus and ten

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[1] Cf., e.g., the acts of the victorious Megarian oligarchs, *supra*, p. 56, n. 1.

others to Sparta to reach any settlement which would be tolerable (8.90.2).[1] At the same time they persevered in their construction of a fort at Eetionea. Thucydides says that the purpose of this fort was to admit the enemy when they wished (8.90.3).

The embassy to Sparta accomplished nothing, and meanwhile Theramenes continued to charge that the fortification at Eetionea was designed to destroy the city (8.91.1). At this point 42 Peloponnesian ships under Hegesandridas lay off the Laconian coast preparing to proceed to Euboea. Theramenes declared that these ships were going not to Euboea, but Eetionea (8.91.2). Thucydides says that Theramenes' charge was not completely false, that some such action was in the making (8.91.3). He then details the wishes of the extremists: first, to preserve their oligarchy and their rule of the allies; failing in this, to keep the ships and the walls and be autonomous; but if this too was not possible, then, to avoid being destroyed by a restored democracy; for this end they would introduce the enemy, giving up the walls and ships and agreeing to any terms whatever for the city, if only their own persons might have immunity (8.91.3). Note that in this last event even the autonomy of the state would be sacrificed. In the unsuccessful embassy to Sparta, the envoys had been enjoined to reach an agreement ὁπωσοῦν ἀνεκτὸς, in any way whatever tolerable (8.90.2). Now they will accept terms ὁπωσοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν (8.91.3). Tolerability is no longer at issue.

The remaining history of this *stasis* does not concern us here. For understanding the motives which drove men to commit treason, the important point here is the psychological reaction of these men as the situation developed. Internal party division and the pressure of the war result in the constitutional attempt to install an oligarchy and conclude a Persian alliance. When this fails, the oligarchs' desire for power leads them to an illegal and violent seizure of the government. *Stasis* breaks out and the immediate cause is that desire for power which Thucydides declares the

[1] For the charge of treason against Antiphon and others, *supra*, p. 6, n. 4; see also W. S. Ferguson, "The Condemnation of Antiphon," *Mélanges Glotz* 1 (Paris 1932) 349-66. Phrynichus is mentioned in the condemnation decree. He was posthumously found guilty of treason (Lycurg., *In Leoc.* 113), having been assassinated shortly after his return from Sparta (8.92.2). On his assassination see Tod, *G.H.I.* 1, 86, Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, 85; T. Lenschau, "Phrynichos," *RE* 20^2 (1941) 909; Lysias 13.71; Lycurg., *In Leoc.* 112.

basic cause of every *stasis* (3.82.8). In the final stage, fear for their own safety at the hands of a restored democracy drives the extremists to plan to betray the city. Having gotten the upper hand, they saw that they could trust no one, for even members of their own party were defecting, and calculating that security was not to be hoped for, they planned to avoid suffering (3.83.2), even at the cost of the best interest of the city (3.82.8).

In his analysis of *stasis* Thucydides makes it clear that the actions of political leaders must be accounted for not only in political terms but also in terms of the *physis anthrōpōn* (3.82.2). This is precisely what he does in his treatment of the Megarian democratic *prostatai* and, with greater detail, in his account of the Athenian oligarchs. For, if Thucydides' analysis of the *stasis* in Corcyra resembles his account of a disease,[1] then in his description of the events at Athens in 411 he has provided a case history of the disease. There is no general analysis, but a step by step recording of the degeneration of men's characters under the pressures of war and *stasis* (3.82.2). Once the *stasis* breaks out, the symptoms are apparent, and the reactions of the leaders are in accord with the general analysis. In the final stage, the disease of the state exhibits a terminal symptom, treason; for by treason the state itself will cease to exist as an autonomous entity; it will become the captive of the enemy.

B. *Plataea and Siphae—Chaeronea: political, social and economic divisions, but no stasis. Exiles*

Plataea (No. 1). When Naucleides and his associates betrayed Plataea in the spring of 431 they did so in order to gain power for themselves, to destroy those of the citizens opposed to them and to bring the city over to the Thebans (2.2.2). Later on the Boeotians maintained that the conspirators had acted to take Plataea out of its alliance with Athens and bring it into the Boeotian Confederacy (3.65.2). With regard to Plataea's relations with the Boeotian Confederacy, it seems clear that it was not a member in 431.[2] Fur-

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[1] *Supra*, p. 46, n. 1.

[2] I. A. F. Bruce, "Plataea and the Boeotian Confederacy," *Phoenix* 22, 3 (1968) 190. For further bibliography on this question see Bruce, *Hell. Oxy.*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p 23, n. 1) 105. J. A. O. Larsen, *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* (Berkeley 1955) 31 ff., held that Plataea was not a member, but has recently reversed his position

thermore, Plataea had long had a close association with Athens, including Athenian citizen rights, and was undoubtedly a democracy.[1]

That Naucleides and his party were oligarchs is clear from the description of them as ἄνδρες ὑμῶν [sc. Πλαταιῶν] οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει (3.65.2). Here again we have the economic and social factors inherent in the division between oligarchs and democrats. It is also clear that these oligarchs in Plataea had little political support. Thucydides explains that the majority of the Plataeans, when they realized that they could overpower the Thebans who had been introduced, did so because they did not wish to withdraw from the Athenian alliance (2.3.2). In domestic political terms, then, the oligarchs were not capable of mounting a serious threat to the pro-Athenian democratic regime. There is no evidence that party politics in Plataea had ever reached the state of *stasis*, undoubtedly because the oligarchic interests had so little support.

That the betrayal in Plataea did not occur during *stasis* is an important point; for, as Thucydides tells us with respect to Corcyra in 427, and as we have noted in the cases of Corcyra in 411/10, Megara and Athens, the effects of *stasis* were such that illegal and violent actions, including betrayal, became almost the norm. Betrayal was often a result of *stasis*, but the fact that a city was betrayed does not necessarily mean that the city was in *stasis*.

The Plataean fifth columnists plotted their betrayal primarily with one Eurymachos, son of Leontiades, who is described as ἀνδρὸς θηβαίων δυνατωτάτου (2.2.3). Leontiades, Eurymachos' father, was a Boeotian noble who Medized during the Persian War (Hdt. 7.233.1-2), and Eurymachos' son, another Leontiades, was the leader of the Theban oligarchs who handed Thebes over to the Spartans in 383/2 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25-36).[2] Naucleides and his fellow oligarchs naturally dealt with members of a similar class at Thebes who were in positions of power. Thebes and the Boeotian Confederacy had a representative form of government in which

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and now maintains in *Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History* (Oxford 1968) 26-40, that Plataea was an active member of the confederacy until the outbreak of the war. We agree with Bruce, "Plataea," 199 n. 40, that this seems "very improbable," especially because it is inconsistent with Th. 3.65.2.

[1] Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 855, 906; cf. Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 339-40 (on 3.55.3).

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 4, called them "a long-lived and mischievous family."

political rights were based on property.[1] This is an important fact for the consideration of the motives of our fifth columnists. Naucleides and his party presumably wanted to bring Plataea into the Boeotian Confederacy because, given the property qualification in the Boeotian Federal Constitution, they would thereby have secured power for themselves.

Finally, we note that Naucleides' fifth column acted not only not in a time of *stasis*, but also not in wartime. In fact it was their action which was the immediate cause of the outbreak of hostilities. However, that the war was imminent was well known (2.2.3). From the point of view of the wealthy, upperclass fifth columnists, association with Thebes and the Boeotian Confederacy may well have had an attraction in addition to the political power it offered. Geographically Plataea was a part of Boeotia and was only some 70 *stadia* or 7-8 miles away from Thebes. It was on the northern side of Cithaeron and separated from Athens by the mountainous chain of Cithaeron and Parnes. When the war broke out, a pro-Athenian Plataea would certainly become an object of Boeotian attack. In any such attacks, the lands outside the walls would be plundered and difficult to defend. Doubtlessly the wealthy class in Plataea derived the bulk of their income from land.[2] Protection of landed property was a serious issue, as we know in the case of Athens during the Ten Years War and again after the Spartan occupation of Decelea. It was just such landed interests which provided support for the oligarchs at Athens in 411 when they overthrew the democracy.[3] The fact that an alliance with Thebes would provide greater protection for their interests than the Athenian alliance may well have played a role in the motivation of the fifth columnists.

Siphae and Chaeronea (No. 10). Thucydides says that some men

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[1] *Hell. Oxy.* 11.2. For discussion of the nature of the πλῆθος τὶ χρημάτνω. see Bruce, "Plataea," *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 60, n. 2) 195-96 with references to the literature.

[2] Bruce, "Plataea," 196; Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 907 n. 1, commenting on Th. 2.54, called the Plataeans "Leute auf dem Lande."

[3] Hignett, *Athenian Constitution*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 56, n. 2) 272. For the devastation inflicted by the Spartan garrison at Decelea, see Th. 7.27.3-5. At 8.48.1 the oligarchs consider that they suffer most because of the war. This same attitude was displayed by the oligarchic landed interests at Athens in the Archidamian War (2.65.2). In 411, they wanted the government restricted to those able to benefit the city either by their property or by their persons (8.65.3).

in the Boeotian cities conspired with the Athenians in order to set up democracies (4.76.2). The cities presumably had oligarchic forms of government consistent with the constitutional organization of the Boeotian Confederacy. Obviously democratic dissidents existed in some Boeotian cities, but there is no evidence that their opposition had resulted in any *stasis.*

The immediate objective of this plot was the betrayal of Siphae and of Chaeronea in conjunction with an Athenian attack on Delium (4.76.3-4). If this succeeded, the conspirators hoped that it would foment revolutionary activities in other Boeotian cities (4.76.5). Siphae was in Thespian territory and we know that in the next summer, 423, the Thebans dismantled the Thespians' walls on a charge of Atticism (4.133.1).[1] In spite of Thespiae's loyal support of the Boeotian cause at Delium (4.93.4, 96.3), this Theban charge may reflect pro-Athenian activities in Thespiae during the conspiracy of 424. Chaeronea was politically linked with Orchomenus,[2] and the close relationship of these cities may be inferred from the fact that the actual betrayal of Chaeronea was to be accomplished by men of Orchomenus. In addition, exiles of Orchomenus were especially active in the plot (4.76.3). It seems likely, therefore, that Thespiae and Orchomenus were to be among the first of the other Boeotian cities in which the fifth columnists hoped to instigate revolutions.

This fifth column also provides an example of exiles active in the plot.[3] The danger to any regime of exiled opponents needs no

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[1] Later on in the war, in spring 414, the Thespian *demos* attacked the government in power, but the Thebans sent aid and the sedition was put down (6.95.1). It is also possible that Ptoeodorus, who is described by Thucydides as the chief mover of the plot (4.76.2), was a Thespian exile, not a Theban as our text reads. This involves reading ἐκ Θεσπιῶν, a marginal variant in two mss. for ἐκ Θηβῶν (Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 537).

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 537-38, says that it is not certain that ξυντελεῖ (4.76.3) implies the subordination of Chaeronea to Orchomenus. In *Hell. Oxy.* 11.3 the verb does indicate the subordination of Boeotian cities to Thebes. If we assume that the constitution described in *Hell. Oxy.* was in force continuously from 447 to 387/6, then ξυντελεῖ in Thucydides probably indicates that Chaeronea was a dependency of Orchomenus; see Bruce, *Hell. Oxy.*, 103-106.

[3] Ionian and Lesbian, including Mytilenean (Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 288, 293) exiles were with Alcidas' expedition at the time of Teutiaplos' proposal to recapture Mytilene (No. 4) with aid from within. Later on we find these Mytilenean and other Lesbian exiles operating on the mainland and taking Antandrus (No. 7) with the help of a fifth column; cf. the role of the exiled

elaboration. In his instructions against possible betrayal, Aeneas Tacticus warns against the danger of anyone in the city communicating with exiles (Aen. Tact. 10.5-6). The desire of exiles to return to their cities was proverbial and in most cases their return could be accomplished only by a change in the government of their city.[1] In view of the political aim of this plot, it is likely that Ptoeodorus and the exiles of Orchomenus were democrats who had been expelled for political reasons. But the motives of exiles should not be considered in political terms exclusively. Cut off from family, friends, property and even burial in their native soil, many were primarily concerned to return home. This concern might even override their political affiliations and lead them to cooperate or compromise with groups of whose policies they disapproved.[2]

C. *Anactorium, Messina and Camarina: colonial loyalties and the racial factor*

The betrayal of Anactorium (No. 7) to the Athenians in 425 was probably carried out by a pro-Corcyrean faction in Anactorium. Earlier the city had been handed over to the Corinthians and it has been suggested that the pro-Corcyrean *vs.* pro-Corinthian division had its origins in the fact that the foundation of Anactorium included both Corinthian and Corcyrean settlers.[3] In his detailed study of the relations between colonies and mother cities A. J. Graham has called attention to the importance of kinship ties between the colony and the mother city.[4] Epidamnus, a Corcyrean colony,[5] affords a clear example of how such ties were the determining factor during *stasis* and foreign intervention.

During the 430's *stasis* broke out between the democrats and oligarchs in Epidamnus and both factions ultimately appealed to Corcyra (1.24-26). Graham concluded that Corcyra's acceptance of the appeal by the oligarchs on the grounds of kinship was a

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Diagorids in the fifth column at Rhodes, and the activities of the exiled Thasian oligarchs and democrats who probably were involved in fifth columns (*infra*, ch. 5).

[1] E. Balogh, *Political Refugees in Ancient Greece* (Johannesburg 1943) 57.

[2] The prime example of an exile supporting policies because they were expedient to secure his return home was Alcibiades (8.47.1).

[3] *Supra*, p. 17, n. 3. A. J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece* (Manchester 1964) 128-33.

[4] Graham, *Colony, op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 3) 10, 150.

[5] Graham, *Colony*, 30-31, 132, 149; *infra*, p. 65, n. 5.

"vivid illustration of the way in which kinship provided the fundamental basis for the relations between colony and mother city." [1] The Epidamnian democrats had also appealed to Corcyra on the grounds that it was their mother city (1.24.6). The Corcyreans, however, accepted the oligarchs who had pointed to the graves of their ancestors in Corcyra (1.26.3). Graham noted that "it is probably right to see in the oligarchs of Epidamnus the descendants of the first settlers from Corcyra, who had become the aristocracy of the colony and provided a close link with the mother city." [2] What is most significant is that both sides in this *stasis* appealed to Corcyra, the mother city, the city with which the ties of kinship were strongest. Legon noted that it is "obvious" that the democrats also had such ties at Corcyra as Diodorus reports (D.S. 12.30.3).[3] It is clear, then, that political ideology was not the motivating factor behind the appeals of each faction. We do not know whether Corcyra had a democratic or oligarchic form of government at the time, but both sides appealed to it and there is no evidence that either appeal was put in political terms.[4] One might suppose that, if Corcyra was oligarchic, this would not only explain its support of the Epidamnian oligarchs more satisfactorily, but also imply that the Epidamnian oligarchs were politically motivated in their appeal. However, we would still be left with the need to explain the appeal of the Epidamnian democrats in political terms. Furthermore, the Epidamnian democrats later appealed to Corinth as their founding city and Corinth was surely not democratic.[5] The

[1] Graham, *Colony*, 150.

[2] Graham, *Colony*, 150.

[3] Legon, *Demos and Stasis*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 2, n. 1) 10.

[4] It is clear from Thucydides (3.70-85) that Corcyra was democratic in 427, but Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 766, and E. Meyer, *G.A.* 4^1, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 23, n. 1) 566; 4^2, 6, maintained that Corcyra was oligarchic in the 430's because it accepted the petition of the Epidamnian oligarchs and rejected the democrats. Busolt further argued (774-5) that Athens forced Corcyra to become democratic between the 430's and 427. Grote, *H.G.* 6, 51-52, believed that Corcyra was democratic in the 430's and accepted the kinship plea of the oligarchs as the decisive factor.

[5] Doubtless economic motives and the long standing hostility between Corinth and Corcyra were prime factors in the acceptance of the appeals by Corinth and Corcyra respectively (Legon, *Demos and Stasis*, 7; Graham, *Colony*, 142-49). Corinth was of course the original founder of Corcyra itself, but Corcyra had long since established its independence. Interestingly enough the Corinthians' chief justification for accepting the plea of the Epidamnian democrats is that Corcyra had not behaved as a colony should toward its mother city, particularly with respect to religious obligations

whole episode clearly demonstrates that, although a political division existed in the colony, relations with the mother city were determined primarily on grounds of kinship.

To return to Anactorium, we have no evidence of any division along political lines in the city either at the time of the Corinthian capture by treachery after Sybota, or at the time of its betrayal to the Athenians and their allies. Furthermore, Anactorium was founded by citizens of both Corinth and Corcyra, and was considered "in some degree a common possession of Corcyra and Corinth" (1.55.1).[1] Aristotle noted that such mixed origins in a state often resulted in *stasis* (*Pol.* 5.2.10-11, 1303 a-b), and Graham has shown that distinctions based on mixed origins continued to play a vital role in a colony even after many generations.[2] Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that the war between Corinth and Corcyra had a divisive effect on the colony founded by citizens of both states, and that because of the powerful ties of kinship between colonists and mother cities, pro-Corcyrean and pro-Corinthian groups actively supported their respective mother cities during the war.

The plan to betray Messina (No. 19) to the Athenians was forestalled by Alcibiades' disclosure of the plot to the pro-Syracusan party in Messina. The affair is reported briefly by Thucydides and Plutarch and the two parties in Messina are described only as pro-Syracusan and pro-Athenian. In order to suggest an explanation of the motives of this pro-Athenian fifth column it is necessary to consider what we do know about Messina's history.

Zancle (Messina) was originally a Chalcidian foundation (6.4.5). It was recolonized by Samians and other Ionians at the end of the Ionian revolt (6.4.5, Hdt. 6.22-24). Next the Samians were expelled

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(1.25.3-4; Graham, *Colony*, 153). This may well be Corinthian propaganda, but propaganda must have a basis in fact and Thucydides was well aware of the difference between propaganda and truth (see below on Messina in this chapter). Finally, it should be noted that while Epidamnus was considered a Corcyrean foundation (*supra*, p. 64, n. 5), some Corinthians were included in the original settlement and a nominal founder was invited from Corinth (1.24.2). The second plea of the Epidamnian democrats to Corinth as the mother city must be understood in light of this as well as of the fact that Corinth was also the mother city of Corcyra.

[1] Graham, *Colony*, 129; see further 130-31 for discussion of *koinon* (1.55.1). On the foundation of Anactorium, *supra*, p. 64, n. 3.

[2] Graham, *Colony*, 15-22. For further examples see below on Messina and Amphipolis in this chapter.

by Anaxilas of Rhegium who recolonized Zancle with a mixed population and changed its name to Messina (6.4.6).[1] Messina, then, was, like Anactorium, a city with mixed origins. However, unlike Anactorium in which the settlement was mixed in civic terms, Corcyrean and Corinthian, in Messina the successive settlements resulted in a mixture of Dorian and Ionian peoples; i.e., a racial as well as a civic division.

In the Peloponnesian War Messina was forced to submit to the Athenians in the summer of 426 (3.90.2-4).[2] In the next summer Messina invited Syracusan and Locrian intervention in order to revolt from Athens (4.1.1.). There is no evidence that this revolt was the product of any internal division in Messina. Messina then continued to support Syracuse against Athens and her Ionian allies, Leontini and Naxos (4.24-25) and in the next summer, 424, a general peace was concluded in Sicily (4.65). Two years later, in the summer of 422, Athens sent out Phaeax on a diplomatic mission to Italy and Sicily (5.4.1). In his narrative of this mission Thucydides mentions Phaeax' meeting with some Locrians who had been expelled from Messina. We then learn that these Locrians had been introduced into Messina by one faction during a state of *stasis* which broke out after the Sicilian peace of 424, and that Messina had fallen under Locrian control for a short period (5.5.1). Unfortunately, all we know is that Messina had been in *stasis* at some point between 424 and 422, that one side had appealed to the Locrians, apparently with success, and that subsequently the Locrians were expelled. We know almost nothing of internal politics in Messina but Freeman supposed that the *stasis* was a

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[1] Rhegium itself was originally a joint foundation of Chalcidians and Messenians driven out of the Peloponnese by the Spartans (Hdt. 7.64.1); see K. J. Dover, *Thucydides Book VI* (Oxford 1965) 9. In the case of Rhegium the distinctions based on origins in the population remained important even 240 years after the foundation (Graham, *Colony,* 18).

[2] Freeman, *Sicily* 3, *op. cit.* (*supra,* p. 20, n. 1) 31, following Holm, *Geschichte Siciliens* 2, *op. cit.* (*supra,* p. 20, n. 1) 5, suggested that there were Athenian supporters within Messina during this attack. That the mixed population of Messina was "not of one mind" (Freeman, 31) is true, for subsequent events in Messina support this. However, this alone does not justify the supposition that pro-Athenian supporters were busy in Messina in 426. The text of Thucydides does not support this view; the fact that the Messenians did not put up much resistance may have been due, not to any pro-Athenian group in the city, but to the Athenians' recent victory over the Messenians at Mylae.

result of the division inherent in the "mingled population." [1] Corroboration of a racial division as the origin of this *stasis* may be found in the fact that the Locrians, who were Dorians, had been called in by one side and settled as colonists (5.4.1).

In the summer of 415 Messina refused to ally with Athens or to allow the Athenians to enter the city. However, Messina did agree to provide the Athenians with a market outside the city walls (6.50.1). The next episode which involves Messina was the planned betrayal forestalled by Alcibiades the following winter. After this we hear no more of Messina and, although it was clearly governed by a pro-Syracusan party hostile to Athens, we note that it is absent from the list of Sicilian allies of Syracuse given by Thucydides just before the final battle in the harbor in the summer of 413 (7.58.1-2).[2]

What, then, can be concluded about the pro-Athenian fifth columnists? The fact that Messina allowed Athens a market outside the city in the summer of 415 suggests that there may have been pro-Athenian sentiment of some influence in the population. Also these negotiations were carried on by Alcibiades, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the plot to betray Messina began at this point, with Alcibiades himself involved in the intrigue.[3] After the failure of the fifth columnists we find that Messina still does not actively support Syracuse. It would seem that the victorious pro-Syracusan party still did not have enough power to bring Messina firmly over to Syracuse, which is what we would have expected at this point. The only evidence we have which would explain this is again the basic division of the population of Messina along racial lines. The pro-Syracusan party was able, with Alcibiades' help, to destroy the fifth columnists, but was not able to bring the mixed population of Messina to completely support Syracuse.[4] In light

[1] Freeman, *Sicily* 3, 71.

[2] At 7.33.2 Thucydides says that almost all of Sicily, except Acragas, now sided with Syracuse. As Dover, *Thuc. VII*, 26, pointed out, this is an exaggeration, for Naxos and Catana continued to support Athens, while Messina, "though unfriendly to Athens, is not mentioned in 58.1-2 among the allies of Syracuse."

[3] So H. D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge 1968) 224. At 6.74.1 Thucydides says that Alcibiades knew what was about to happen in Messina, ξυνειδὼς τὸ μέλλον, which could be true regardless of whether or not he had been personally involved in the plot. Plutarch, *Alc.* 22.1, reports that he knew the fifth columnists themselves, which, if true, would be a stronger indication of his involvement.

[4] Local politics may well have been a factor in the continued "neutrality"

of what evidence we have, we would suggest that the pro-Athenian fifth columnists were probably Messenians of Ionian origin who, like many of their contemporaries, viewed the war as basically one between Dorians and Ionians and acted accordingly.

This hypothesis raises the general problem of the importance of the racial factor in Sicilian affairs. Finley has recently maintained that the emphasis on racial ties as a determining force in Sicilian history is mistaken and is to a large extent the product of the propaganda of fifth century writers. Finley says that "generally the kith and kin appeal, frequent though it may have been, and even strong, was never potent enough to override all other considerations." [1] Graham, although he shows that the basic ties, including race, were very important in the relations between colonies and mother cities, even over a long period of time and often in spite of wide geographical separation, nonetheless is aware that there were many instances in which such ties were superseded by other factors. He points out however, that to Thucydides and his contemporaries this came as something of a surprise, particularly with reference to Sicily and the racial factor.[2] If we consider some of the relevant passages in Thucydides, it becomes apparent not only that the racial factor received a good deal of attention but also that Thucydides himself distinguished between propaganda and true motivation. In the summer of 427 the Leontines appealed to Athens for help in their war against Syracuse. Thucydides says that they based their appeal on their alliance with Athens and on the fact that they were Ionians (3.86.3). Thucydides then tells us that the Athenians agreed to aid Leontini, using the excuse, *prophasei*, of their kinship, but really because they wished to prevent the importation of grain from Sicily to the Peloponnese and because they wanted to see if it was possible to gain control of Sicily (3.86.4). At the congress at Gela in the summer of 424 Thucydides reports Hermocrates making the same distinction between Athens' alleged and real motives in

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of Messina. We know next to nothing about this, but it is clear from the history of the next generation that the Greek cities in Sicily had much to fear from a powerful Syracuse. Many Messenians may have been neither pro-Syracusan nor pro-Athenian and thought it better to stay out of the war and let Syracuse and Athens destroy each other.

[1] M. I. Finley, *A History of Sicily*, 1: *Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest* (London 1968) 32; cf. 21-22.

[2] Graham, *Colony*, 10-11, chs. 5-7, 215-17.

his speech to the assembled Sicilians (4.61.2-3). Later on in the same speech, however, Hermocrates makes his pan-Sicilian appeal for unity against the foreign invader, an appeal aimed at the very racial division under discussion (4.64.2-5).[1] In the debate about the Sicilian expedition at Athens in the spring of 415 Alcibiades is clearly represented as expecting a great Athenian advantage and some support to arise out of the mixed population of Sicily (6.17.2-4). In the summer of 415 the Athenians at Syracuse proclaimed that they had come to restore the Leontines because they were allies and kin. They then invited the Leontines in Syracuse, who may have been the fifth columnists,[2] to join them (6.50.4). Finally, in listing the allies of the Syracusans and Athenians before the last great battle in the harbor Thucydides says that they chose sides not so much because of kinship, but according to their particular interests in terms of advantage or compulsion (7.57.1). Nonetheless Thucydides finds it necessary to explain why certain Dorian states fought with Athens (7.57.6-10) and Dover points out that, while the basic principle of the classification of the allies is geographical (7.57-58), Thucydides "obviously attaches importance to racial divisions." [3]

It is quite clear, then, that while Thucydides emphasized the racial factor he was well aware that it was not the sole deciding force in the policy decisions of the states involved. But this is not to say that it was unimportant. Propaganda, if it is to be persuasive, needs a basis in fact. The Dorian-Ionian racial division in Sicily was a historical fact. It was also true that cities with mixed populations tended to suffer from *stasis*, as Aristotle maintained. And it was also true that both sides expected the racial divisions in Sicily to be a factor in the war. Here it must be remembered that the war itself tended to exacerbate existing divisions within the cities, as Thucydides tells us in his analysis of *stasis* (3.82.2). Therefore, we agree with Dover who says that "racial affinities and antipathies were fully exploited in the language of diplomacy . . . and there is no doubt that on occasion they affected policy and political views." [4] Finally, we must bear in mind that we are concerned in this study not with

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[1] Cf. Freeman, *Sicily* 3, 56-61; Busolt, *G.G.* 3[2], 1131; Dover *Thuc. VI*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 67, n. 1) 81.

[2] *Supra*, p. 20, n. 1.

[3] Dover, *Thuc. VII*, 48.

[4] Dover, *Thuc. VI*, 10.

the forces which determined the policies of particular cities, but with the motives of small groups of men within the several cities who were opposed to the policies of their cities. For such men as these, loyalty to a particular political party or to any other cause, especially one such as kinship or race, will provide the motivation for illegal and violent actions including treason. Another fifth column in Sicily, that in Camarina (No. 6) will serve to clarify our position.

In the summer of 425 a certain Archias and his party were plotting to betray Camarina to Syracuse. In the first place, Camarina illustrates the fact that racial ties were sometimes subordinated to other factors, for in this first Sicilian war it allied with Athens and Leontini, the Ionians. Indeed, Thucydides notes that it was the only Dorian state which did fight on the Athenian side (3.86.2).

In the second Sicilian war Camarina vacillated before finally supporting Syracuse. During the winter of 415/14 Thucydides reports a debate at Camarina in which ambassadors from Syracuse and Athens tried to convince the Camarinaeans to join their respective sides. The basic argument which Thucydides says Hermocrates made in this debate was a racial one; his call for support from the Camarinaeans was on a Dorian to Dorian basis (6.77.1-80.3). Thucydides represents him as saying that the Athenians are φύσει πολεμίους to Camarina while the Syracusans are φύσει συγγενεῖς (6.79.2). Camarina at first remained officially neutral, allied to both sides, but continued to assist Syracuse because it feared that neighboring city, with which it had long been at enmity, more than Athens (6.88.1-2); it finally came over to the Syracusan side after the battle of Plemmyrium had made it clear to those cities which had been "fence sitting" that Syracuse was probably going to win and, therefore, they had better join the winner (7.33.1-2).[1]

To return to the summer of 425, the fact that Dorian Camarina was fighting against Syracuse and the Dorian allies is easily understandable in terms of the long hostility between the two cities. Camarina had originally been founded by Syracuse, c. 598, but had then revolted from its mother city. The revolt was unsuccessful and the inhabitants of Camarina were defeated and expelled by Syracuse (6.5.3).[2] In the first decade of the fifth century Hippocrates of Gela received the territory of Camarina from Syracuse

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[1] Cf. Dover, *Thuc. VII*, 26.

[2] For the date and further details about the colonization see Graham, *Colony*, 93, with further references to the literature.

and recolonized it (6.5.3, Hdt. 7.154.3). Next Gelon, as tyrant of Syracuse, sacked Camarina and enrolled the inhabitants as citizens of Syracuse and finally Camarina was settled for the third time by Gela, perhaps about 461 (6.5.3, Hdt. 7.156.2, D.S. 10.76.5).[1] In addition there was the proximity of Camarina to Syracuse which Camarina, the smaller and weaker, viewed with apprehension, not without reason in light of its history.[2]

This fear and hostility of Camarina towards Syracuse best explains its unique position among the Dorian Sicilian states in the summer of 425. But there was a group within Camarina, led by Archias, who were pro-Syracusan and planned to betray the city. We have already noted that the Syracusan diplomatic overture to Camarina in the winter of 415/14 was put precisely in racial terms. The population of Camarina in 425 were descendants of the Geloan, and perhaps some Syracusan [3] settlers of the previous generation. It must be remembered that Gela too was Dorian and was supporting Syracuse in 425.[4] Here too we must bear in mind that we are not talking about the policy and motives of the city of Camarina which clearly superseded "ties of kith and kin," but about the motives of a dissident group within the city. As in the case of Messina we have almost no evidence regarding internal political affairs in Camarina, and consequently any assessment of Archias and his party may be incomplete. We have noted, however, that family, religious and racial ties were quite important in the relations between colonies and mother cities, and that the racial factor, although often subordinated to other interests, was considered influential on both sides in the Sicilian war. We would suggest, therefore, in light of what evidence we do have, that Archias and his party may have represented those people in Camarina by whom ties to their mother cities and fellow Dorians were taken seriously.[5]

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[1] Diodorus dates the third foundation to 461, after Gelon's death. The passage in Thucydides seems to indicate that this foundation took place in Gelon's lifetime after his destruction of Camarina. Cf. Freeman, *Sicily* 2, 318-19; Dover, *Thuc. VI*, 10.

[2] Freeman, *Sicily* 3, 183. [3] Freeman, *Sicily* 2, 318-19.

[4] At 3.86.2 Thucydides says that all the Dorian states except Camarina were allied with Syracuse. In the second Sicilian war Gela again supported Syracuse (7.1.4-5, 33.1, 58.1).

[5] The case of Acragas, another Dorian city which once allied with Athens (5.4.6), in 422, and later remained neutral during the second Sicilian war (7.32.1, 33.2, 58.1), provides a partial parallel with Camarina. Acragas

D. *Brasidas' Campaign: the tribute and other factors*

When Brasidas set out to "liberate" Athens' allies in the north, "he must have counted on anti-Athenian movements in those cities and his calculations proved sound." [1] However, Busolt has pointed out that although Thucydides speaks at times as if support for Brasidas and the Peloponnesians was widespread in these cities, nonetheless when he actually describes the revolts of Acanthus, Amphipolis, Torone, Mende, and Scione, the picture of pro-Peloponnesian support in the cities is quite different.[2] In fact it was only at Scione that the population showed enthusiastic support for Brasidas (4.120.121.1).[3] Earlier at Acanthus there had been a divison in the population on the question of receiving Brasidas, and after he was allowed to speak before the assembled Acanthians they voted in a secret ballot to revolt (4.84-88). In the cases of Amphipolis, Torone and Mende Brasidas found little support in the bulk of the inhabitants and relied on fifth columnists to betray these cities. It should be noted too that while Busolt was correct in noting the difference between Thucydides' general comments on the enthusiasm for the Peloponnesian cause which Brasidas engendered by his just and moderate conduct and his descriptions of the actual situations in the several cities, Thucydides himself distinguished

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continued to be neutral even after the fall of Plemmyrium to the Syracusans (7,33.2), but we know that a party existed within the city which favored joining the Syracusans. At 7.46 Thucydides says that Syracuse sent Sicanus with 15 ships to Acragas, which was in a state of *stasis*, in order to bring it over if that were possible. A little later we learn that while Sicanus was still at Gela the party favorable to the Syracusans was expelled (7.50.1) and Acragas maintained neutrality to the end (7.58.1). Here again Thucydides tells us nothing of the internal situation in Acragas save that *stasis* had broken out and one party favored Syracuse. While the pro-Syracusan sympathies of the party in Acragas may also reflect racial feeling, there is no certain evidence that this group intended to betray their city. The bare facts which Thucydides supplies do not really suggest that any plans had been formulated for a betrayal. Sicanus was sent off ὅπως ἐπαγάγοιτο τὴν πόλιν, εἰ δύναιτο (7.46.1), which need not indicate that Acragas was about to be betrayed. Sicanus may have been sent to influence the situation at Acragas with a show of force in support of the pro-Syracusan party; or his appearance at Acragas may have been intended to stimulate some treachery within, a kind of angling for a fifth column (*infra*, ch. 7).

[1] Adcock, *War*, 73.

[2] Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1158-59, n. 1.

[3] Interestingly enough Thucydides begins his account of the revolt of Scione by noting that the Scioneans considered that they were originally founded by men of Pellene in the Peloponnese; i.e., while as "Achaeans"

between Brasidas' diplomatic successes and those cities he took by treachery (4.81.2).

The traitors at Amphipolis (No. 11) are described by Thucydides as Argilians residing in Amphipolis and others who were working with them. The only further information we are given about the "others" is that some were working on behalf of Perdiccas and some on behalf of the Chalcidians (4.103.3). Thucydides then says that the people of Argilus itself were especially active in the plot; Argilus was nearby and the Argilians had always been viewed with suspicion by the Athenians and had been plotting against Amphipolis. Brasidas' arrival in the north gave them their opportunity and they set to work with their fellow Argilians resident in Amphipolis for the betrayal of the city. Thus when Brasidas arrived in their territory the Argilians immediately received him, revolted from Athens and pushed on with him against Amphipolis (4.103.4). With the aid of treason in the ranks of the Amphipolitan guards, Brasidas quickly became master of Amphipolitan territory outside the city walls (4.103.5).

The hostility of Argilus toward Athens probably was a result of the incorporation of much of their territory into the Athenian foundation of Amphipolis in 437/6. It has been suggested that the reduction in Argilus' tribute after the foundation of Amphipolis reflects the absorption of Argilian territory.[1] As Gomme pointed out the reduction in tribute had done little to appease Argilus or increase its loyalty to Athens.[2] Although we do not know how much Argilus was assessed in 425, it is reasonable to assume that the amount was higher than in previous years.[3] The assessment of 425 had provided for a general increase in tribute throughout the empire. The decree itself was moved in the third prytany of 425/4,[4] in the early autumn, and the fact that Brasidas began his campaign a few months later, just after the tributary states got the news, suggests that the support he must have counted on derived in part from the tribute increase.[5]

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they may not have considered themselves Dorians, their origins were Peloponnesian and their dialect was West Greek.

[1] *A.T.L.* 3, 308; for the amounts of Argilus' tribute see pp. 5-6, 62, 308, n. 42 and Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 211, 277.

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 576. [3] *A.T.L.* 3, 5-6.

[4] *A.T.L.* 3, 70-89; Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 500-04.

[5] So *A.T.L.* 3, 325; cf. Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 557.

To return to the Argilian fifth columnists in Amphipolis, we do not know precisely when they came to live in Amphipolis, but it is likely that they did so at the time of the foundation and incorporation of Argilian territory in 437/6.[1] Nor do we know whether or not they enjoyed full citizen rights in Amphipolis.[2] It is clear that the betrayal of the city in which they lived was undertaken at the instigation of and, therefore, because of their loyalty to their mother town. In the same passage in which he warns against the danger of exiles, Aeneas Tacticus notes that men of nearby states residing in a city for any purpose should also be watched.[3]

The other members of the fifth column are described as οἱ μὲν Περδίκκᾳ πειθόμενοι, οἱ δὲ Χαλκιδεῦσιν (4.103.3). Except in the case of Argilus we do not know from where the non-Athenian settlers of Amphipolis came, but that they were from the surrounding area seems likely.[4] They may well have come from nearby Chalcidian cities or cities now loyal to Perdiccas. What is certain is the population of Amphipolis was mixed. Thucydides clearly distinguishes between Amphipolitans of Athenian origin and those of mixed origins (4.106.1) and, as events unfolded, these distinctions in origin became all important.[5] After Brasidas had captured the territory outside the walls there was great confusion in the city, especially because the Amphipolitans were suspicious of each other (4.104.1). Thucydides even notes that had Brasidas advanced at that moment against the city, he would have taken it (4.104.2), but Brasidas elected to wait for his supporters within to move (4.104.3). Next those opposed to the traitors, clearly the majority of Amphipolitans, prevented the opening of the gates and sent to the Athenian commander at Thasos, Thucydides, for help (4.104.4). Brasidas then offered his proclamation and his terms were moderate (4.105.5). At this point the majority of

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[1] Graham, *Colony*, 37-38, 199-206; *A.T.L.* 3, 308.

[2] Graham, *Colony*, 247. n. 1.

[3] Aen. Tact. 10.10. Tacticus says that they should be "registered," ἀναγράφεσθαι. He clearly had temporary residents primarily in mind, such as students, but the addition "or for any other purpose," ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ χρείαν, widens the classification. The Argilians may or may not have been citizens of Amphipolis, but in view of the proximity of Argilus and the fact that their settlement in Amphipolis was very recent, this mattered little with regard to their loyalties.

[4] *A.T.L.* 3, 308.

[5] Graham, *Colony*, 206.

Amphipolitans began to change their minds, especially because most of them were not of Athenian origin, and the city accepted Brasidas' terms (4.106.1-3).

Both the betrayal and the subsequent diplomatic success of Brasidas were fundamentally based on the divisions of origin among the Amphipolitans themselves. In the case of the fifth columnists from Argilus that town's hostility toward Athens, and probably, the raising of the tribute in 425 played a vital role. The other fifth columnists probably were settlers from Chalcidian cities or from places loyal to Perdiccas. Finally, the presence of the Athenian military in Amphipolis (4.104.4) and the financial obligations which Athens had imposed on the colony (4.108.1) [1] may well have served as further incentives to treasonable action for those Amphipolitans who wanted to be free of Athenian control. Such obvious evidence of Athens' control could only have served to aggravate the hostilities inherent in the mixed population.

At Mende (No. 13) all we are told is that the fifth columnists were few in number (4.123.2). We do not have any record of the amount by which Mende's tribute was increased in 425, but Gomme noted that the general tribute increase, while it did not result in widespread hostility toward Athens in these northern cities, "may indeed have hurt only the rich." [2] That this was a factor in the betrayals to Brasidas is supported by two passages in Aristophanes: a wealthy traitor from Thrace is about to be tried at *Vespae* 288-89; Hermes rebukes the Athenians for having harassed the wealthy men of their allies with the charge of favoring Brasidas (*Pax* 639-40). It is possible, then, that these Mendean fifth columnists were a small group of wealthy men who found in Brasidas a means of deliverance from the rising costs of allegiance to Athens. Moreover, Thucydides has provided us with another example of a psychological factor, again fear, in the betrayal. Thucydides says that these fifth columnists went through with their plot because they feared its revelation (4.123.2).[3]

In the case of Torone (No. 12) we are again told that the fifth columnists were only a few men (4.110.1). Torone's tribute had risen twice since the beginning of the war and by the winter of

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[1] Amphipolis did not pay tribute. The exact nature of these revenues to Athens is unknown (*A.T.L.* 309, n. 45).

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 557.

[3] *Supra,* on Megara and Athens in this chapter.

425/4 the amount reflected an overall increase of at least 150 percent.[1] We would suggest, therefore, that it is quite likely that the fifth columnists in Torone were a little group of wealthy men to whom this increase in tribute mattered a great deal. Furthermore, while Gomme was undoubtedly correct in maintaining that here at Torone "again there is no evidence that the majority wanted to be quit of the Athenians," [2] there clearly were some citizens who had not been parties to the conspiracy but promptly supported the fifth columnists. Thucydides says that while most of the citizens were in a state of surprise and panic, the conspirators and "those who were pleased with the betrayal" immediately joined with the Peloponnesians who had been introduced (4.113.1). Finally here again the presence of an Athenian garrison (4.110.1-2, 113.1) probably increased the resentment of those Toroneans opposed to Athenian control.

E. *Byzantium: a unique case*

The case of Byzantium (No. 26) is unique in terms of the motivation of the fifth columnists. Byzantium had revolted from Athens and received Peloponnesian forces in the summer of 411 (8.80.2-3). In the summer of 409 Alcibiades and the Athenians attacked Byzantium and the siege lasted into the following winter.[3] Finally a fifth column, five of whom are named by Xenophon—Cydon, Ariston, Anaxicrates, Lycurgus and Analixaus [4]—betrayed the city. Diodorus reports that they did so because they hated the harsh administration of the Spartan Harmost Clearchus (D.S. 13.66.6). Xenophon and Plutarch both say that Anaxilaus was afterwards tried for treason at Sparta,[5] but was acquitted

[1] In 430 Torone's tribute had been doubled, rising from 6 talents to 12. In the general increase of 425 it rose to 15 talents or more; see *A.T.L.* 3, 325.

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 589. [3] For the date, *supra*, p. 23, n. 1.

[4] Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.18; Plutarch names only Anaxilaus and Lycurgus (*Alc.* 31.2). Cydon is probably the same Cydon who was one of the envoys to Athens when Byzantium allied with Athens in 378 (*I.G.* 2^2, 41; Tod, *G.H.I.* 2, 121). As Tod notes, he probably fled Byzantium with the other fifth columnists when Lysander later recaptured it (Xen., *Hell.* 2.2.1). It is possible that another of the Byzantine envoys of 378, Philinus, was associated with the fifth columnists. We know that a Byzantine named Philinus was granted the titles of *proxenos* and benefactor by the Athenians about the same time that Lysander recaptured Byzantium and the fifth columnists fled (I. G. 2^2, 76; Tod, *G.H.I.* 2, p. 57).

[5] Presumably he was one fifth columnist who did not escape when Lysander recaptured Byzantium.

because in his defense he argued that he was not a Spartan but a Byzantine; he had not betrayed his city, Byzantium, but had saved it. Specifically he maintained that because of the siege no provisions were coming into the city and the Peloponnesian forces were consuming what food there was, while the Byzantines themselves and their women and children were left to starve (Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.19; Plu., *Alc.* 31.5-6).

However welcome the Peloponnesian forces had been when Byzantium revolted, the effect of the protracted siege led to the desire on the part of some Byzantines to be rid of them. Of course Clearchus fed his soldiers first. It is somewhat surprising that discontent among the Byzantines was not more widespread, as it had been in Mytilene when the starving population forced the oligarchs to surrender in the summer of 427 (3.27.3). However, our evidence indicates that most of the Byzantines remained loyal to the Peloponnesian cause during the siege and, furthermore, that the fifth column arose only when the siege was causing extreme hardship. The fifth columnists' reaction to the Peloponnesian garrison cannot be explained as the natural reaction of a small group of dissenters within the city, for there is no evidence that they were dissatisfied until late in the siege. Anaxilaus and his comrades provide the only example of fifth columnists who were clearly motivated by a genuine concern for the well being of their city.[1]

Conclusion

To conclude, we first note that in some cases one motivating factor, e.g., the racial at Messina and Camarina, seems to have been the dominant force behind the betrayal. But we must be wary of oversimplification. In order to elucidate the various factors we have had to emphasize them where the evidence existed; but, it must be remembered that the evidence is often far from complete.

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[1] Of course one might argue that Anaxilaus' group had been pro-Athenian all along, presumably because they were in important positions until the revolt. The later epigraphical evidence (*supra*, p. 77, n. 4) could be adduced to support this, but only *ex post facto*. Such an argument would be *ex silentio* for the only evidence we do have supports the position we take. Apparently the Spartans who tried Anaxilaus believed him.

With this reservation, we have seen that *stasis* and politics played an important role, but that any analysis which concentrates solely on the *stasis* arising out of oligarchic democratic party strife is insufficient. The opposition between oligarchs and democrats was not merely a difference in political ideology, but included social and economic distinctions as well, and these must be included in any assessment of the motives of the parties involved. In addition, it has been shown that *stasis* was not always a prerequisite to betrayal and, that divisions in a state, including *stasis,* sometimes originated because of racial or civic loyalties; i.e., on social and not necessarily on political grounds. In purely economic terms, wealthy citizens undoubtedly feared for their property and balked at the rising costs of the war. It is important to remember that we are not dealing with forces which motivated cities to pursue a certain policy, but with the motives of small groups of dissenters within particular cities. For such men, political, social or economic causes gave rise to intense hatred of the opposition, fear, and the desire for power, what we have termed the psychological factors in the betrayals. While in any particular case one factor may appear as the most important, in a majority of instances a combination of factors was present. This clearly demonstrates the basic thesis of this chapter: the motives which impelled the various fifth columnists to commit treason were complex, and any attempt to explain them must consider the social, economic, and psychological factors along with the purely political ones.

CHAPTER FIVE

OTHER FIFTH COLUMNS

We have already noted that the term "fifth column" has a wider application than the overt betrayal of a city.[1] In this chapter we will consider those fifth columns which did not, as far as we can be certain, plan or carry out an overt betrayal. In some cases we have definite evidence of treasonable or subversive activity in cooperation with the enemy; in others, the evidence is only suggestive of a fifth column.

1. Cythera, Mytilene, Chios

When the Athenians attacked Cythera in the summer of 424, we are told that, before it capitulated, some men of Cythera were in communication with Nicias. In fact, communication with this group paved the way for the capitulation (4.54.3). Apparently Athens had supporters within Cythera, but we know nothing about their identity or motives, nor is there any evidence that they planned an overt betrayal. However, Thucydides' description of them as τινας τῶν Κυθηρίων clearly indicates that these men were acting on their own and were not legitimate diplomatic representatives of Cythera.[2] These Cytherean fifth columnists illustrate a basic kind of treason: communication with the enemy. A group within a city, often, we have seen, consisting of prominent and influential men, was in a good position to give vital information to the enemy. For example, the fifth columnists in Syracuse (No. 20) kept Nicias well informed, particularly regarding Syracusan finances (7.48.2, 49.1). Unfortunately, we have no details about the Cytherean fifth column's communications with Nicias.

A clear example of a fifth column which gave vital information to the enemy is provided by the Athenian *proxenoi* in Mytilene during its revolt from Athens in the summer of 428. Thucydides says that these *proxenoi* reported to the Athenians that Mytilene was engaged in unifying Lesbos under its control and in planning, with the aid of the Spartans and Boeotians, to revolt from Athens

[1] *Supra*, ch. 1 under Terminology.

[2] *Supra*, ch. 1 and n. 6 on p. 12.

(3.2.3).[1] The Athenians attempted to reach a diplomatic settlement, but when this failed they sent out 40 ships to try to force the Mytileneans into line by striking the first blow. Their plan was to catch the Mytileneans by surprise while the population was celebrating a festival to Malean Apollo outside the city (3.3.1-3). Thucydides tells us that the Athenians were informed about this festival, ἐσηγγέλθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς, but does not name the informers. It is reasonable, however, to assume that the same men who had revealed the plans of the revolt now gave this information to Athens. Strategically the information was of great value. The detail that the festival was to be ἔξω τῆς πόλεως is quite significant in view of what we know about the facts of warfare.[2] Had the plan worked, the Mytileneans would have been caught by surprise in the midst of a festival outside their defenses with no chance of organized resistance, and the revolt of Mytilene would probably have ended at this point. But the Mytileneans were informed of the plan, cancelled the festival and fortified and set guards around their half finished walls and the harbors (3.3.5). When the Athenians arrived they drove back the ships which came out against them and the Mytileneans asked for terms. An armistice was arranged and an embassy was sent to Athens, including one of the fifth columnists who now was repentant of his actions, to try to arrange for the withdrawal of the Athenians. At the same time the Mytileneans also sent an embassy to Sparta for aid. The embassy to Athens returned having reached no agreement and hostilities resumed (3.4-5.1). For the remaining period of the revolt we hear no more of these Athenian *proxenoi*, nor are they mentioned after the surrender of Mytilene to Paches early in 427 (3.28.1). With Legon, "we can only surmise that they had been effectively silenced." [3] Their betrayal of the revolt, however, had an important bearing on the outcome. Athens' early response and the resulting siege, before Mytilene had completed its preparations, certainly contributed to the ultimate failure of the revolt.[4]

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[1] Athens also received intelligence of the impending revolt from Tenedians and Methymneans (3.2.3).

[2] *Supra*, ch. 3.

[3] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 210.

[4] At 3.13.2 the Mytileneans point out to the Spartans that their revolt has come about prematurely before they were fully prepared. Decisive action by the Athenians throughout, coupled with lack of support from the Peloponnesian allies, clearly played a role in the failure of the Spartans to come to Mytilene's aid (3.15-16).

Thucydides describes these fifth columnists as αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν, πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων (3.2.3). Aristotle reports this *stasis* originated because a certain Doxander, *proxenos* of Athens in Mytilene, was rejected in his attempt to marry his sons to two orphaned daughters of a wealthy citizen of Mytilene named Timophanes (*Politics* 5.3.3., 1304a). Grote [1] and Busolt [2] accepted the Aristotelian account, while Gomme says "there will have been more to it than this." [3] Legon assumes that these *proxenoi* "must be democrats or potential democrats" and that "Athens distributed its political patronage in Mytilene, i.e., the *proxenia* and the consequent privilege of representing Athenian interests, not to members of the ruling faction, but to their rivals." [4]

It may well be that Athens looked for men with democratic sympathies to fill the office of *proxenos*, but beyond the general tendency of Athens to support democratic regimes, a tendency which had its exceptions (including Mytilene), there is no evidence to support Legon's assumption. Rather, both accounts may indicate that the opposition of the *proxenoi* to the existing regime originated for private reasons. Aristotle clearly gives the rejected suit of Doxander's sons, and Thucydides' ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν may be understood as emphasizing the private nature of the opposition of the *proxenoi*.[5] Furthermore, Aristotle records this affair as an example of the disagreements in ruling or oligarchic classes themselves which result in serious consequences for the whole state

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[1] Grote, *H.G.* 5, 143, n. 1. Grote pointed out that while this private *stasis* was not the cause of the war with Athens, as Aristotle maintained, there is no reason to doubt the story of the *stasis* itself.

[2] Busolt, *G.G.* 3², 1005, n. 2. Busolt suggested that Thucydides suppressed Doxander's name out of personal regard for him.

[3] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 252-53.

[4] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 204.

[5] Cf. 8.86.5, where ἰδίᾳ refers to the private reasons why the men at Samos were angry at the envoys of the Four Hundred. This surely means the concern for their relatives mentioned at 8.86.3. Of course, because one does something "privately" does not preclude his having political motives too; cf. 2.67.1, where the Argive Pollis goes on the embassy to Persia ἰδίᾳ, "privately"; i.e., not as an official representative of the Argive government which was democratic and neutral. In view of the later pro-Spartan activities of the Argive oligarchs, it is reasonable to assume that Pollis was an oligarch (see below on Argos in this chapter). But, in the case of the *proxenoi*, we have no evidence of any politically motivated opposition to the existing regime and ἰδίᾳ may be taken with κατὰ στάσιν. Grote, Busolt and Gomme seem to have taken it this way (*supra*, notes 1, 2, 3), as did Steup, *Thuk.* 3, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 50, n. 3) 3.

(*Politics* 5.3.1-3, 1303b-1304a). Finally, there is no evidence throughout Thucydides' account of the revolt of Mytilene that there was a democratic faction opposed to the existing oligarchic regime, nor is there any evidence that Athens either set up or intended to set up a democracy in Mytilene. In fact, we do not know what kind of government was established in Mytilene after the revolt. As Legon, following Bradeen, rightly points out, the *demos* turned on the oligarchy because of the famine resulting from the siege (3.27.3); this mutiny of the *demos* was not inspired by a desire for democracy or any love of Athens.[1] In view of all this, we find it difficult to accept Legon's assessment that "these men must be democrats or potential democrats" and that Athens made them *proxenoi* because they were the "rivals" of the "ruling faction." It is at least as likely that they were members of the ruling faction and their break with it came about for private, not political, reasons.

We have already seen in the preceding chapter that the political factor by itself does not usually suffice to explain the motivation of fifth columnists, even in cases where there is definite evidence of political motivation. Furthermore, we have noted that psychological factors were often involved in moving these groups of dissidents to treason. In Doxander's case we are dealing with one man, and there is no reason to reject Aristotle's account of an emotional reaction to a disappointment in his private affairs as the basis of his embitterment and subsequent treason. In any event, Doxander was not alone; for he was only one of the *proxenoi* who made up the fifth column. Here we would point out that, of all the Mytileneans, the ones who clearly had the most to lose if Mytilene revolted from Athens were the Athenian *proxenoi*. As Legon has noted, the influence and prestige of this position "cannot be overestimated." [2] We would suggest, therefore, that the *proxenoi* betrayed the revolt in order to preserve their advantageous office and because, as the official recognized friends of Athens, they would probably be in danger if the revolt succeeded. This view avoids imputing any purely political motives to them, for which there is no evidence, and is consistent with Thucydides' words ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν.

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[1] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 223-25. D. W. Bradeen, "The Popularity of the Athenian Empire," *Historia* 9 (1960) 265.

[2] Legon, "Meg. and Myt.," 204. For bibliography on Greek proxeny, *infra*, p. 106, n. 2.

Chios remained a loyal ally of Athens until, along with a number of other states in the empire, it revolted after Athens' defeat at Syracuse.[1] Despite the consistent loyalty of Chios, the Athenians ordered the Chians to dismantle their wall in the winter of 425/4 because they suspected that some revolutionary activity was in the making (4.51). The Chians complied with Athens' order and continued to support the Athenian cause until the winter of 413/12. However, the Athenian suspicions of 425/4 probably had some basis in fact. There is evidence that some Chians were involved in pro-Peloponnesian activities in or about 427. Adcock has shown that *I.G.* 5.1 is probably a record of contributions to the Spartan war chest collected by Alcidas in 427.[2] Among the contributors we find τῶν Χίων τοὶ φίλοι, "the friends (of Sparta) among the Chians."[3] Adcock writes that "the implication is that while the government of Chios remained loyal to Athens or at least not openly against her, there was a section of Chians who had different sentiments."[4] Dittenberger cited Thucydides 4.51 in connection with the inscription as further evidence of pro-Spartan sentiment in Chios.[5] Thucydides simply says that the Athenians suspected τι νεωτεριεῖν (4.51), and a revolution need not involve a fifth column. It is also possible that, since we know that Alcidas took some Chians prisoner whom he later released (3.32.3), Adcock may be correct in saying "it may not be too cynical to suggest that possibly the friendliness of some Chians was induced by bonds and the prospect of personal rather than communal liberty."[6] However, the inscription and Thucydides 4.51 taken together are suggestive of a pro-Spartan fifth column in Chios in the mid-twenties.[7]

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[1] A fragment of Eupolis' *Poleis* praises Chios for her staunch support of Athens; Th. Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* 1 (Leipzig 1880-88), p. 321. Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1184, n. 1, dated the *Poleis* to 424, taking this fragment as a reference to the agreement between Athens and Chios in the winter of 425/4 (4.51). As Gomme points out, "this is to be too precise; Chios was consistently well behaved until her revolt in 413" (*Thuc.* 3, 500).

[2] F. E. Adcock, "Alcidas ἀργυρόλογος," *Mélanges Glotz* 1 (Paris 1932) 1-6.

[3] *I.G.* 5.1.10; Tod, *G.H.I.* 1, p. 134; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, p. 184.

[4] Adcock, "Alcidas," *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 2) 5.

[5] W. Dittenberger, *S.I.G.* 1^3.84. Dittenberger dated the inscription 428-21.

[6] Adcock, "Alcidas," 5.

[7] One may note that, although Dittenberger, Adcock, Tod, Meiggs and L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961) 197, date the inscription to the twenties, the dating is not certain. See Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, p. 184, where Lewis suggests that it might belong to 396/5.

2. Fifth columns and revolts

Chios revolted from Athens in summer, 412 (8.14.1-2). Since a pro-Spartan fifth column may have been active in Chios in the mid-twenties, it might be suspected that these same men played a role in the revolt. This may have been the case, but it does not mean that they were still fifth columnists in 412. In his accounts of the revolts during the war, Thucydides usually distinguishes between those revolts which involved treason and those which did not. In some cases, fifth columns engineered the revolts; e.g., Amphipolis (No. 11), Torone (No. 12), Mende (No. 13). These revolts were the product of treasonable actions by groups within the cities opposed to the Athenian alliances maintained by the governments of their cities. In other cases, the revolts reflect a change in policy by the legal governments of the cities and no treason was involved; e.g., Mytilene (3.2), Acanthus (4.84-88.1), Scione (4.120-121.1). Between these two extremes, there are some revolts in which the evidence is difficult to interpret. We begin with Thucydides' description of the revolt of Chios.

A. *The revolt of Chios*

In describing the negotiations preceding the revolt of Chios, Thucydides speaks of "the Chians", not a particular faction in Chios, as desiring the revolt (8.5.4., 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 7.1). Next we learn that a majority of the Chians were kept in ignorance of the plans because "the few," οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι, usually understood as meaning the oligarchs,[1] did not want to incur the hostility of the populace before they had the power to act (8.9.3). When they did act, we find that again the architects of the revolt were only "the few," that they urged Alcibiades and Chalcideus to arrive unexpectedly at Chios, and that they arranged for the *Boule* to be in session when Alcibiades and Chalcideus did arrive (8.14.1-2). At this point it would seem that we are dealing either with a fifth column, or with the officials of an oligarchic government. Clearly a small group of Chians engineered the revolt in cooperation with the enemy. Yet Thucydides, far from describing these ὀλίγοι as traitors, even offers a defense of their revolt (8.24.5). On the other hand, he tells us that because of the hardships resulting from Athenian attacks "some men," τινες, tried to bring the city back over to the Athenians (8.24.6). This is then referred to as a plot, ἐπιβουλὴν (8.24.6), and

[1] Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1417; Steup, *Thuk.* 8, 26.

later as treason, προδοσίαν (8.31.1). Finally we learn that Tydeus son of Ion and his adherents were put to death on a charge of "Atticism" (8.38.3). It is the pro-Atheian opposition to the revolt which is described as the work of a fifth column (No. 20). What, then, are we to make of the ὀλίγοι who were the authors of the revolt? As we have seen, Thucydides first says that the revolt was negotiated by "the Chians"; the implication is that this was the act of the state of Chios, the leaders of which Thucydides later tells us had the best interests of the state in mind (8.24.5).[1] That we then learn that the revolt was the work of "the few" or "the oligarchs" does not necesserarily mean that they were fifth columnists, because Chios probably had a mixed form of constitution in which the "few" and the "many" shared in the government (8.24.4).[2] That "the few" arranged for the meeting of the *Boule* indicates again that they were leaders of the Chian government.[3] Finally, although the majority of Chians were taken by surprise and confused when Alcibiades and Chalcideus arrived, the question was submitted to the *Boule* which sanctioned the revolt. Thucydides makes it clear, then, that this revolt was the act of the chief officials of the Chian government and constitutional procedure was followed. It is also clear that the Chians did not accept the revolt under duress, for Alcibiades and Chalcideus arrived with only 5 ships (8.12.3). Rather, we find that the Chians undertook the Peloponnesian cause with great zeal (8.22.1) and there is no evidence of any opposition to the new alignment until the war began to go against them.[4] In conclusion, the Chian oligarchic leaders exercised shrewd

[1] For this use of the ethnic adjective as a substantive to mean the state itself as opposed to a specific group within the state, *supra*, ch. 1. Cf., T. J. Quinn, "Political Groups at Chios: 412 B.C.," *Historia* 18 (1969) 23.

[2] Quinn, "Chios," *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 1) 23-26. Thucydides' admiration for the Chians' moderate constitution is paralleled by his admiration for the government of the Five Thousand at Athens in 411 (8.97.2).

[3] The fact that the question of the revolt was submitted to the *Boule* is a further indication of the mixed nature of the Chian constitution. The oligarchs had to secure the approval of the *Boule*, which may have been the popular council, βουλὴ δημοσίη, known from a sixth century inscription (Tod, *G.H.I.* 1, 1; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, 8).

[4] This opposition was not politically inspired. Tydeus and his party are not described as democrats, but simply as pro-Athenian. It is clear that their pro-Athenian treasonable activities came about primarily because of the difficulties into which their state had fallen, not because of any particular ideology. Similarly, as Thucydides makes clear (8.24.5), the revolt was arranged by the oligarchic leaders because they hoped it would benefit the whole state, not for any domestic political motives. The fact that the

political judgement and timing and employed, to some extent, the methodology of a fifth column, but, although they were mistaken in their assessment of Athens' power and ultimately brought their state into great difficulties, they were not traitors.[1]

B. *The revolt of Thasos*

Although the revolt of Thasos did not involve any treason, Thucydides' narrative suggests that there was a pro-Spartan fifth column active before the revolt. Similarly, there is some evicence that, after the revolt, a pro-Athenian fifth column existed in Thasos.

During the summer of 411 Dieitrephes arrived in Thasos and, consistent with the policy of the Four Hundred, abolished the democracy (8.64.2). As Phrynichus had warned, the establishment of oligarchies in the allied cities would not insure loyalty to the Athenian cause (8.48.5). Thasos was the first to prove Phrynichus correct. Two months after Dieitrephes' departure the city was fortified and the Thasians daily looked for the Spartans to free them from Athens (8.64.3). At this point it is clear that the revolt of Thasos involved no treason; revolt from Athens had now become the avowed foreign policy of the oligarchic government.

Thucydides goes on to say that Thasian exiles were with the Peloponnesians and were working with their associates in Thasos to effect Peloponnesian intervention and a revolt. In fact, the Athenians had played directly into the hands of the exiles and their associates by abolishing the democracy which would have opposed them (8.64.4).[2] This suggests that pro-Spartan Thasians

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oligarchic regime became narrow and oppressive (8.38.3) was a result of the revolt and subsequent Chian difficulties, not the aim of the revolt. Cf., Quinn, "Chios", 26-30.

[1] The revolt of Miletus was arranged by Alcibiades in cooperation with the Milesian leaders. Thucydides says that he was ἐπιτήδειος τοῖς προεστῶσι τῶν Μιλησίων (8.17.2). It seems clear that this revolt was the act of the Milesian government, and there is no evidence that the Milesian people opposed it. Late in the war, just before Aegospotamoi, the Milesian oligarchs overthrew the democracy with the aid of Spartan troops (D.S. 13.104.5). Sparta, however, was Miletus' ally, so, by our definition of a "fifth column" as a party in league with the *enemy*, this subversion was not the action of a fifth column. There is no evidence that the Milesian leaders in the summer of 412 had any subversive intentions in arranging the revolt. For the revolt of Euboea, *infra*, ch. 7.

[2] We take αὐτοῖς and the unexpressed subject of ἐβούλοντο to refer to the "the exiles and their associates in the city" (8.64.4).

had been working with the exiles and the Peloponnesians while the democracy was still in power. If this was the case, then they constituted a fifth column at that time. In the changing fortunes of war it was possible that one day's treason might become the next day's patriotism.

Thasos revolted from Athens late in 411 (*Hell. Oxy.* 2.4). The subsequent history of Thasos is beset with difficulties: we do not know whether the pro-Spartan oligarchic regime was continuously in power until Thrasybulus recovered Thasos in summer, 407 (Xen., *Hell.* 1.4.9; D.S. 13.72.1), or was deposed once or twice between 411 and 407.[1] Regardless of whether or not their rule was interrupted, epigraphical evidence indicates that dissident Thasians, presumably democrats, supported the Athenians during this period. *I.G.* 2^2.6 records the award of *proxenia* to five sons of Apemantus sometime before the Thirty came to power.[2] Apemantus has been identified as the Apemantus, son of Philon, whose property was confiscated by the Thasian oligarchs in 411 (*I.G.*, 12.8.263.6)[3] The pro-Athenian sympathies of this family continued into the fourth century. We find Amyntor, one of the five sons of Apemantus in *I.G.*, 2^2.6 mentioned in a list of Thasians exiled for Atticism who received *ateleia* from the Athenians about 385 (*I.G.*, 2^2.33.26).[4] Other inscriptions of the last decade of the fifth century record three more Thasians, Sthorys, Archippus and Hipparchus, who

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[1] Xen., *Hell.* 1.1.12 may imply a capture of Thasos by Thrasybulus early in 410. Next, Xen., *Hell.* 1.1.32 (410?) records a revolution in Thasos in which Eteonicus, the harmost, and the pro-Spartans were driven out. Thus, if Thrasybulus captured Thasos and the pro-Spartan oligarchy fell early in 410, we have to assume that the oligarchs had succeeded in reintroducing the Spartans only to be driven out again later in 410. We then have to assume that the oligarchs returned a second time, and the pro-Spartan regime lasted until 407.

The first interruption of the oligarchy depends on whether or not Xen., *Hell.* 1.1.12, does imply the capture by Thrasybulus. All Xenophon says is that Thrasybulus, with 20 ships, arrived at Sestos from Thasos, having been engaged in collecting money. This need not mean that Thrasybulus captured Thasos; cf. Alcidas' collections in places he certainly did not capture (*supra*, on Chios). See Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, p. 255, with references to the literature. The second interruption may be dismissed if Beloch's objections to ἐν Θάσῳ in *Hell.* 1.1.32 are accepted. See Beloch, *G.G.* 2^2, 2, 24. Andrewes, "Generals," *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 22, n. 2) 7, n. 21, follows Beloch.

[2] The inscription is a restoration of the decree destroyed under the Thirty. Tod, *G.H.I.* 2, 98.

[3] Tod, *G.H.I.* 2, p. 5; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, p. 254.

[4] Tod, *G.H.I.* 2, p. 5.

received Athenian citizenship because of their support of Athens (*I.G.* 2^2.17, 24, 25).[1] Finally, a Thasian inscription, which may be a decree of the oligarchic regime, offers rewards for informers who expose plots against Thasos in the city or revolutionary or treasonable activities in the colonies.[2] In the part relating to the colonies, traitors, whether Thasians or colonists, are specified. Apparently there was reason to fear Thasians living on the mainland.[3] This may reflect concern over exiles, particularly if "in the colonies" includes Neapolis, which remained loyal to Athens after the revolt of Thasos.[4] The proximity of mainland Neapolis to Thasos would have made it an ideal base of operation for pro-Athenian exiles.[5]

The literary evidence is meager, but we do know that at the time of Thrasybulus' recapture, Thasos was in *stasis* and he forced the restoration of pro-Athenian exiles (Xen., *Hell.* 1.4.9; D.S. 13.72.1).

Any conclusion about Thasian history following the revolt must be tentative because the evidence is fragmentary and problematic. We cannot be certain that a pro-Athenian fifth column

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1 Tod, *G.H.I.* 2, p. 6. These probably do not refer to the period of the oligarchic regime, but to the period after Aegospotamoi when Lysander captured Thasos, murdered the pro-Athenians, and installed a decarchy (Nepos, *Lys.* 2.2.-3.1; Polyaenus 1.45.4). However, these inscriptions provide further evidence of the pro-Athenian sympathies of certain Thasian citizens during the last years of the war.

2 The inscription was first published by J. Pouilloux, *Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos* (Paris 1954), no. 18, 139-162. Pouilloux attributed the decree to the oligarchic regime (which he held was in power continuously from 411-407). F. Chamoux, "L'Ile de Thasos et son Histoire" *REG* 72 (1959) 348-58, argued that it cannot be definitely assigned to the oligarchs of 411 and dates it 430-400. Pouilloux has been supported by H. W. Pleket, "Thasos and the Popularity of the Athenian Empire," *Historia* 12 (1963) 75-77; Graham, *Colony*, 83 finds Pouilloux' arguments "in general sound." Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, p. 254, say that "there is much to be said for Chamoux' caution."

3 For the mainland colonies of Thasos, see Graham, *Colony*, 81-90.

4 *I.G.* 1^2.108 contains two decrees in which Athens honors Neapolis for its loyalty and support against the Peloponnesians and Thasos. See Tod, *G.H.I.* 1, 84; the text as revised by Meritt and Andrewes appears in *S.E.G.* 12.37; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, 89, reproduce, "with very minor divergencies," the *S.E.G.* text. For the possibility that Neapolis is included, see Pouilloux, *Recherches*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 2) 155-57; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, p. 253.

5 Cf. Corcyrean exiles on the mainland and then at Mt. Istone (3.85.2-3); Samian exiles at Anaia (3.32.2, 4.75.1); Mytilenean and other Lesbian exiles on the mainland (4.52.2-3, 75.1); exiles of Methymna attack Methymna and Eresus from the mainland (8.100.3).

was active during the oligarchs' tenure; however, the pro-Athenian sympathies of some Thasians, the *stasis* and the restoration of the exiles are certain. Presumably, the pro-Athenians did actively oppose the oligarchs with Athenian aid; if the decree offering rewards for informers does belong to the oligarchic regime, then the probability that such a fifth column existed is greatly increased.

C. *The revolt of Rhodes: revolt and subversion*

In the revolt of Rhodes from Athens in the winter of 412/11, the evidence is again suggestive of fifth column involvement. Thucydides says that the Spartans sailed to Rhodes in response to invitations ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν (8.44.1). The Spartans arrived at Camirus with 94 ships. The majority of the inhabitants fled in terror because they knew nothing of the planned revolt and they had no walls. The Spartans then called them together along with the inhabitants of Lindus and Ialysus and persuaded the Rhodians to revolt from Athens (8.44.2). The facts supplied by Thucydides do not make it clear whether or not the action of these δυνατώτατοι was strictly treasonable. It is usually assumed that the δυνατώτατοι were oligarchs,[1] but the word may only mean that they were influential men in the Rhodian cities, perhaps, as at Chios, in important government positions.[2] This might explain why, when the peoples of the three cities met, they agreed to the revolt without, as far as we know, any opposition. If this was the case, then it is difficult to call the δυνατώτατοι traitors. However, unlike Chios, there remain the 94 ships, a large force. It is clear that the people of Camirus had little choice in the affair. The presence of this force may also have influenced the assembled Rhodians to accept the revolt.

We know that the exiled Rhodian aristocrat Dorieus was with the Spartans at the time of the revolt (8.35.1, 84.2). Dorieus and his Diagorid kinsmen had been exiled during *stasis*, perhaps by 428 (Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.19; Paus. 6.7.4).[3]

They were expelled by the Rhodians and the Athenians and a sentence of death was passed upon them. It seems that Athens interfered in the internal affairs of the Rhodian tributary cities

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[1] Grote, *H.G.* 6, 299; Busolt, *G.G.* 3[2], 1449-50.

[2] Grote, *H.G.* 6, 229, n. 1.

[3] For the date, see Beloch, *G.G.* 3[1], 43. Cf. Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 260-261, on Th. 3.8.1.

to insure their loyalty. This anti-aristocratic interference makes it probable that these cities were democratic, at least after the expulsion of the Diagorids, and that they remained democratic and loyal to Athens until the revolt.[1]

The Spartans remained 80 days in Rhodes (8.44.4), and it is probable that an oligarchic reorganization was carried out during this period.[2] An inscription of Lindus, showing that the city was under a *Boule*, has been connected with this oligarchic reorganization.[3] We know that, in the year following the revolt, Dorieus was sent to Rhodes by Mindarus because certain Rhodians were banding together ἐπὶ νεωτερισμῷ (D.S. 13.38.5). This probably indicates a democratic reaction to the oligarchic reorganization carried out with Spartan aid.[4]

In conclusion, we would suggest that the Rhodian δυνατώτατοι, in league with the exiled Diagorids, aimed at reorganizing their cities along oligarchic lines and arranged the revolt as a necessary step in their takeover. There is a distinction between these Rhodian oligarchs and the fifth columnists in Plataea (No. 1) and Siphae Chaeronea (No. 10). Those fifth columns also aimed at subverting the existing political order, but their plans called for the overt betrayals of their cities to accomplish their ends. It is a subtler form of subversion to first engineer a revolt or a change in alliance, and then proceed to the overthrow of the constitution with the aid of the former enemy. This may be more clearly illustrated by the fifth column in Argos which executed an oligarchic *coup d'état* early in 417.

3. Subversion in Cooperation with the Enemy

A. *Argos*

The democratic state of Argos had remained neutral during the Ten Years War and it had benefited greatly from its neutrality (2.9.2, 5.28.2).[5] It is clear, however, that during the Ten Years

[1] H. van Gelder, *Geschichte der alten Rhodier* (Haag 1900) 72-77. For the Athenian moves against the aristocrats, see H. von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," *RE*, suppl. 5 (1931), 761-62.

[2] van Gelder, *G.R.*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 1) 81.

[3] von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 1), 763; Dittenberger, *S.I.G.*, I³, 110.

[4] van Gelder, *G.R.*, 81.

[5] For the most complete exposition of Argive politics following the Peace of Nicias, see G. Busolt, *Forschungen zur griechischen Geschichte* (Breslau 1880) 75-181; a short survey is provided by Busolt, *G.G.* 3², 1240-42.

War there were certain Argive citizens who favored the Peloponnesian cause: in the summer of 430 an Argive named Pollis went on the Peloponnesian embassy to the Persian King (2.67.1); in the summer of 425 the Corinthians were informed ἐξ Ἄργους of the impending Athenian invasion (4.42.3). It is reasonable to assume that, as the events following the Peace of Nicias showed, these pro-Spartan Argives were oligarchs who hoped to capture the government of their city, and therefore supported the Spartan cause.[1]

In the diplomatic maneuvers following the conclusion of the peace and alliance between Sparta and Athens in 422/21 (5.23-24), the democratic government of Argos first negotiated with the dissatisfied Corinthians and Boeotians, and finally formed an alliance with the Mantineans, Eleans and Athenians (5.27-47).[2] During these uneasy years the Argives organized a special force of 1000 young men, "the strongest in body and the wealthiest" (D.S. 12.75.7). This aristocratic force was to prove the undoing of the democratic government which created it.[3]

In the summer of 418 Agis led a Spartan army into Argive territory. Argos and its allies had been besieging Epidaurus, and Sparta's position as leader of the Peloponnese was deteriorating (5.57.1). The campaign ended in a truce (5.59.4-60.1), and the events which led up to this truce reveal that the Argive oligarchs were cooperating with Agis and the Spartans.[4] The blunders of the Argive generals in bringing their army into a highly unfavorable position (5.59.3) have been criticized from a military point of view,[5] but Kagan has pointed out that political considerations explain the apparent blunders; the Argive generals (or some of them) did not want to fight the Spartans: "it is plain that the Argive force was commanded by oligarchic generals. This may be inferred from the fact that the oligarchic Thousand constituted the back-

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[1] D. Kagan, "Argive Politics and Policy After the Peace of Nicias," *C. Ph.* 57 (1962), 210. Kagan's article particularly centers on the activities of the pro-Spartan oligarchs. For their subversive aim, see Th. 5.76.2, quoted below. For Pollis, *supra*, n. 5 on p. 82.

[2] For the diplomacy of this period, see H. D. Westlake, "Corinth and the Argive Coalition," *AJP* 61 (1940), 413-21; D. Kagan, "Corinthian Diplomacy After the Peace of Nicias," *AJP* 81 (1960), 291-310.

[3] Kagan, "Argive Politics," *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 1), 211. For the *coup*, see below, especially n. 2 on p. 95.

[4] Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1240-41; Kagan, "Argive Politics," 212-14.

[5] Henderson, *Great War*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 23, n. 2) 306-16.

bone of the army and becomes perfectly clear in the negotiations between Agis and Thrasyllus. If a battle were joined, the oligarchs would have to fight, all possibility of *rapprochement* would be ended, and hope for a change of regime at Argos would be gone." [1] With their army in an untenable position, two Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, *proxenos* of the Spartans at Argos, concluded a four month truce with Agis (5.59.4-60.1). Thucydides says that they arranged this truce entirely on their own and not by the order of the people (5.60.1). Agis, too, shared knowledge of the negotiations with no one except one of his advisers, "presumably an ephor." [2]

When the Argive army returned home, the people prosecuted Thrasyllus and, although he escaped with his life, his property was confiscated (5.60.5-6).[3] However, it is clear that in spite of this reaction against the truce and those who had negotiated it, the pro-Spartan oligarchs maintained their influence. Thucydides reports that the Argives did not wish to break the truce, and asked the Athenian relief force to depart. Furthermore, they refused to allow the Athenians to go before the people for negotiations (5.61.1). This last is significant, for it undoubtedly reflects oligarchic influence in the Argive leadership. The oligarchs did not want the democratic assembly to decide the issue. The sequel shows why, for after the Mantinean and Elean allies had protested, Alcibiades was allowed to present the Athenian case. After some further hesitation, the Argives resumed the war against the Spartans (5.61.1-3).

The battle of Mantinea soon followed. In the maneuvering before the battle Agis retreated and the Argives failed to pursue him. Thucydides says that the Argives began to find fault with their generals because of this, and even suspected that they were being betrayed (5.65.5). Thucydides does not comment on whether or not the generals were betraying the army, but goes on to say that they were upset for the moment and then led the army into position for advancing against the enemy (5.65.5). In the battle itself

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[1] Kagan, "Argive Politics," 212.

[2] Kagan, "Argive Politics," 214.

[3] We do not know what the charge against Thrasyllus was. Kagan, "Argive Politics," 215, thinks it was cowardice, not treason. All Thucydides says is that they began to stone him at the Charadrus, where they tried all cases arising from an expedition before entering the city (5.60.6); Ferguson, *CAH* 5, 201, says it was treason.

the Argives, and particularly the Thousand, fought bravely and there is no hint of treason in their ranks (5.72.3-73.3). At the end of the battle, Agis allowed the Thousand to flee without pursuit (5.73.4). Diodorus reports that Pharax, one of the *symbouloi* assigned to Agis, directed him to allow the Thousand to escape (12.79.6-7). Kagan suggests that Pharax' strategy was justified by the subsequent oligarchic *coup d'état* carried out by the Thousand.[1] Whether or not Pharax had this much foresight must remain an open question. There is no evidence that the oligarchs or the Thousand were involved in any conspiracy with Pharax or the Spartans at this point. However, the suspected treason of the Argive generals before the battle, the previous pro-Spartan activities of the Argive oligarchs, and the subsequent *coup* suggest that there was some treasonable activity at Mantinea, perhaps involving only a few of the oligarchic leaders.[2]

In the following winter, 418/17, the Spartans sent proposals to Argos to arrange for peace (5.76.1). Thucydides then says (5.76.2):

> ἦσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς [sc. Λακεδαιμονίοις] πρότερόν τε ἄνδρες ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ βουλόμενοι τὸν δῆμον τὸν ἐν Ἄργει καταλῦσαι· καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἡ μάχη ἐγεγένητο, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐδύναντο πείθειν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐς τὴν ὁμολογίαν. ἐβούλοντο δὲ πρῶτον σπονδὰς ποιήσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους αὖθις ὕστερον καὶ ξυμμαχίαν, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιτίθεσθαι.

The pro-Spartan oligarchs had all along had as their objective the subversion of the democracy. The defeat at Mantinea had strengthened their position, for the democracy was discredited, and "the only significant military force in Argos" was now the oligarchic Thousand.[3] Thucydides outlines exactly how these fifth columnists now intended to carry out their plans; first the peace treaty, then the alliance, and finally the attack on the democracy.

The Spartan ambassador, Lichas, *proxenos* of the Argives at Sparta, brought two proposals, one to carry on the war, the other for peace. Although there was still a good deal of opposition, for Alcibiades happened to be present, the oligarchs persuaded the people to accept the peace. Thucydides' language is significant here; the fifth columnists are οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πράσσον-

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1 Kagan, "Argive Politics," 216.

2 D. Gillis, "Collusion at Mantinea," *RIL* 47 (1963), 199-226, argues for an elaborate oligarchic plot at Mantinea.

3 Kagan, "Argive Politics," 216.

τες, an idiomatic usage which we have seen describes treasonable action;[1] furthermore, they are described as ἤδη καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τολμῶντες (5.76.3). Again, it is clear that these oligarchs had been working secretly with the enemy for some time.

The second stage of the plan followed soon after, for "these same men" brought about the renunciation of the Mantinean, Athenian and Elean alliance and the conclusion of an alliance with Sparta (5.78). Then, near the beginning of spring, 417, the Spartans and the Thousand overthrew the democracy in Argos, and established an oligarchy. From Diodorus and Aeneas Tacticus we learn that they assassinated the democratic leaders (5.81.2; D.S. 12.79.2-3; Plu., *Alc.* 15.2; Arist., *Pol.* 5.3.5, 1304a; Aen. Tact. 17.2-4).[2]

The oligarchy was short-lived, for late that same summer the people rose in arms and put it down (5.82.2; D.S. 12.79.3; Plut., *Alc.* 15.2). The restored democracy returned to the Athenian alliance, but in the following winter we again hear of Argives working for the Spartans 5.83.1).[3] The following summer, 416, Alcibiades sailed to Argos and arrested 300 Argives suspected of favoring the Spartans (5.84.1; D.S. 12.81.2-3). The following winter the Argives themselves made further arrests of suspected pro-Spartans (5.116.1).

In conclusion, these Argive oligarchs did not overtly betray their city. Their aim throughout was subversion of the democracy; this they hoped to accomplish by concluding an alliance with Sparta. Perhaps they considered that such a program would result in a more stable regime for themselves; if the people would support a

[1] *Supra*, ch. 1, on πράσσω.

[2] A. W. Gomme, *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford 1937) 151, says that Thucydides does not say that the Thousand were involved in the *coup*. This cannot be accepted, for who, in that case, are the χίλιοι Ἀργεῖοι at 5.81.2? Plutarch and Diodorus make it clear that the Thousand overthrew the democracy. Aristotle's οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες περὶ τὴν ἐν Μαντινείᾳ μάχην could hardly refer to any other Argives than the Thousand (cf. Th. 5.72.3). Aeneas Tacticus mentions neither the Thousand, nor the fact that Spartan troops were involved. However, it is usually assumed that he is referring to the oligarchic *coup* of 417; see Dain and Bon, *Énée le Tacticien, op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 11, n. 4) 126-127. It must be remembered that Aeneas' concern is with the technique of the *coup*; i.e., that it was carried out during a festival (*infra*, ch. 6). Aeneas is not interested in political affairs *per se*. There is nothing in his narrative which conflicts with the view that he is describing the oligarchic *coup* of 417, and his detailing of the assassination of the democratic leaders agrees with Diodorus.

[3] Thucydides' language here suggests that an overt betrayal may have been in the works, but we cannot be sure of this.

Spartan alliance, there would be a greater chance of their supporting, or at least acquiescing in, the rule of those who brought about such an alliance. Their opportunity came with the defeat at Mantinea. The democracy with its Athenian alliance was discredited, while the prestige of the oligarchic Thousand was enhanced. The people, however, did not submit to the regime established with the aid of Spartan arms. As Kagan has noted, "in almost two generations of existence democracy had taken root among the people of Argos," and the alliance with Sparta was "a policy which could not hope to win favor among the Argives," the traditional enemy of Sparta.[1] Their regime was quickly overthrown, but they certainly influenced the course of the war. Weakened by the internal dissension which was the product of the fifth-column activities, Argos never again played an important role in the war. More than this, had this fifth column not been active during the crucial years following the Peace of Nicias, Alcibiades' Argive policy might well have succeeded, and "the outcome of the Peloponnesian War might have been far different."[2]

B. *Corcyra*

In the summer of 427 the Corcyrean oligarchs overthrew the democratic government of their city in a bloody *coup d'état* (3.70.6-71.1) and the great *stasis* followed. This *coup* had its origins in a plot with the Corinthians. Specifically, it involved the return of 250 Corcyreans held by the Corinthians since their victory at Sybota (1.54.2, 55.1). These prisoners were supposedly being ransomed, with the Corinthian *proxenoi* in Corcyra pledging to produce the money. In fact, they had been persuaded by the Corinthians to bring Corcyra over to Corinth (3.70.1).[3]

These 250 prisoners were very influential men in Corcyra and the Corinthians treated them well to win them over to their cause (1.55.1). Thucydides' account implies that the return of the pri-

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1 Kagan, "Argive Politics," 217.

2 Kagan, "Argive Politics," 217.

3 Corcyra was *de jure* neutral, for her alliance with Athens was only defensive (1.44.1). *De facto* Corcyra had already actively supported Athens (2.25.1). As Gomme pointed out, "the Greeks could equal us in make-believe and self-deluding diplomacy" (*Thuc.* 2, 360). Soon after the return of the prisoners the Corcyreans voted to maintain their anomalous position as allies of Athens and friends of the Peloponnesians (3.70.2). We soon learn, however, that the democrats intended to conclude an offensive alliance with Athens (3.70.6).

soners did not long precede the outbreak of the *stasis*. It was probably timed to take advantage of the fact that Athens was busy with the blockade of Mytilene; i.e., early in 427.[1] That these men remained in Corinth for nearly six years does not present much of a problem,[2] if we remember that men do not become traitors overnight. As Gomme points out, these men had fought against Corinth in the thirties; "perhaps the majority of them were moderately honest and patriotic" and "there had not always been friendship between Corinth and the first families in Kerkyra."[3]

Thucydides gives no explanation of the change in attitude of these 250 Corcyreans beyond the good treatment by their Corinthian captors (1.55.1). However, the whole narrative of the *stasis* provides an explanation in terms of the effect of the war on the oligarchs and democrats in the Greek cities. Here again the issues were economic as well as political. The 250 prisoners and their fellow oligarchs were wealthy men. This is clear from the alleged ransom (3.70.1),[4] the accusation brought by Peithias against τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους πέντε ἄνδρας (3.70.4), the fact that the oligarchs lived around the *agora* and the harbor (3.72.3) indicating that they were probably absentee landlords and merchants,[5] and the oligarchs' hiring of 800 mercenaries (3.73). Furthermore, the labor force in Corcyra consisted mainly of slaves. As the events unfolded, the slaves supported the democrats (3.73).[6] It is not unreasonable to assume that, in addition to the good treatment, the Corinthians persuaded the 250 that, in spite of past differences, their interests would now best be served by alliance with the Peloponnesians. It is also likely that some of their fellow oligarchs in Corcyra helped to persuade them; we know that the Corinthian *proxenoi* were involved in the conspiracy. In addition, these 250 men were in an enforced exile.[7] Their return, and all that implied, particularly for men of wealth and influence, was offered for bring-

[1] Busolt, *G.G.* 3², 1041; Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 359.
[2] Legon, *Demos and Stasis*, 17, thinks it does.
[3] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 359.
[4] As Gomme noted, 800 talents "seems impossibly large" (*Thuc.* 2, 359).
[5] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 362; Busolt, *G.G.* 3², 1046, noted "Markt und Hafen waren also die natürlichen Stützpunkte der Oligarchie."
[6] For these social and economic factors in factional divisions, *supra*, ch. 4, especially on Corcyra, Athens and Plataea.
[7] For exiles, *supra*, ch. 4, on Siphae-Chaeronea.

ing their city over to Corinth. Of course, if the plan worked, they would also be among those who assumed the political leadership of Corcyra. Finally, we would suggest that the long stay in Corinth makes the change in attitude of the 250 more understandable. The implications of alliance with the Athenians or Peloponnesians were now becoming clear, and, after six years, the prospect of returning home must have been very attractive.

Like the Argive fifth column, the Corcyrean oligarchs had two interdependent aims; a change in the foreign alignment of their state and the capture of the government. Like the Argive oligarchs too, it was their conspiracy which resulted in the internal disorder in the state. We have already seen that fifth-column betrayals were sometimes the result of *stasis*. Here the process is reversed. The political, social and economic divisions were present in Corcyra, but the treasonable conspiracy was the spark which ignited the violent civil strife (3.70.1).

There is no need here to repeat the details of the oligarchs' attack on the Corcyrean democracy. What is distinctive about this fifth column is that the subversion of the democracy was to precede the change in foreign aligment. This reflects the political and military realities of the situation. It is clear that, although the democracy was willing to grant concessions to the pro-Peloponnesian oligarchs and even persist in an illusory neutrality (3.70.2), the democratic government favored the Athenian side, had already actively helped Athens (2.25.1), and intended to conclude an offensive alliance with Athens (3.70.6). Unlike the Argive oligarchs, the Corcyrean fifth columnists could not proceed along constitutional lines and convince the assembly to support the Peloponnesians. The Corcyrean democracy, it must be remembered, had not been discredited by a military defeat, as was the Argive. Even after the *coup* the oligarchs presented their policy to the people as one of neutrality (3.71.1); clearly, they hoped to avoid a full confrontation before they got some help. Like the Argive oligarchs, they were aiming at an alliance which would be unpopular, because of the historical enmity between Corcyra and Corinth; but they had no Thousand. The 800 mercenaries and the arrival of the Peloponnesian forces under Alcidas were to provide them with the necessary force. The fierce opposition of the Corcyrean people, the arrival of Athenian aid, and the failure of Alcidas to support the oligarchs combined to defeat them.

Conclusion

The hallmark of a fifth column remains the overt betrayal; but we have seen fifth columns giving strategic information to the enemy, contributing financial support to the enemy, engineering revolts and the subversion of their governments in cooperation with the enemy. The fifth columns often engaged in combinations of these activities. This was already noted in the overt betrayals; e.g., overt betrayal with revolt, Amphipolis (No. 11), Torone (No. 12), Mende (No. 13); overt betrayal with subversion, Plataea (No. 1), Siphae-Chaeronea (No. 10). In these cases the fifth columnists had the opportunity to achieve their ends by an overt betrayal. The ones studied in this chapter demonstrate that the actions undertaken by the fifth columns were largely determined by the political and military realities of their particular situations. The Athenian *proxenoi* in Mytilene transmitted vital information to Athens, but apparently had no further opportunities for treasonable action. The friends of the Spartans in Chios in 427 could not have achieved anything beyond their financial contributions to the Peloponnesians without some military support. The Athenians responded firmly at any sign of revolutionary activity (424) and the Spartans were unwilling to attempt any intervention in the Aegean at this time. In the Ionian War, the Rhodian oligarchs could count on Spartan support and hence they engineered the revolt as a prerequisite to their takeover. The Argive oligarchs had the subversion of the democracy as their aim all along. In order to achieve their ends they arranged the change in alliance first, capitalizing on the loss of prestige the democracy had suffered at Mantinea. The Corcyrean oligarchs reversed this order, because they could not have brought their state over to the Peloponnesian side unless they first controlled the government.

Just as the causal factors behind the fifth columns must be assessed in terms of the war and the internal divisions in each city, so the various activities of the fifth columns must be understood as functions of the prevailing external and internal conditions in which they had to operate. The elucidation of the differences in their activities contributes to our overall understanding of them.

CHAPTER SIX

TECHNIQUES: HOW THE FIFTH COLUMNS WORKED THE DEFENSE AGAINST FIFTH COLUMNS

1. How the fifth columns worked

Of the fifteen overt betrayals attempted, thirteen succeeded and two, Plataea (No. 1) and Megara (No. 9), were initially successful and later failed.[1] This high incidence of success was the result of the techniques employed in the betrayals. In our consideration of these techniques we shall primarily be concerned with the overt betrayals; the other fifth columns will be considered when relevant.

The basic aim of any betrayal was to achieve surprise. As we have already noted, a small striking force admitted by the traitors could have the situation well in hand before the bulk of the inhabitants knew what was happening.[2] Success depended on the timing, the strategic deployment of forces, and the communications between the fifth columnists and the enemy.

A. *Timing*

Aeneas Tacticus, writing two generations after the Peloponnesian War, warns against the danger of betrayal at night (10.25-26; 22.1-8).[3] Night provided cover and the bulk of the inhabitants would be asleep. Thus the Plataean fifth columnists admitted the Thebans at night (2.2.1; Aen. Tact. 2.3); the betrayal of the long walls of Megara took place before dawn (4.67.2-4); the betrayal of Amphipolis began at night (4.103); Brasidas' entrance into Torone was accomplished at night while Athenian hoplites were sleeping in the *agora* (4.110-113.2); the betrayal of Selymbria occurred at night (Plu., *Alc.* 30.2); Byzantium was betrayed at night (Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.20; D.S. 13.67.1; Plu., *Alc.* 31.3). On two occasions the weather also provided cover for the betrayals.

[1] *Supra*, ch. 2.

[2] *Supra*, ch. 3.

[3] For the date of Aeneas Tacticus and his works, see the editions of Hunter, Oldfather, and Dain and Bon (*supra*, p. 11, n. 4). As Adcock noted (*supra*, ch. 1 and p. 3, n. 3), Aeneas Tacticus is particularly concerned with the danger from within. For this reason his manual is an excellent source for the techniques of fifth columns. As we shall see, much of what he says can be illustrated by incidents in the Peloponnesian War.

Thucydides says that Brasidas pushed on to Amphipolis on a stormy, snowy night, wishing to escape the notice of those in the city except the traitors (4.103.1-2). The stormy weather was also a factor in his capture of the territory outside the walls (4.103.5). The night Plataea was betrayed was rainy (2.5.2-3). Presumably the rain, along with the fact that it was still peacetime and no guards were posted (2.2.3), helped to cover the betrayal.[1]

As Aeneas Tacticus warns, another particularly dangerous time for a city was a festival (22.16-18). The idea of a surprise attack during a celebration is as old as the story of the fall of Troy. Vergil says the Greeks *invadunt urbem somno uinoque sepultam* (*Aeneid* 2.265).[2] On three occasions this idea was used by fifth columns. Plataea was betrayed on a night during a festival period (3.56.2, 65.1).[3] The oligarchic *coup d'état* at Argos was carried out during a festival (Aen. Tact. 17.2).[4] Aeneas offers the Argive *coup* as an example of the danger inherent in a festival outside the city.[5] This may be further illustrated by the Athenian plan to catch the population of Mytilene by surprise while they were celebrating a festival to Apollo outside the city (3.3.3). We have suggested that the men who informed Athens about this festival were the Athenian *proxenoi* who had betrayed the revolt.[6]

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[1] The rain was a factor in the ultimate failure of this betrayal. It delayed the rest of the Thebans who were supposed to arrive while it was still night (2.5.1-3).

[2] Cf. Washington's attack on Trenton in the early A. M. of December 26, 1776 while "Colonel Rall's Hessians were sleeping off Christmas"; see, S. E. Morrison, *Oxford History of the American People* (New York 1965), 245. In recent history the "Tet Offensive" of 1968 provides an example of this age-old strategy. In the Peloponnesian War the idea was used several times in situations where fifth columns were not involved. Demosthenes fortified Pylos while the Spartans were celebrating a festival (4.5.1); the Argives attacked Epidaurus during the Carneia (5.54.2-3); after Mantinea, the Eleans, Mantineans and Athenians attacked Epidaurus again during the Carneia (5.75.4-5); Demosthenes evacuated the Athenian garrison from Epidaurus under the cover of a gymnastic contest he arranged (5.80.3); the Argive democrats rose against the oligarchs while the Spartans were celebrating the Gymnopaedia (5.82.2); the Milesian oligarchs overthrew the democracy during the Dionysia (D.S. 13.104.5; *supra*, p. 87, n. 1).

[3] See Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 340; Steup, *Thuk.* 3, 112, 132.

[4] That Aeneas is referring to the *coup* of 417 in cooperation with the Spartans, *supra*, p. 95, n. 2.

[5] At. 10. 4 Aeneas states that festivals in the city may be held; naturally festivals outside the walls were more dangerous, but the general prohibition in 22.16-18 appears to apply to all festivals.

[6] *Supra*, ch. 5, on Mytilene.

Surprise attacks aimed at engendering panic and confusion. At night or during a festival the odds of causing confusion were much greater. Loyal citizens roused from their beds or in the midst of celebration were unable to mount any organized resistance. They could not know how many of the enemy had entered, what parts of the city the enemy controlled, or, perhaps most important, whom they could trust. In the betrayals of Amphipolis (4.104.1) and Torone (4.111.2, 112.1, 113.1), Brasidas succeeded in causing confusion and suspicion among the inhabitants. At Plataea the populace at first feared that a large force had entered the city. Thucydides adds that they "could not see in the night." Therefore, they accepted the Thebans' terms (2.3.1).[1] At Selymbria the Athenians failed to achieve surprise. However, the subsequent diplomatic success of Alcibiades resulted in part from the fact that some of the Selymbrians supposed that the entire Athenian force was within the walls (Plu., *Alc.* 30.4).

As well as warning against the danger of panic and confusion in general (27.1-4), Aeneas Tacticus specifically cites the use of disturbances by conspirators (23.6-11). This may be illustrated by the betrayal of Byzantium. The admission of the Athenians was timed to coincide with a disturbance in the port. After feigning withdrawal, the Athenians dispatched triremes for a night raid on the port. Meanwhile, the land army was brought up close to the walls. The raiders in the port made a great deal of noise and, consequently, the Byzantines and Peloponnesians rushed off to the scene of the disturbance. The fifth columnists then admitted Alcibiades and his troops (D.S. 13.67.1-3); Plu., *Alc.* 31.1-3).

B. *Strategic deployment of forces*

Aeneas Tacticus emphasizes the necessity of guarding the city's strategic points; i.e., the wall, gates, open areas such as the *agora*, and "the strongest place" (22.1).[2] While the walls and gates were most important for the admission of the enemy, the successful betrayal also entailed gaining control of strategic places such as

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[1] The subsequent failure of the Thebans resulted from their conciliatory attitude which in turn gave the Plataeans the opportunity of finding out that only 300 Thebans had entered. The Plataeans then organized an effective resistance (2.3.3-4.8). Of course the Thebans were undoubtedly buying time until their main force arrived. The rain ultimately beat the Thebans (*supra*, p. 101, n. 1).

[2] See Aen. Tact. 1.8-9; 18-20, 22, 28.

the *agora* or the highest point in the city as quickly as possible. At Plataea the admission of the Thebans was accomplished easily because no guards had been posted (2.2.3). The Thebans immediatey seized the *agora* and proposed their terms (2.2.4). At Byzantium the city was under siege. Apparently, however, the walls were left unguarded when the Byzantines and Peloponnesians rushed to the port. Alcibiades and his men, deployed near the walls, were then admitted in complete safety. Diodorus says that ladders were employed and Xenophon reports that gates were opened which led to the *agora* (Plu., *Alc.* 31.3; D.S. 13.66.3; Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.20).

In other cases guards had to be dealt with. At Amphipolis some of the guards were in the conspiracy and this helped Brasidas to seize the bridge and gain control of the territory outside the walls (4.103.5). At Megara, the betrayal of the long walls illustrates a stratagem Aeneas Tacticus warns against; he tells how a certain Pytho, otherwise unknown, captured Clazomenae by having wagons block the gateway (28.5). The Megarian fifth columnists had been sending a boat down to the sea on a wagon each night. The *archon* in charge had agreed to this because the boat was supposed to be for brigandage. In reality, the conspirators were providing a way to get the gates open (4.67.3). On the night of the betrayal, Demosthenes and the Athenians waited in ambush nearby. When the wagon returned and was in the gateway, they rushed it. The wagon blocked the closing of the gates, and the conspirators butchered the guards (4.67.4).

The best documented betrayal is that of Torone. Here Thucydides gives a good deal of topographical information, showing the importance of these strategic points in a betrayal. The fifth columnists first admitted seven men through the sea wall (4.110.2). As Gomme pointed out, διαδύντες "implies that there were gaps in the wall, as on the land side (4.112.2), not yet repaired." [1] Gomme further noted that the sea wall was "where they would be least expected, as Brasidas could not approach by sea." [2] These seven and the fifth columnists avoided being seen by the guards stationed on the highest point in the city. They immediately seized the heights and killed these guards. Next they broke open the

[1] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 589. Gomme also says that this was "an inexcusable failure since Brasidas' arrival in Chalkidike."

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 589.

postern which faced the promontory of Canastreum on the sea side (4.110.2).[1] They then moved to the land side and cut through the bar of the gates leading to the *agora* (4.111.2).[2] In the meantime Brasidas sent one hundred peltasts up to the city walls to await the opening of the gates (4.111.1-2). The men inside first conducted some of these peltasts around to the Canastreum postern and then opened the *agora* gates. The objective was to attack from both sides (4.111.2). They rushed in and, as Brasidas came up with the remaining troops, the greater number went uphill to take the heights; the others fanned out in all directions, and they were in control of the city before most of the Toroneans knew what had happened (4.112-113.1).

C. *Communications*

Good communications between the fifth columnists and the enemy were necessary for the success of these betrayals. Of course, these communications had to be kept secret; e.g., Thucydides notes the secrecy involved in the betrayal of the long walls at Megara (4.67.2).[3] Obviously, secrecy was better maintained if

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[1] For the topography see Gomme, *ad loc.*

[2] Fifty Athenian hoplites were sleeping in the *agora*, so the cutting must have been done fairly quietly. For instructions on how to do this, see Aen. Tact. 19.

[3] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 530, writes "Grote, V, p. 288, notes the surprisingly successful secrecy kept in this affair by all concerned, who must have been fairly numerous." That they were "fairly numerous" is inferred from ἄλλο μετ' αὐτῶν πλῆθος (4.68.4), which Gomme *ad loc.*, renders (correctly, we think) "a number of others, who were in the conspiracy." However, this involves confusing what Thucydides says about the planned ambush the next morning with what he says about the betrayal of the long walls. At 4.67.2 Thucydides says καὶ ᾔσθετο οὐδεὶς εἰ μὴ οἱ ἄνδρες οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ἦν εἰδέναι τὴν νύκτα ταύτην. The meaning clearly is "and no one knew except those whose business it was to know during this night." Steup, *Thuk.* 4, 135, bracketed τὴν νύκτα ταύτην and Gomme found it "awkward." Gomme also says "we should expect φυλάττεσθαι or the like . . . rather than εἰδέναι." We suggest that the text is clear as it stands, for Thucydides is specifically talking about the betrayal of the long walls. The point is not many were in the know during *this* night. Therefore, it is *not* surprising that the secret was well kept. The passage at 4.68.4 refers to the planned ambush at the gates the next morning. Now "a number of others" know about it, and, not surprisingly, the plot was betrayed (4.68.6).

Our interpretation accepts the text as it is, and makes better sense if the difference between the two actions is kept in mind. The pre-dawn betrayal of the long walls required only a few men, presumably those involved with the boat. There was no reason to inform many about the plan. The morning

the number of people involved was small. This is supported by the few cases in which we have evidence for the numbers involved. At Torone and Mende the conspirators were few (4.110.1, 123.2), and at Byzantium apparently five men arranged the betrayal (Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.18). These were all successful. On the other hand, the planned ambush at the gates of Megara was known to many (4.68.4), and was betrayed (4.68.6). The plot to betray Siphae and Chaeronea involved a number of conspirators (4.76.2-3), and was betrayed (4.89.1). In addition, this plot was planned a considerable time before it was to be executed, thereby increasing the danger of exposure.[1]

We must distinguish between the communication involved in the planning of the betrayal and that in the operation itself. For the former our evidence is limited, particularly regarding the overt betrayals. Thucydides usually says that certain men got in touch with the enemy or sent invitations to the enemy, but does not elaborate on the mechanics of the communications. Presumably, messages were sent through the lines, like the fatal message Nicias received before the retreat from Syracuse. He believed it came from the fifth columnists (7.73.3-74.1). The Oxyrhynchus historian gives an example of how fifth columnists got in touch with the enemy: an enemy soldier hid by night in a wood around a temple near the city walls. When a fifth columnist went on guard duty he signalled, either by calling out or throwing a stone. The soldier came out of the woods and letters were exchanged by attaching them to a rope let down for this purpose (*Hell. Oxy.* 5.2).[2]

It is clear that regular diplomatic channels were used by conspirators. The plan to betray Messina to the Athenians was probably worked out during Alcibiades' embassy there.[3] The extremists

ambush was to involve a sally from the gates by the citizen body. The conspirators would naturally enlighten their supporters and friends about the plot in order to protect them. This is the point of the "anointing with oil" (*infra*, n. 1 on p. 107).

[1] Westlake, *Individuals*, 116.

[2] The city has not been identified. For the various conjectures, including Megara, Byzantium, Thasos and Chios, see Bruce, *Hell. Oxy.*, 45-46.

Herodotus tells of one Timoxenus of Scione who communicated with Artabazus in order to betray Potidaea. Messages were wrapped around arrows which were shot to a predetermined spot. The plot failed when Artabazus missed the target and hit a Potidaean in the shoulder (Hdt. 128.1-3; cf. Aen. Tact. 31).

[3] *Supra*, ch. 4, and p. 68, n. 3.

of the Four Hundred were negotiating with Sparta. Surely their plan to betray the city through the fortress at Eetionea was discussed with the Spartans in their last embassy.[1] *Proxenoi* were often involved in treasonable or subversive conspiracies. The *proxenos* looked after the affairs of citizens of a particular foreign state, hence he had excellent possibilities for contacts at his disposal.[2] At Mytilene the Athenian *proxenoi* were the fifth column.[3] Alciphron, *proxenos* of the Spartans at Argos, was one of the two Argive oligarchs who negotiated the four-month truce with Agis. After Mantinea, Lichas, *proxenos* of the Argives at Sparta, was sent to Argos with the peace proposal which led to the oligarchic *coup*.[4] At Corcyra, the alleged plan to ransom the prisoners involved the Corinthian *proxenoi*.[5] Finally, although we do not know who the fifth columnists were in Syracuse, Nicias' ability to communicate with them may have been enhanced by the fact that he was Syracusan *proxenos* at Athens (D.S. 13.27.3).

For the operational stage we again have limited evidence. At Torone, a few of the fifth columnists secretly went out of the city to watch for Brasidas. They conducted the seven men around to the sea wall (4.110.2). Similarly, men of Argilus, who were conspiring with their fellow townsmen in Amphipolis, guided Brasidas on the night of his arrival (4.103.4). Signals were used. Aeneas Tacticus advises strict control of the use of lights, lamps or torches, at night because they were often used for signalling to the enemy (10.25-26). A fire signal was used by the fifth columnists at Torone to indicate that the moment had arrived for the gates to be opened (4.111.1-2). Fire signals were similarly employed in the admission of the Athenians at Selymbria (Plu., *Alc.* 30.2), and Byzantium (D.S. 13.66.1).[6]

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[1] *Supra*, ch. 4, on Athens.

[2] The most complete survey of Greek proxeny remains P. Monceaux, *Les Proxénies Grecques* (Paris 1886). For later bibliography, see Balogh, *Refugees, op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 64, n. 1), 111, n. 160; F. M. Heichelheim, *An Ancient Economic History* 2 (Leyden 1964) 234-35, n. 47. See also Tod, *G.H.I.* 1, 90; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, 4, 90; W. P. Wallace, "An Eretrian Proxeny Decree," *Hesperia* 5 (1936), 273-84.

[3] *Supra*, ch. 5, on Mytilene.

[4] *Supra*, ch. 5, on Argos.

[5] *Supra*, ch. 5, on Corcyra.

[6] Diodorus calls the signal a σύσσημον which does not necessarily mean a fire signal. However, in the context a fire signal was most probable. Aeneas Tacticus uses σύσσημον where he is clearly talking about fire signals (10.26). For bibliography on fire signals see W. Schmid and O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* 1.2, 228, n. 4.

One difficulty fifth columnists faced was that in the confusion and fighting following the betrayal they might be cut down by the enemy they had admitted. At Megara, the conspirators took precautions against this; in order to distinguish themselves from their fellow citizens in the planned ambush at the gates, they anointed themselves with oil (4.68.5-6.1).[1]

2. The defense against Fifth Columns

Since the primary aim of a betrayal was surprise, the best defense against it was to know about it ahead of time. With rare exceptions,[2] foreknowledge was in fact the only effective defense. This is clear from the fact that of the fourteen overt betrayals we called failures, twelve were never attempted.[3] In eight cases we know that they were never attempted because the plots became known; Spartolus (No. 3), Camarina (No. 6), Siphae-Chaeronea (No. 10), Tegea (No. 17), Messina (No. 19), Chios (No. 21), Athens (No. 23), Corcyra (No. 24). In addition, the betrayal of the city of Megara (No. 9) failed for the same reason, as did the plot to ambush the Mytileneans at the festival of Malean Apollo.

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[1] Thucydides says: ξυνέκειτο δὲ αὐτοῖς τῶν πυλῶν ἀνοιχθεισῶν ἐσπίπτειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, αὐτοὶ δὲ διάδηλοι ἔμελλον ἔσεσθαι λίπα γὰρ ἀλείψεσθαι, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται . . . ἀληλιμμένων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὄντων ἤδη περὶ τὰς πύλας (4.68.5-6). Steup, *Thuk.* 4, 139, and Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 531, objected that anointing with oil would not be an effective method of recognition in a fight, especially if they were fully armed. Gomme added that ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται "suggests becoming victims in a subsequent trial (or pretence of a trial) rather than in open fighting." But ἀδικῶνται does not necessarily have legal implications and nothing else in the passage suggests them. Thucydides is talking about the opening of the gates and the Athenian rush; therefore it is presumable that the anointing with oil was meant to protect the conspirators from being wounded by the Athenians. As for the efficacy of the signal, an oiled area on the body obviously glistens in a good light (and the ambush was to be in the morning), an unoiled one does not. This anyone can see for himself in a mirror. Presumably the Athenians were alerted to watch out for "the anointed ones." The conspirators could not have adopted an obvious sign of recognition without arousing suspicion. Accordingly, the objections of Steup and Gomme seem unwarranted.

The allied troops who planned the mutiny against Eteonicus at Chios carried reeds to distinguish themselves (Xen., *Hell.* 2.1.1); see C. Bonner, "Notes on a Certain use of the Reed," *TAPA* 39 (1908) 35-40.

[2] Plataea (No. 1) did not fail because the fifth column was exposed (*supra*, p. 102, n. 1). Selymbria (No. 25) is the only example in which the betrayal became known ahead of time, but still succeeded.

[3] *Supra*, ch. 2.

A. *Specific measures against fifth columns*

When a treasonable plot was known or suspected, specific precautions were taken. At Mytilene, the festival was cancelled and the walls and harbors fortified and guarded to thwart the surprise attack by the Athenians (3.3.5). At Megara, the oligarchs argued that it was not in the city's interest to march out to battle. They did not let on that they knew of the planned ambush, but were careful to guard the gates so that the fifth columnists could not act (4.68.6). In the early summer of 415, the mutilation of the herms and profanation of the mysteries at Athens gave rise to the fear of a plot against the democracy. When a Spartan force appeared at the Isthmus, it was assumed that the city was to have been betrayed. At this point, the Athenians slept one night under arms in the temple of Theseus in the city, probably in the southwest corner of the *agora* (6.61.1-2).[1]

Early in 422 Brasidas attempted a night surprise on Potidaea. He succeeded in getting a ladder up against the wall during the changes of the guard, but was soon discovered and retreated (4.135). This effective guarding of the walls need not mean that any treachery was suspected. However, Brasidas' record was well known and he was not observing the truce. Furthermore, we know that a fifth column in Potidaea (No. 14) had been negotiating with Brasidas the previous summer (4.121.2). We hear no more about this fifth column and Westlake assumed that the Athenians had "rounded up" the conspirators.[2] If this was the case, then it may have spurred them to tighten security, especially at night.

Aside from these basic defensive measures, allied forces were often called in to secure the city. Spartolus appealed to Olynthus for a garrison to prevent its betrayal to the Athenians (2.79.2). The Athenians sailed to Camarina to forestall its betrayal to Syracuse (4.25.7). The Boeotians marched to Siphae and Chaeronea when the impending betrayals became known (4.89.2). The pro-Spartan government of Tegea called in the Spartans to thwart the betrayal to the allied forces of Argos, Athens and Mantinea (5.64.1-2). Conon and six hundred Messenians from Naupactus were sent to Corcyra to prevent its betrayal to the Spartans (D.S. 13.48.5-6).

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[1] For the location of the Theseion (formerly it was thought to be the Heliaea), see H. Thompson, "Activity in the Athenian Agora, *Hesperia* 37 (1968) 68.

[2] Westlake, *Individuals*, 158.

Arrest and execution of fifth columnists were common. The six hundred Messenians and the Corcyrean democrats attacked the pro-Spartans, arrested some, killed others, and drove more than a thousand into exile (13.48.7). At Messina, the pro-Syracusan party executed the fifth columnists when Alcibiades informed them of the planned betrayal (6.74.1). When the Chian leaders found out about the plan to betray the city to Athens, they sent for Astyochus and considered what were the most moderate ways of dealing with the problem. One alternative they considered was taking hostages (8.24.6); later on they executed Tydeus, son of Ion, and his followers for Atticism (8.38.3).[1] After the restoration of the democracy, Alcibiades sailed to Argos and arrested three hundred persons suspected of pro-Spartan sympathies. Those arrested were lodged in nearby islands under Athenian control (5.84.1).[2] The following winter the Argives themselves arrested more suspected pro-Spartans (5.116.1). When Mytilene capitulated to Paches, he arrested the chief instigators of the revolt, promising to do them no harm until the Athenians decided their fate. It is noteworthy that Paches lodged these men in Tenedos (3.29.2). He may well have expected an attempt at betrayal should the long-awaited Spartan relief force arrive. This was precisely what Teutiaplos proposed to Alcidas (3.30.3).

The plan to betray Athens was thwarted by Theramenes. He kept denouncing the plot and successfully mobilized public opinion, particularly the hoplites, behind him. The result was that the fortification at Eetionea was dismantled (8.90.3, 91.1-2, 92.3, 10).

B. *Exposure of fifth columns. General consciousness of security problems*

Since the first line of defense against betrayal was to know about it beforehand, we must consider how the plots were exposed. In five cases we know that informers revealed the conspiracies. Four of these informers were people involved in the plots; at Siphae-

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[1] Polycrates of Samos took hostages as a precaution against betrayal (Hdt. 3.45.4). Tydeus was probably the son of Ion the tragedian; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Von des attischen Reiches Herrlichkeit," *Philologische Untersuchungen* 1 (1880) 13, n. 14; Steup, *Thuk.* 8, 88; G. Huxley, "Ion of Chios," *GRBS* 6 (1965) 35, n. 33.

[2] A security measure used in modern Greece. Makronesos served as a political prison after the communist civil war, and Leros is so used by the present Junta.

Chaeronea, Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis,[1] informed the Spartans of the impending betrayals (4.89.1); at Messina, the plot was betrayed by Alcibiades when he fled from recall (6.74.1, Plu., *Alc.* 22.1); at Athens, Theramenes revealed the plans of his former associates (8.90.3, 91.1-2); at Megara, an unnamed fifth columnist betrayed the planned ambush (4.68.6). About the other informer, we only know that he crossed from Athens to Euboea, and thence to Mytilene where he revealed Athens' plan to ambush the Mytileneans at the festival (3.3.5).

The actions of Alcibiades and Theramenes are easily understood in political terms. Why the other defectors, or the unknown man who went to Mytilene, informed is not known. It is clear, however, that governments were well aware of the danger of plots and actively courted such information. Aeneas Tacticus recommends that rewards be offered for information about anyone plotting against the city (10.5). The Thasian decree discussed above provides an exact parallel for the period of the Peloponnesian War.[2] We know that informers were encouraged at Athens from Solon's time on.[3] The Athenians followed a similar policy in their subject states. The Chalcidians were required to take a loyalty oath which included swearing to denounce to Athens any revolutionary activity (*I.G.* $1.^{2}39.25$).[4]

In the five other instances, Spartolus, Camarina, Tegea, Chios and Corcyra, we do not know how the plots were discovered. However, in addition to the encouragement of informers, there is a good deal of evidence that states and leaders were especially cognizant of security problems. Adcock noted that "secrecy might not survive open debates on military policy." [5] This is one of the points Hermocrates had in mind when he proposed the election of a few generals with full powers (6.72.5). Nicias, too, was concerned

[1] We assume that he was involved because Thucydides identifies him as a Phocian after telling us that Phocians were in the plot (4.76.3). There was also a communications failure on the Athenian side. Demosthenes reached Siphae before Hippocrates had reached Delium to make his diversion (4.89.1-2). However, "the principal cause of the failure of the campaign was the leakage of information as much as the mistiming of the two invasions" (Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 558).

[2] *Supra,* ch. 5 and p. 89, n. 2.

[3] Bonner-Smith, *Justice* 2, 39. Cf. the complaint of the chorus of wasps that a defendant got off by claiming that he had informed on the Samians (Ar., *Vespae* 283).

[4] Tod, *G.H.I.* 1, 42; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, 52.

[5] Adcock, *War,* 75.

about security (7.48.1, 50.3). The Chian leaders attempted to keep their negotiations with the Spartans secret (8.7),[1] but the Athenians suspected that a revolt was in the works (8.9.2). The general Spartan concern for secrecy was noted by Thucydides (5.68.2). The Athenians were ever fearful of plots against the state, especially betrayals (6.53.3). The extent of this concern in Athens is well illustrated by the frequent references to betrayals and plots in Aristophanes; e.g., the chorus accuses Dicaeopolis of being a traitor because of his private peace (*Ach.* 290); the chorus of birds refers to the son of Peisias [2] who would betray the gates to those deprived of civic rights (*Aves* 766); at *Ranae* 362 the chorus talks of betrayal of a garrison or a fleet; allied betrayals to Brasidas are alluded to at *Vespae* 288-89 and *Pax* 639-40; finally, the basic plot of the *Lysistrata* involves the seizure of the acropolis by Athenian women in cooperation with Spartan women—"subversion" in cooperation with the "enemy".[3]

Various measures were employed in the interest of security on both sides during the war. The well known massacre of 2,000 helots (4.80.2-4) was prompted by Spartan fears of a possible revolt by the dependent population.[4] The helots were an ever-present potential enemy within, and the Athenians aimed at stirring them up both in the Ten Years War (4.41.2-3) and during the Syracusan expedition (7.26.2). The notorious *Krypteia* was employed as a security force against the helots (Plu., *Lyc.* 28).[5]

Although Pericles boasted that Athens was an open city which did not prevent anyone from learning anything by which an enemy might profit (2.39.1), the evidence indicates otherwise, at least in wartime. Aeneas Tacticus recommends restricting communi-

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[1] For political as well as security reasons.

[2] Otherwise unknown.

[3] Cf. *Aves* 328, where the chorus of birds complains that they have been betrayed by the Hoopoe who has introduced their enemy, men. Aristophanes also ridicules the fear of sabotage at *Ach.* 915-24. Thucydides tells us that when the plague first broke out in the Piraeus, the Athenians believed that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the wells there (2.48.2).

[4] *Supra*, ch. 3.

[5] Michell, *Sparta*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 33, n. 1) 162. W. Sinningen, "The Roman Secret Service," *CJ* 57 (1961-62) 65, calls the *Krypteia* a "secret service of sorts," a "by-product of the unique problem posed by helotry." For an anthropological explanation of the origins and function of the *Krypteia*, see H. Jeanmaire, "La Cryptie Lacédémonienne," *REG* 26 (1913) 121-50. Jeanmaire argues that service in the *Krypteia* was a kind of initiation period Spartan youths had to go through.

cation with visiting foreign embassies (10.11). Thus the Athenians, at the outbreak of the war, escorted Melesippus to the border to prevent his making contact with anyone (2.12.2). Aeneas also advises that citizens and metics should not be permitted to leave the city ἄνευ συμβόλου, without a kind of passport (10.8). A similar device was apparently in use at Athens, or in the empire, in 414; in Aristophanes a σφραγίς was required for entrance into the city (*Aves* 1213). Enemy aliens are naturally suspect. At the outbreak of the war the Athenians immediately arrested all Boeotians in Attica (2.6.2).[1] Later in the same summer they expelled the inhabitants of the tributary island of Aegina and repopulated it with Athenians (2.27.1). The proximity of Aegina and its known pro-Peloponnesian sympathies made it a threat to Athens' security.[2] It is well known that the Athenians kept a careful watch over their subject states.[3] The *episkopoi* were traveling comissioners employed to investigate allied affairs.[4] As Meiggs and Lewis suggest, the *episkopoi* probably used the local Athenian *proxenoi* as sources of information: "when the Athenian *episkopos* comes to keep a watchful eye on the establishment of Cloudcuckoobury his first question is ποῦ πρόξενοι; he needs to know what is going on, and the local friends of Athens are the people to tell him (Ar. *Birds*, 1021)." [5] Finally, we note that the Athenians confirmed their

[1] Similar action was taken against Japanese residents, many of whom were citizens, in the United States during World War Two; see C. H. Pritchett, *The American Constitution* (New York 1959) 361-363; Korematsou v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 86. The seizure of Aegina also provided land for Athenian settlers.

[3] *A.T.L.* 3, 142-45. For the literary and epigraphical evidence of Athens' interference in and control of allied states, see G. F. Hill, *Sources for Greek History Between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars*, revised by R. Meiggs and A. Andrewes (Oxford 1951), 355-56.

[4] For the *episkopoi*, see Hill, *Sources*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 3) 356. On the *episkopoi* and garrison at Erythrae (*I.G.*, I². 10), where *prodosia* was probably feared, see *A.T.L.* 3, 142, 254-55; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, p. 91-92.

[5] Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, p. 276; cf. *A.T.L.* 3, 144. For the *proxenoi* in fifth columns, see above in this chapter. On the Athenian *proxenoi* at Mytilene who informed Athens of the impending revolt, *supra*, ch. 5. A notice in I. Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca* 1 (Berlin 1814) 273, mentions a κρυπτὴ ἀρχή used by the Athenians in the subject states. While we know that the Athenians watched over their allies, we have no other evidence that they employed such a secret service. The notice appears in the fifth part of Bekker's *Anecdota*, the λέξεις ῥητορικαί, a rhetorical collection of Byzantine times found in Coislinianus 345, a tenth century codex; see, Tolkiehn, "Lexikographie," *RE* 12 (1925) 2460, 2478.

suspicions about the impending revolt of Chios at the Isthmian Games (8.10.1). Panhellenic festivals were held under a truce (5.49.1, 8.9.1) and, with official representatives and many other citizens of various states in attendance, they must have had something of the character of a neutral capital during wartime.[1] It is likely that other states as well as Athens made use of the festivals to learn what their allies and enemies were doing.

Obviously security measures were not only directed at fifth columns. However, in view of the numerous fifth columns during the war, the specific defensive measures against them, including the encouragement of informers, and the concern with betrayals illustrated in Aristophanes, we would suggest that this general consciousness of security problems resulted, at least in part, from the fear of betrayal. That about half the known fifth columns were exposed and forestalled indicates that security measures were fairly effective.

Conclusion

In chapter three we noted that the limitation on traditional hoplite warfare and the resulting increase in the use of other techniques such as light-armed troops and small tactical units contributed to the active solicitation of fifth columns by attacking forces. In this chapter we have seen documented in our sources on a scale unprecedented in Greek history the emergence of the techniques required in fifth-column warfare: clandestine exchange of information between traitors and the enemy, timing of the attack at night or during a festival, strategic deployment of forces in a commando-type strike, surprise and the *fait accompli*. Yet success was far from certain, for the defense responded: the danger was recognized, guards increased, citizens and other residents as well as foreign visitors watched, arrests and executions employed, informers encouraged, security in general tightened.

These techniques, all too familiar in the modern world, have been largely ignored in the study of Greek military history. We have illustrated their emergence in the Peloponnesian War with specific reference to fifth columns; however, we have also noted that their use was by no means restricted to betrayals, that secu-

[1] Dicaeopolis remarks that Cleon cannot slander him for defaming the state because it is the Lenaea and foreigners are not present (Ar., *Ach.* 502-05); the Dionysia, while not Panhellenic, was attended by the "allies."

rity measures were not only directed at fifth columns, and that the use of small tactical units, and of festival periods or night for cover, may be documented for a variety of operations in addition to betrayals. The basic strategic aim of such techniques, regardless of the particular operation, was surprise. Yet the use of surprise in Greek warfare has not only been unnoticed, but also held to have been uncommon. Gomme, for example, in discussing sieges in the fifth century, said that it is "a matter of wonder . . . that surprise was not more often attempted." [1] Adcock has written that "surprise is highly valued by all good judges of war, and the power to achieve it is one criterion of military or naval resourcefulness. Yet surprises are not common in Greek or Macedonian war by land or sea. It is on the whole true that the art of reconnaissance and the gathering of intelligence was not a strong point of fleets or armies in antiquity. To achieve surprise usually needs good intelligence, just as does the capacity to guard against it." [2] Given the evidence we have presented, we cannot accept the judgments of Gomme and Adcock that surprises were rare, at least in the Peloponnesian War. The number of fifth columns in the war, and the offensive and defensive techniques employed, both with respect to betrayals and in other operations, make it clear that surprise and "the capacity to guard against it" were common.

Finally, this implies a corollary, for we agree with Adcock that "surprise usually needs good intelligence, just as does the capacity to guard against it." We have already noted that successful betrayals necessitated the clandestine exchange of information between the traitors and the enemy, and that efficient security depended primarily on foreknowledge of the plot. Therefore, intelligence, at least in the basic sense of "the procurement of information believed to be pertinent," played a greater role in Greek warfare than has hitherto been noted, and numerous passages exclusive of fifth columns support this.[3]

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[1] Gomme, *Thuc.* 1, 17-18.

[2] Adcock, *War*, 40-41. Cf., *supra*, p. 3, n. 3.

[3] For the definition of intelligence in the text see H. H. Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958) 13. As Ransom notes, this is only the first step in the highly complex process of gathering intelligence in the modern world. We do not mean to imply that any Greek city had an established organization which systematically collected and evaluated all kinds of information about its enemies or potential enemies. But, while the evidence does not indicate that the Greeks institutionalized the gathering of information about their enemies and subjected it to rigorous

technical procedures, this does not mean that they did not attempt to get such information and use it; *supra*, on security measures (2.B); for a list of passages illustrating the use of intelligence exclusive of fifth columns, *infra*, Appendix 1. The gathering of intelligence by scouting, reconnaissance, interrogation of prisoners and defectors, and, occasionally, the use of spies has been noted by Th. Pekary, "Spionage," *Lexikon der Alten Welt* (Zurich 1965) 2862. Discussion of these and related matters such as military communications, e.g. signals, may be found in W. Riepl, *Das Nachrichtenwesen des Altertums* (Leipzig 1913). Riepl's study deals primarily with Rome, but Greece receives some attention too, particularly in the notes; see, e.g., pp. 33-35, 39, 43-74, 437-73. G. Reincke, "Nachrichtenwesen," *RE* 16 (1935) 1496-1541 is based primarily on Riepl; see 1498-1506 for scouting, reconnaissance, and military communications. What has yet to be studied is the use of intelligence in Greek warfare. Demosthenes' use of surprise, ambush, reconnaissance, scouts, and informants who knew the terrain has been noted by E. C. Woodcock, "Demosthenes, Son of Alcisthenes," *HSCP* 39 (1928) 93-108 and, more recently, M. Treu, "Der Stratege Demosthenes," *Historia* 5 (1956) 420-447. In both, however, the emphasis is on the innovative nature of Demosthenes' contributions to tactics and strategy; e.g., the introduction of light-armed forces (Woodcock, 96-97, 101, 107), the *epiteichismos* (Treu, 439-47). Neither is primarily concerned with Demosthenes' use of intelligence.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FIFTH COLUMN IN THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR

The fifth column was a major instrument of strategy in the Peloponnesian War. This is clear from the fact that each side employed fifth columns regularly throughout the war. As we have already noted, the necessities of warfare made the exploitation of a fifth column the most efficient method of capturing a city.[1] This combined with the internal divisions in the Greek cities [2] resulted in the courting of fifth columns by each side. In addition to the captures accomplished or attempted by treachery, attacking forces sometimes hoped for help from within even when no plot to betray the city had been arranged. When Agis marched on the walls of Athens in 411 he was looking for some movement to agree to terms favorable to Sparta following the oligarchic *coup* (8.71.1). After the destruction of Eetionea, Thucydides says that Hegesander was hovering off Epidaurus, perhaps in accordance with a prearranged understanding, but probably in the hope that, given the dissension in Athens, an opportunity might arise (8.94.2). In other words, Hegesander was probably "fishing" for a fifth column. The expedition of Sicanus to Acragas which was in *stasis* also may have been an angling for an act of support, perhaps even betrayal, by the pro-Syracusan faction.[3] Whether or not a city was in *stasis*, it was good strategy for an attacking army to negotiate with a group inside if possible. Nicias did this at Cythera and the result was the capitulation.[4]

Even more indicative of the role which the fifth column played in stategic thinking are two cases in which the idea that a betrayal was in the works was falsely planted to achieve an objective. After the summer of 415 the Athenian generals [5] based at Catana

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[1] *Supra*, ch. 3.

[2] *Supra*, ch. 4.

[3] *Supra*, p. 72, n. 5.

[4] *Supra*, ch. 5; cf. the Peloponnesian intentions at Stratus (2.81.2; *supra*, ch. 3).

[5] Thucydides does not name the generals (6.64.1), who were Nicias and Lamachus. Plutarch, *Nicias* 16.1-3, gives Nicias only as the author of the plan. Diodorus also records the incident, but does not name the generals

used the following stratagem: they sent to Syracuse a native of Catana thought by the Syracusan generals to be one of their supporters.[1] He said that he came from the pro-Syracusans in Catana and named members of the Syracusan party who the generals knew were still there. He told them that the Athenians spent the night in the city away from their arms; that if the Syracusans would fix a date and arrive at dawn, their supporters in Catana would close the gates on the Athenians in the city and set fire to the ships while the Syracusans captured the camp outside. The Syracusans accepted the proposal, set the date and marched to Catana only to find that the Athenians had sailed to Syracuse and landed by the Olympieum (6.64-65).

In the winter of 412/11 Astyochus stopped for the night at Corycus, near Erythrae, on his way to Miletus. During the night he received a letter from Pedaritus at Chios revealing that some Erythraean prisoners, held by the Athenians at Samos, had been freed for the purpose of betraying Erythrae and had arrived there.[2] Astyochus immediately set sail for Erythrae and Pedaritus joined him there. They investigated and discovered that the whole story had been concocted to secure the freedom of the prisoners (8.33.3-4). It was the most unusual use of the fifth-column idea in the war.

So far we have been concerned with the strategic use of fifth columns to accomplish immediate objectives such as the capture of a particular city or the landing at Syracuse. Beyond this, the fifth column was an important factor in overall strategic planning on each side. Descriptions of the Peloponnesian War as a war of attrition have usually referred to the original war plan of Pericles,[3] but Kromayer has pointed out that the whole war was one of attrition.[4] As the war progressed both sides took to the offensive,

(13.6.1-4). As the passage in Thucydides makes clear, there was a pro-Syracusan party in Catana, but there is no evidence of any treasonable action undertaken by this group.

[1] This use of a "double agent" was a neat intelligence operation; *supra*, ch. 6, p. 114, n. 3, and Appendix 1.

[2] How Pedaritus got this information is not known. The whole episode again illustrates the development of military intelligence and efficient security (by the Spartans).

[3] H. Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst* 1 (Berlin 1900) 100-108; Beloch, *G.G.* 2[1], 300-01; Henderson, *Great War*, 47-68; Kromayer, *Heerwesen*, 152-53; Adcock, *War*, 80-81.

[4] Kromayer, *Heerwesen*, 154.

but these offensives were usually not directed at the principal opponent. Rather, both sides attempted to accelerate the wearing out process by offensive campaigns, for the most part, against each other's allies. A survey of some of these offensives, which include many of the major campaigns of the war, will illustrate the importance of the fifth column in strategic planning on both sides.

1. The Fifth Column in Spartan Strategy

A. *The Ten Years War*

Even before the war broke out the Peloponnesians were aware that an effective strategy would be the instigation of revolts among the Athenian allies, depriving Athens of its revenues; however, Archidamus realized that such an undertaking would require naval power and money (1.80.4-81.4).[1] Early in the war, in the summer of 428, the Mytileneans revolted from Athens and asked Sparta for help. One argument they made to the Spartans was that support for their revolt would encourage further defections by Athens' allies (3.13.6-7). The Spartan relief force under Alcidas arrived too late to save Mytilene.[2] At this point Teutiaplos proposed to Alcidas that an attempt be made to retake Mytilene with the aid of a fifth column (No. 4). Alcidas turned down this proposal as well as the suggestion of some Ionian exiles that he seize one of the Ionian cities and use it as a base to instigate revolts (3.31.1-2). In addition to the possibility of betrayal at Mytilene and the presence of these Ionian exiles indicating that Alcidas could probably have counted on some support in the allied cities, we have already noted that a pro-Spartan fifth column probably existed in Chios at this time.[3]

For our study the important point is that this is the first time in the war that the fifth column is connected with the strategy

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[1] The more optimistic Corinthians thought that the money could be raised (1.121-122.1). For the Spartan strategy dictated by the war of attrition, see P. A. Brunt, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War," *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 255-280. While Brunt shows that Sparta aimed at wearing Athens down by detaching the allies, he does not discuss the role of the fifth column in Spartan strategy.

[2] *Supra*, ch. 5 and p. 81, n. 4.

[3] *Supra*, ch. 5, on Chios in the twenties.

of instigating revolts.[1] Alcidas dismissed the idea,[2] and modern historians have generally condemned the lack of daring and enterprise of the Spartan admiral.[3] However, as Adcock has pointed out,[4] Alcidas was probably on a fund raising mission, and this may well have influenced his decision to return to Sparta as quickly as possible. Beyond this, Alcidas may well have had a keener appreciation of the military realities of his time than posterity has attributed to him. His failure to undertake the instigation of revolts, given the fact that he could have had some fifth column support, and his later failure to support the fifth columnists in Corcyra (3.79.3) should be understood in light of Archidamus' statement at 1.80.4-81.4. Even with the aid of fifth columns the Spartans could not successfully instigate revolts among Athens' maritime allies because Sparta not only did not control the sea, but also could not even hope to contest control of the sea.[5] Alcidas may well have appreciated what we have already seen about betrayals of island cities; i.e., for any lasting success control of the sea was necessary.[6]

The most successful Spartan offensive of the Ten Years War was Brasidas' campaign in the north. His campaign best illustrates the strategy of wearing down Athens by detaching the allies,[7] and the fifth column clearly played a vital role in his plans.[8] Unlike Alcidas, Brasidas could take advantage of the fifth columns among Athens' allies. As Brunt noted, the Spartans were now operating in "the only part of Athens' empire which they could reach by land, the Thracian district." [9]

B. *The Peace of Nicias*

After the Peace of Nicias the Spartans found their position in the Peloponnese seriously threatened by the Argive-Mantinean-

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[1] For the fifth column and revolts, *supra*, ch. 5.

[2] At Corcyra Alcidas again refused to aid the fifth columnists, overruling Brasidas (3.79.3).

[3] Grote, *H.G.* 5, 160-61; Busolt, *G.G.* 3², 1022, 1049; Westlake, *Individuals*, 142-47; Henderson, *Great War*, 113-120.

[4] *Supra*, ch. 5 and p. 84, n. 2.

[5] Brunt, "Spartan Policy," *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 118, n. 1) 259-64.

[6] *Supra*, ch. 2, on the geographical distribution of the overt betrayals.

[7] In his speech at Acanthus Brasidas says that he is there to prevent the Acanthians from harming Sparta by the money they send to Athens (4.87.3).

[8] *Supra*, ch. 4, on Brasidas' campaign.

[9] Brunt, "Spartan Policy," 274.

Athenian alliance. Therefore, in the summer of 418 they marched against Argos under the command of Agis (5.57.1). While this offensive culminated in Agis' victory at Mantinea, the oligarchic fifth column in Argos tried to avoid the confrontation.[1] Agis' agreement to the four-month truce indicates that he too hoped for a non-military solution to Sparta's Argive problem. Sparta's basic strategy throughout with respect to Alcibiades' Argive policy was to detach Argos from the Athenian alliance by exploiting the fifth column in Argos. The battle could not be avoided, but the victory made the oligarchic *coup d'état* possible. It was short lived, but it was a significant gain for Sparta. The democracy was soon restored, but Sparta had succeeded in weakening Argos to the point where it no longer played an important part in the war. As Kagan pointed out, without this fifth column, "the outcome of the Peloponnesian War might have been far different." [2]

C. *The Ionian War*

In the Ionian War Sparta was able to challenge Athens at sea. The objections of Archidamus no longer held. Sparta's own allies were now eager to finish the war (8.2.1), and contributed to the costs of a fleet (8.3.2).[3] In addition, Sparta now expected substantial help from Sicily (8.2.3), and Persian support was soon forthcoming (2.65.12; 8.5.4-5; 8.6.1-2; 8.17.4-18). The basic strategy remained the detachment of Athens' allies, and now the allies were eager for revolt since they assumed that Athens' power had been broken (8.2.2). In view of this, fifth columns were not necessary for most of the revolts. However, some allied governments were not ready to revolt. Fifth columns, therefore, were still important to Sparta's plans. We have already noted that a pro-Spartan fifth column probably engineered the revolt of Rhodes.[4] A wealthy ally with a large fleet was thereby lost to Athens for the remainder of the war.[5] At Thasos, the Athenians obligingly

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[1] For this and what follows on Argos, *supra*, ch. 5.

[2] *Supra*, ch. 5, p. 96, n. 2.

[3] Contrast the reluctance of Sparta's allies during the revolt of Mytilene (*supra*, p. 81, n. 4).

[4] *Supra*, ch. 5, on Rhodes.

[5] For the strength of Rhodes, 8.44.1; the Spartans collected 32 talents from the Rhodians after the revolt (8.44.4). The Spartans continued to use Rhodes as a base (8.60.2). They put down revolutionary activity there the following year (D.S. 13.38.5). Lysander secured ships at Rhodes in 407/6

ousted the democracy, thereby playing into the hands of the pro-Spartan fifth column in the city and their exiles who were working with the Peloponnesians for a revolt. The revolt soon followed.[1]

The betrayal of Oropus (No. 22) in the winter of 412/11 requires special consideration. It was a necessary part of the plan for the revolt of Euboea. Thucydides says that it was betrayed to the Boeotians by men of Eretria and Oropus who were plotting the revolt of Euboea (8.60.1). Because of its proximity to Eretria it was a threat to both Eretria and the rest of Euboea as long as the Athenians held it and the Eretrians, once they had Oropus, went to Rhodes to invite the Peloponnesians to Euboea (8.60.1-2). Negotiations for the revolt had begun the previous winter when the Euboeans sent ambassadors to Agis (8.5.1).

Oropus was in Boeotia close to the Attic frontier and was subject to Athens (2.23.2).[2] Its position on the coast opposite Euboea made it the landing point for provisions from Euboea destined for Athens (7.28.1).[3] Its strategic value may be further illustrated by the fact that in the summer of 426 it was the base for an Athenian assault on Tanagra (3.91.3). Finally, after the battle of Delium it served as an escape route for the defeated Athenians (4.96.7).

With the betrayal of Oropus the revolt of Euboea became strategically feasible. The Peloponnesians now had a nearby base for their ships. In the following summer, 411, Hegesander landed with forty-two ships at Oropus (8.95.1).[4] The Peloponnesian plan was to catch the hastily assembled Athenian fleet at Eretria by surprise. The Eretrians offered no food for sale in the *agora*, but only in the outskirts of the city. While the Athenian crews were busy providing themselves with breakfast, the Eretrians raised a signal [5] to Hegesander at Oropus who sailed immediately.

(Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.1). In 406/5 Callicratidas collected ships from Rhodes (Xen., *Hell.* 1.6.3). Lysander used Rhodes as a base in 405 (Xen., *Hell.* 2.1.16-17).

[1] *Supra*, ch. 5, on Thasos.

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 80.

[3] The Spartan presence at Decelea interrupted this valuable supply route. See, Dover, *Thuc. VII*, 21.

[4] For the number of ships, see 8.94.1.

[5] We do not know what kind of signal it was. Oropus was only 60 stadia away by sea (8.95.3). The whole episode again demonstrates the use of surprise based on good communications and intelligence; *supra*, ch. 6, p. 114, n. 3; Appendix 1, *infra*.

The Athenians were caught unprepared and, although they managed to hold out in battle off the harbor of Eretria for a short time, they were soon forced ashore. Those who took refuge in Eretria were butchered by the inhabitants.[1] The revolt of all of Euboea, except Oreus, soon followed (8.95). Athens' most valued ally was lost (8.95.2), an event which the Athenians took more seriously than the defeat at Syracuse (8.96.1). The betrayal of Oropus had made it possible.

2. The Fifth Column in Athenian Strategy

A. *The Ten Years War*

In the summer of 424 Athens attacked Megara and Boeotia. Athens had been on the offensive for over two years with campaigns against Melos, Tanagra, in the northwest, Pylos, Sicily and Corinth. The *periplous* of the Peloponnese had been accomplished, for Athens controlled Cythera, Zacynthus, Corcyra and Naupactus.[2] In addition the *epiteichismos* had been established at Pylos.[3] The Athenians now turned their attention to the two Peloponnesian allies on their borders. Megara had been one of the immediate causes of the war (1.139.1-2) and Athens had been invading the Megarid yearly (2.31.3; 4.66.1). In the winter of 429/8 Megara had served as a base for the Peloponnesian attempt on Salamis and the Piraeus (2.93-94). The Athenians prevented further Peloponnesian sea raids by capturing and fortifying Minoa in the summer of 427 (3.51). However, despite the yearly invasions, the city of

[1] It is clear that the revolt of Euboea itself, particularly Eretria, was not engineered by a fifth column. At 8.5.1 Thucydides says that the Euboeans sent ambassadors to Agis to discuss the revolt (cf., on the revolt of Chios, *supra*, ch. 5 and p. 86, n. 1). The Eretrians were particularly active in the revolt and helped to arrange the betrayal of Oropus (8.60.1-2), and Thucydides' narrative shows that the inhabitants of Eretria were united in their enmity toward Athens (8.95.4-6). An Eretrian inscription suggests that the city may have been under an oligarchy soon after the revolt (Tod, *G.H.I.* 1, 82; Meiggs-Lewis, *G.H.I.*, 82), but there is no evidence in Thucydides that the revolt was engineered by a group of pro-Spartan oligarchs opposed to a pro-Athenian democratic regime. On the revolt of Euboea, see W. P. Wallace, *The Euboian League and its Coinage* (New York 1956) 1-4. Wallace connected the revolt with the foundation of the Euboean League.

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 510.

[3] F. E. Adcock, "ΕΠΙΤΕΙΧΙΣΜΟΣ in the Archidamian War," *CR* 61 (1947) 2-7.

Megara, the long walls and Nisaea were still in Peloponnesian hands in the summer of 424. The detachment of Megara from the Peloponnesian side would give Athens control of the land up to the Isthmus. Not only would the Peloponnese be isolated by Athens' naval strategy, but now its land communications with central Greece would be severed. This was particularly important this summer for the offensive against Boeotia.[1] As Adcock [2] and Henderson [3] have pointed out, the Athenians had no intention of fighting a pitched battle even with the Boeotians alone. The capture of Megara would help to insure that no Spartan relief force came to Boeotia.

The campaigns against Megara and Boeotia clearly illustrate the overall Athenian offensive strategy: containment of the Peloponnese, detachment of Sparta's allies, and avoidance of a major land battle. The only way these strategic requirements could be met in a land offensive was for Athens to have supporters within Megara and Boeotia. Megara would be taken by a small Athenian force,[4] and the Boeotians would be unable to unite for effective resistance because of internal revolution (4.76.4-5). Fifth-column support was, therefore, the *sine qua non* of Athens' designs against Megara (No. 9) and Boeotia (No. 10, Siphae-Chaeronea).[5] Had they succeeded, we cannot doubt that the course of the war would have been altered decisively in Athens' favor.

Thucydides gives two reasons why Demosthenes favored occupying Pylos in the summer of 425 over the objections of his colleagues:[6] Pylos had a harbor and the Messenians, who were old natives of the land and spoke the same dialect as the Lacedaemon-

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[1] Westlake, *Individuals*, 112-13.

[2] Adcock, *War*, 17, 84.

[3] Henderson, *Great War*, 226, 232.

[4] *Supra*, ch. 3, on small tactical units; cf. Th. 4.73.4.

[5] For these fifth columns, *supra*, ch. 4; on the operations, *supra*, ch. 6.

[6] For the element of luck in the landing, F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London 1907) 88-94; O. Luschnat, "Die Feldherrnreden im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides," *Philologus*, Supplbd. 34, 2 (1942) 34; J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*, tr. by P. Thody (New York 1958) 174. Gomme, *Thuc.* 3, 488, argued that the emphasis on chance has been exaggerated (by Cornford). Westlake, *Individuals*, 107, takes a middle view, agreeing that Cornford, Luschnat and de Romilly have "perhaps" exaggerated the feature of chance, but adds "there is no doubt of its prominence." Regardless of how "lucky" the landing was, Demosthenes clearly saw the strategic advantages of Pylos; for Demosthenes and the *epiteichismos*, see Treu, "Demosthenes," *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 114, n. 3) 439-47.

ians, would do them the greatest harm by using it as a base of operations (4.3.2). As events showed, Demosthenes clearly had more foresight than his colleagues. After the capture of Sphacteria, the Messenians did exactly what Demosthenes expected. In addition to their incursions, they provided a refuge for deserting helots and the Spartans began to fear a helot revolt (4.41.2-3, 5.14.3). We have already noted that this Spartan fear of a helot revolt was their basic motive in desiring peace and the return of the prisoners.[1] We have also noted that the helots were an ever present potential enemy within for the Spartans.[2] This is not to say that they were a fifth column, because there is no evidence of any organized helot group working with the Athenians. However, it is clear that Demosthenes planned a Messenian guerilla war at the beginning of the Pylos campaign, and it is not unreasonable to assume that he had the helots in mind at this point.[3] If so, his strategy included the fifth-column idea, exploitation of the potential enemy within. In any case, it soon became apparent that such exploitation was possible and the Athenians sought to increase the Spartan fear of internal revolution. In the following summer, 424, the Athenians captured Cythera [4] and Spartan fears increased (4.55.1). This *epiteichismos* strategy in the Peloponnese was the major Athenian offensive success in the Ten Years War. The main factor in its success was the fifth-column idea, for Spartan policy in this case, as always, was governed by the fear of a helot uprising (4.80.2-3). Later on in the war the Athenians attempted to use it again. In the summer of 413 Demosthenes established an *epiteichismos* on the Laconian coast opposite Cythera [5] in order to provide a refuge for deserting helots and establish a base for incursions as at Pylos (7.26.2).

B. *The Sicilian Expedition*

In the debate preceding the Sicilian expedition Alcibiades argued that the Sicilian cities had mixed populations and would

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[1] *Supra*, ch. 3 and p. 33, n. 1.

[2] *Supra*, ch. 6, on security measures.

[3] This would be entirely consonant with what we know of Demosthenes' approach to the war. His offensives against Megara and Boeotia were also based on the fifth-column strategy; for his use of surprise and intelligence, *supra*, p. 101, n. 2; p. 114, n. 3; *infra*, Appendix 1.

[4] With the aid of a fifth column, *supra*, ch. 5.

[5] On the location, see Dover, *Thuc. VII*, 19.

therefore be incapable of unified action; that they could be "sweet-talked" into coming over to Athens, especially if they were in *stasis* as he heard (6.17.2-4). When the Athenian forces landed at Rhegium the generals held a conference to decide on their course of action (6.47-49). Alcibiades proposed that attempts be made to bring over the Sicilian cities. He urged that Messina be approached first because of its strategic position (6.48). As Dover points out,[1] Alcibiades' strategy was consistent with his earlier argument at Athens. The plan of Alcibiades was adopted (6.50.1).[2] Liebeschuetz has held that the Athenians' objective in the Sicilian campaign was to "force their will on Syracuse through the combined pressure of a coalition and subversion." [3] He further noted that the adoption of Alcibiades' strategy "offers a very close parallel" to an earlier Athenian offensive, "the plan for the conquest of Boeotia." [4] The passages dealing with Alcibiades clearly support this. It is further confirmed by the Athenian action at Messina, the first objective in Alcibiades' strategy. The diplomatic overtures failed and plans were made for the betrayal of the city (No. 19). Alcibiades well understood that cities could be brought over by treachery if diplomacy failed.[5] Finally, at 7.55.2 in a general comment [6] on the failure in Sicily, Thucydides says that the Athenians

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[1] Dover, *Thuc. VI*, 55.

[2] Westlake, *Individuals*, 176, argued that this conference was not concerned with the general strategy of the whole campaign, but with the specific problem of money and supplies because support had not been forthcoming from the Italiot cities and as yet there was no assurance of support from Sicily itself. Westlake admits, however, that the generals' speeches "were evidently influenced, as is natural, by their own ideas about the strategy of the campaign." This is certainly true of Alcibiades, given his statements at 6.17.2-4. We follow Dover, *Thuc. VI*, 55 and Liebeschuetz, "Sicilian Expedition," *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 20, n. 1) 289, and consider that the conference was concerned with the whole campaign, not only the problems of money and supplies. Indeed, Alcibiades' basic strategy, to bring over the cities, was partially designed to solve these problems.

[3] Liebeschuetz, "Sicilian Expedition," 293.

[4] Liebeschuetz, "Sicilian Expedition," 290, n. 10.

[5] For Alcibiades' part in the conspiracy at Messina, *supra*, ch. 4 and p. 68, n. 3.

[6] The passage is a difficult one, but the antithesis between the strategy by which they were accustomed to bring over enemies and superior force is clear; see Dover, *Thuc. VII*, 46. We prefer Dover's first interpretation, that the political difference is the point, because Thucydides is talking about the fact that the Athenians were up against democracies, cities with which they were similar in character. It is worth noting, as Dover does, that Nicias had pointed out in the debate at Athens that they were not attacking enemies

were not able to succeed either by introducing a change of constitution, by which they were accustomed to bring over enemies, or by superior force. The important point for our study is that Thucydides clearly distinguished the methods in which Athens failed: their accustomed strategy—i.e., as Liebeschuetz noted, subversion, the same strategy they used in Boeotia—and force.

The defection of Alcibiades ruined the plan to take Messina. This was important for two reasons: first, it cost the Athenians a valuable winter base; second, as Westlake pointed out, the Athenian failure at Messina, "which Thucydides mentions almost casually, is of considerable significance because it suggests that, if Alcibiades had remained in Sicily for even a few more weeks, his plan might well have achieved a greater measure of success. He probably had in hand similar intrigues elsewhere. When after his recall a second attempt was made to win the support of Camarina (75.3; 88.2), public feeling there was well disposed towards Athens (88.1). If Alcibiades instead of the unknown spokesman Euphemus had conducted the negotiations, he might well have devised some means of bringing about a result more favourable to the Athenians." [1] What might have been is, of course, a matter of speculation; however, given the adoption of Alcibiades' strategy at Rhegium, Westlake's hypothesis is not unreasonable. Furthermore, while Thucydides undoubtedly thought that military mismanagement contributed to the failure of the Sicilian expedition (7.42.3), he also held that political dissension in Athens was responsible for the defeat (2.65.11). The passage at 2.65.11 is generally assumed to refer to the political attack on Alcibiades (for the profanation of the mysteries and mutilation of the herms) which resulted in his recall.[2] Gomme emphasized the military mismanagement (7.42.3) and argued that "no one would conclude from Thucydides' narra-

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desirous of a change of constitution (6.20.2). It is also worth noting that while Alcibiades envisaged exploiting internal divisions in the Sicilian cities, he did not restrict this to politics alone. He talked in terms of *stasis* and mixed populations (6.17.2-4; cf. *supra*, ch. 4). While Thucydides seems to have had the Syracusan democracy particularly in mind at 7.55.2, his use of the plural may indicate that he had other cities in mind as well. At 8.96.5 he specifically cites the similarity in character between Syracuse and Athens. For a possible connection between 7.55.2 and the fifth column in Syracuse, *supra*, p. 20, n. 1.

[1] Westlake, *Individuals*, 224-225. The citations in the quotation are to Th. 6.

[2] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 195; Liebeschuetz, "Sicilian Expedition," 302.

tive that it (sc., the recall of Alcibiades) was decisive." [1] Liebeschuetz acknowledges the importance of 7.42.3, but also maintains that Thucydides "undoubtedly thought that it (sc., the Sicilian expedition) would have gone better had Alcibiades not been recalled." [2] This view, which reconciles the two passages,[3] seems to us more probable and supports Westlake's contention that the failure at Messina was "of considerable significance."

Even after Alcibiades was gone, Nicias and Lamachus continued to carry out his strategy adopted at Rhegium.[4] They sailed to Himera but it refused to admit them. They then captured Hyccara and turned it over to their Egestaean allies. Next, the army went on to Catana (6.62.2-3), which had been won over while Alcibiades was still in his command (6.51).[5] Nicias went to Egesta to collect money, returned to the fleet at Hyccara and then sailed on to urge the Sicels to support Athens. With an unsuccessful attempt on Hybla in the territory of Gela the summer of 415 ended (6.62.4-5).

So far the strategy was not succeeding, and the Syracusans were becoming more confident. Aware of this, the Athenians made their first attack on Syracuse using the fifth-column stratagem to draw the Syracusans out to Catana. After their victory the Athenians returned to Catana (6.71.1). Their strategy had not changed. The attack was not intended as the beginning of full scale operations against Syracuse,[6] but was designed to restore their prestige and influence the Sicilian cities. Thucydides says that the Athenians hoped that after the battle some of the cities would more readily listen to them and come over (6.71.2). However, the strategy of coalition and subversion suffered two major setbacks in the ensuing winter (415/15). The betrayal of Messina failed (6.74.1) as did the diplomatic overtures at Camarina (6.88.2).[7]

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[1] Gomme, *Thuc.* 2, 196.

[2] Liebeschuetz, "Sicilian Expedition," 303.

[3] See further on this, Dover, *Thuc. VII*, 33-34.

[4] Dover, *Thuc. VI*, 70.

[5] Naxos, which they also used as a winter base, had been pro-Athenian all along (6.50.3).

[6] Thucydides especially criticized this (7.42.3). The winter, lack of supplies, money and cavalry are also given as reasons why Nicias and Lamachus withdrew (6.71.2), but if Alcibiades' strategy were made to work, then these deficiencies would cease to be a problem (*supra*, p. 125, n. 2).

[7] Some minor successes were recorded. Most of the inland Sicels joined the Athenians (6.88.4), and overtures were made to the Carthaginians and Etruscans (6.88.6). Dover, *Thuc. VI*, 88, pointed out that "hostility between

The following summer the Athenians commenced operations against Syracuse (6.96.1). Alcibiades' strategy had called for pressuring Syracuse into submission by first gaining allies through diplomacy and betrayal. His reasoning was that if the Syracusans still refused to submit, then the Athenians would attack (6.48). The Athenians had not succeeded in bringing over the cities, but nonetheless they attacked. Liebeschuetz argued that they had no choice: the alternatives were "direct assault or go home." [1] The siege was undertaken and, with the death of Lamachus soon after the landing (6.101.6), Nicias was left in sole command.

Nicias' failure to follow up the first landing in winter 415/14 with decisive action was criticized by Thucydides (7.42.3). Nicias was against the Sicilian expedition from the start, put a great emphasis on the difficulties of supply, money and lack of cavalry, was a sick man, had a fear of prosecution should he return a failure, and believed in divination. Plutarch says that he impressed his colleagues as lacking in daring, that they talked of his procrastination, waste of time and hair-splitting arguments (*Nicias* 21.4). His vacillation during the siege and his failure to retreat before it was too late have generally been blamed for the final disaster by modern historians.[2]

While we do not wholly deny Nicias' shortcomings at Syracuse, an important factor in his conduct of the siege had not received proper consideration; i.e., the fifth column in Syracuse.[3] Liebeschuetz drew a parallel between Athenian strategy in Boeotia and Alcibiades' strategy in Sicily.[4] The same parallel also applies to the siege of Syracuse. It is our view that Nicias was reluctant to raise the siege until his position became wholly untenable because he expected the fifth columnists to bring about either a capitu-

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Syracuse and the Etruscans went back at least to the 470's. In 413 Etruscan troops actually served in the Athenian force at Syracuse (vii. 53.2, 57. 11)."

[1] Liebeschuetz, "Sicilian Expedition," 294. Liebeschuetz says "Nicias had no choice;" however, Lamachus was still his colleague.

[2] See, e.g., Henderson, *Great War*, 367-87, one of Nicias' severest critics; Busolt, *G.G.* 3^2, 1376-77, while less critical talked of his "egoistischer Motive" (fear of prosecution) and "seiner Hartnäckigkeit;" Grote, *H.G.* 6, 182, gives another severe condemnation of Nicias.

[3] For the question of the identification of the fifth columnists, *supra*, p. 20, n. 1.

[4] *Supra*, p. 125, n. 4; Liebeschuetz notes that Athens attempted subversion at Syracuse ("Sicilian Expedition," 296, 298), but does not discuss its relevance to the siege.

lation or a betrayal. We hold this view primarily because of Thucydides' report of the conference of the Athenian generals after Demosthenes' attack on Epipolae failed in the summer of 413. Thucydides says that Nicias knew that the Athenian position was not good, but did not want their weakness openly talked about; he did not want the enemy to know that they were voting on withdrawal. In addition, he knew more about the enemy's situation than his colleagues; he had hopes that Syracuse would yet be in greater difficulties if the Athenians carried on the siege because the Syracusans lacked money and the Athenians still commanded the sea. And there were the fifth columnists in Syracuse who wished to betray the city; they were sending him messages and urging him not to raise the siege.[1] Since he knew all this, he was really undecided about which course to follow (withdraw or stay), but in his open statement he refused to withdraw (7.48.1-3). Thucydides then goes on to report what Nicias told his colleagues: first he expounded on the danger of prosecution on their return (7.48.3-4); then he told them what he knew of Syracuse's financial difficulties and said that they ought to stay (7.48.5-6).

This passage has usually been taken as proof of Nicias' cowardice. He feared prosecution, so he threw away the lives of his men.[2] However, this ignores the distinction Thucydides made in introducing what Nicias said: τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ Nicias was undecided (with good reasons), τῷ δ' ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγῳ he refused to withdraw (7.48.3).[3] What Nicias told his colleagues was not what he really thought. He did not tell them about the fifth column, but led off with an argument designed to impress his fellow generals. It seems to escape Nicias' critics that he was trying to convince his colleagues to stay and the argument he presented was not that he alone

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[1] The use of the imperfect and present participles here (7.48.2) and again at 7.49.1 indicates that this fifth column was in continuous negotiation with Nicias.

[2] Dover, *Thuc. VII*, 41; cf. Nicias' other critics, *supra*, p. 128, n. 2.

[3] Westlake, *Individuals*, 197-98, notes the distinction and concludes that "it is at least arguable that his (sc. Thucydides') implied criticism of Nicias is somewhat harsh." We would agree with Westlake that Thucydides left his readers to draw their own conclusions about Nicias' fear of prosecution, but we do not agree that, given Thucydides' distinction between what Nicias said and really thought, he necessarily implied any criticism of Nicias by reporting the fear of prosecution argument (see below in the text and the next note).

would be prosecuted, but that they all would.[1] His second argument was designed to counter Demosthenes' position that to carry on the siege was a waste of money (7.47.4). Westlake points out that "Thucydides insists that Nicias was accurately informed about the financial difficulties of the Syracusans." [2] Thucydides also insists that Nicias argued strongly for staying because of the fifth column (7.49.1).

Demosthenes countered with a proposal designed to meet Nicias' first argument against going home: they should withdraw to Thapsus or Catana whence they could carry on the war from a better position. Eurymedon agreed with Demosthenes (7.49.2-3). However, Nicias continued to object. Note that with his first argument deflated, Nicias still insisted on remaining at Syracuse. His first argument was τῷ δ' ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγῳ; his real reason, τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ, for remaining had not been disclosed. If they withdrew to Thapsus or Catana, the immediate pressure on Syracuse would be relieved and the chance of betrayal would be lost. Nicias wanted his forces on the spot when the fifth column acted. Indeed, the fifth column could hardly act if Nicias retreated. Thucydides then says that a certain hesitation and procrastination came over them (sc. Demosthenes and Eurymedon), and a suspicion that Nicias was firm because he knew something more than they did. They remained at Syracuse (7.49.4).[3] Thucydides has made it clear that the "something more" which Nicias did not share with his colleagues was the fifth column.[4]

Nicias maintained the siege until the return of Gylippus and Syracusan preparations for a new attack made him agree to abandon

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[1] As we have already noted (*supra*, ch. 1 and p. 7, n. 1), Nicias had good reason to believe this. Dover, *Thuc. VII*, 41, points this out but still insists on Nicias' "moral cowardice." This ignores the distinction between what Nicias really thought and what he said. The "fear of prosecution argument" was not the real reason he wanted to stay; that it was an effective argument is indicated by Demosthenes' counter proposal (see below in the text).

[2] Westlake, *Individuals*, 198.

[3] As Westlake, *Individuals*, 199, noted, it seems that the conference ended without a vote being taken. We do not know whether or not Nicias was outnumbered because we do not know what the constitutional position of Menander and Euthydemus was. We also do not know what Menander and Euthydemus thought; cf. Dover, *Thuc. VII*, 12, 42.

[4] An unanswered question is why Nicias did not inform his fellow generals about the fifth column. He was undoubtedly a cautious man, perhaps too cautious. However, he was also wary of the possible leakage of information

it (7.50.3).[1] However, that he maintained it as long as he did because of the fifth column explains an apparent anomaly overlooked by Nicias' critics. Nicias certainly had a firm grasp of all the difficulties sieges entailed.[2] His concern for money, supplies and a tenable base is evident long before his letter to the Athenians. Then, in the letter, he expounded on these difficulties at length. Finally, in the conference just discussed, he again showed that he was well aware of the besieger's problems. We find it difficult to believe that a general so conscious of the technical problems of a siege dragged one out simply because of weak character. That Nicias of all generals dragged out the siege requires a better explanation, and the fifth column provides it.

That Nicias employed the fifth-column strategy at Syracuse is not surprising for another reason. In boldness, enterprise and intrigue he was not the equal of Brasidas, Demosthenes and Alcibiades; but he was not unaware of their methods.[3] He was an experienced general in a war in which recourse to fifth columns was common. In addition, he had a good deal of personal experience with fifth columns. In the summer of 424 he successfully captured Cythera with the aid of a fifth column.[4] At Mende, in the summer of 423, he witnessed, undoubtedly to his surprise, the uprising of the population against the Spartans who assumed that a betrayal was under way (4.130.5-6). In the Sicilian campaign he was in command when the betrayal of Messina failed, and the episode of the man of Catana shows his grasps of the strategic possibilities the fifth column offered.[5] Finally, we have already suggested that the fact that he had been Syracusan *proxenos* at Athens contributed

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(7.48.1, 50.3). Perhaps he considered that the less who knew about it, the better were the chances of success; cf. *supra*, ch. 6, on communications, p. 104, n. 3, and on security.

[1] The failure to retreat at this point was caused by the eclipse and Nicias' superstitution. This was, as Nicias' critics point out, disastrous and he was responsible for it.

[2] For these difficulties, *supra, ch.* 3.

[3] Westlake, *Individuals*, 186, in referring to Nicias' tactics during the Syracusan surprise on the Circle on Epipolae (6, 102.1-3), has pointed out that he "was capable of quick and ingenious improvisation in battle;" cf. Adcock, *War*, 85-86.

[4] *Supra*, ch. 5.

[5] *Supra*, p. 116, n. 5. It may not be too fanciful to assume that the episode at Mende alerted Nicias to the possibility of exploiting "fifth columns that were not there."

to his ability to establish communications with dissidents in Syracuse.[1]

Conclusion

In conclusion, our survey of these campaigns demonstrates that the fifth-column strategy, exploitation of the enemy, or potential enemy, within, played a major role in military planning on both sides.[2] Given the significance of the campaigns discussed, it is clear that success or failure in this strategy went a long way in determining the outcome of the war.[3] Kromayer wrote that the whole Peloponnesian War may be characterized by Brasidas' offensive and the Syracusan expedition as a war of attrition.[4] These two campaigns also characterize the war, in terms of offensive strategy, as a fifth-column war.

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[1] *Supra*, ch. 6, on the role of *proxenoi* in communications between fifth columns and the enemy.

[2] The Athenians continued to court fifth columns in the Ionian War in their attempt to recover revolted allies: Chios (No. 21), Selymbria (No. 25), Byzantium (No. 26) and Thasos (*supra*, ch. 5). This was their period of greatest success with fifth columns.

[3] Cf. *supra*, ch. 2, on success and failure in the overt betrayals.

[4] Kromayer, *Heerwesen*, 154.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

The existence of fifth columns has not infrequently been noted by historians; but the present work is the first study of the role of fifth columns in any period of Greek history. The evidence presented has demonstrated the importance of this neglected subject for the Peloponnesian War: fifth columns operated in all periods and geographical areas, and throughout the entire course of the war. The technological and economic conditions of warfare led each side to solicit eagerly the cooperation of fifth columns. The motives which drove the members of these groups to commit treason were social, economic and psychological, as well as political; they cannot be completely explained by the traditional political division between oligarchs and democrats. Fifth columns engaged in a variety of treasonable or subversive activities in addition to overt betrayals; these activities were largely determined by the political and military circumstances in which the fifth columns had to operate. Successful betrayals achieved surprise; this was dependent on timing, strategic deployment of forces, and secret communications with the "enemy". Betrayals rarely failed if they were attempted; with only one known exception (Plataea, No. 1), failures resulted from the exposure of the plots. The fifth column was a major instrument of strategy in the Peloponnesian War. Its successes and failures constituted a decisive factor in the outcome of the conflict.

With these conclusions as to the role of the fifth column in the military history of the Peloponnesian War, the objective of this study is achieved. However, it must be noted that they have implications which go beyond the scope of the present work.[1] Here these implications can only be suggested in the hope that they will indicate possibilities for further research on the subject.

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[1] We have already noted that the techniques of betrayals and security measures imply that intelligence played a greater role in Greek warfare than has hitherto been recognized (*supra*, ch. 6, p. 114, n. 3); *infra*, Appendix 1).

First, fifth columns operated in earlier periods of Greek history.[1] Euphorbus, Philargus and their associates in Eretria (Hdt. 6.100-101) and the anti-democratic conspirators in Athens just before Tanagra (1.107.4-6) are only two examples. In view of the importance of the fifth columns in the Peloponnesian War, it is not unreasonable to suppose that a study of the earlier instances will yield significant conclusions.

Second, there are implications for the cultural and intellectual history of the generation which lived through the Peloponnesian War. For example, Thucydides says that the Athenians were always in fear and suspected everything (6.53.3), and that they even slept one night under arms in the Theseion because they feared a betrayal (6.61.2).[2] This suggests that fifth-column activities created a general atmosphere of suspicion and fear. The wide application of laws against *prodosia*,[3] and the consciousness of security problems, especially as illustrated by references in Aristophanes, [4] support this. Given the number of fifth columns in the war, this is not surprising; moreover, such an atmosphere would have undoubtedly contributed to the breakdown of the political order. A full study of the reaction to betrayals as reflected in the literary as well as historical sources would demonstrate to what extent this atmosphere existed, and what its effect was on the world of the Peloponnesian War. In addition, such a study would throw light on contemporary views of treason and on the relation of these views to current trends in ethical and political thought; for example, both Alcibiades at Sparta (6.92.4) and Brasidas at Torone (4.114.3) maintained that what clearly was treason was not treason. Is this the "unjust argument" prevailing over the "just"? [5]

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[1] Calhoun, *Clubs*, 141, noted that "the beginnings of this practice of introducing foreign forces are to be traced far back into legendary times."

[2] Andocides, *De Mysteriis*, does not specifically mention the supposed betrayal; however, he vividly portrays the atmosphere of suspicion and fear (36-37, 59, 68).

[3] *Supra*, ch. 1, on *prodosia* under Terminology, and p. 6, n. 4, p. 7, n. 1.

[4] *Supra*, ch. 6, and p. 111, n. 3.

[5] This approach raises questions which have already been explored in some respects, especially Greek "nationality" and "patriotism;" e.g., Chroust, "Treason and Patriotism," *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 2, n. 4); N. M. Pusey, "Alcibiades and τὸ φιλόπολι," *HSCP* 41 (1940) 215-31; A. Aymard, "Liberté, Patrie et Factions," *REA* 49 (1947) 321-26; F. W. Walbank, "The Problem of Greek Nationality," *Phoenix* 5 (1951) 41-60. However, given the

Finally, there are implications for subsequent military, political and cultural history. For the next sixty odd years the Greek world continued to suffer from the willingness of factions to put their own interests before those of their cities. The contemporary manual of Aeneas Tacticus indicates that the greatest danger for a city was within its own walls, and Adcock has called particular attention to the fifth column as a "means of strategy" in the fourth century.[1] It might be argued that this reflects the decline of the *polis* as the center of loyalty generally held to have occurred during this period.[2] But, in light of the facts of military history, it is not immediately obvious that fifth-century Greeks were more loyal to their *poleis* than their fourth-century descendants. This suggests that the problem of loyalty to the *polis* in the whole classical period requires further examination.[3] There is no denying that to a large extent Philip's success resulted from his ability to exploit the "enemies within" the *poleis*: *diffidit urbium portas uir Macedo* (Hor., *Carm.* 3.16.13-14). But were not many successes of generals in the preceding century largely due to the same cause? Had things really changed, and, if so, just how had they changed, and when, and why?

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facts about treason in the Peloponnesian War, a thorough examination of all the evidence and its implications for the period would seem in order. This, in turn, would have important implications for the fourth century (see below in the text).

[1] Adcock, *War*, 72-73. Obviously a full study of the fifth column in the fourth century is needed; but such a study could not ignore the influence of the Peloponnesian War.

[2] See, e.g., J.B. Bury, *A History of Greece*, rev. by R. Meiggs (London 1951) 574-76; E. Barker, *CAH* 6 (Cambridge 1927) 509-13; Hammond, *H.G.*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 16, n. 1) 582-95; Bengston, *G.G.*, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 23, n. 1) 278-79.

[3] *Supra*, p. 134, n. 5.

APPENDIX I

A complete study of the use of intelligence in Greek warfare, even only in the Peloponnesian War, would take us far beyond the scope of the present work. It is properly the subject for a separate monograph which we are now preparing. However, to justify the statement that numerous passages, exclusive of fifth columns, illustrate the role of intelligence in the Peloponnesian War, we offer the following selected list (all references are to Thucydides). Intelligence means information about the enemy; i.e., his numbers, position, movements, the physical features of the terrain he occupies, in short, any information of strategic value.

2.93. The Megarians persuaded the Spartans to attempt a night surprise raid on the Piraeus which was unguarded. The raid was carried out on Salamis only. We do not know what the Megarians' source of this information was, but the point is that the plan was based upon the information that the port was unguarded. Thucydides often only says that certain information was received and then plans made or action taken, but does not tell us how the intelligence was gathered.

3.80.2 The Spartan fleet off Corcyra was informed by fire signals of the approach of sixty Athenian ships. The Spartans sailed home (3.81.1).

3.95.3 Demosthenes' plan to invade Aetolia involved using his Ozolian Locrian allies. The Ozolian Locrians would have been a great help because they knew the localities and the method of fighting in Aetolia. Demosthenes failed to wait for the Ozolian Locrians and was defeated (3.97-98). As Woodcock, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 114, n. 3) 106-107, pointed out, Demosthenes never repeated this mistake, and subsequently employed scouts and men who knew the localities into which he was going.

3.107.3-112 At Olpae Demosthenes took advantage of an overgrown hollow for a successful ambush. After the sur-

prise succeeded, he secretly granted permission to the Peloponnesians for a retreat in order to discredit them. He then received information (how, we do not know) that the Ambraciots, knowing nothing of what had happened, were on the march to Olpae. He immediately dispatched a force to set an ambush on the roads and seize the strong positions. These troops succeeded in occupying by night the higher of the two hills at Idomene. The Ambraciots had bivouacked on the lower hill. Demosthenes attacked at dawn while the Ambraciots were still bedded down. He sent the Messenians in first while it was still dark with orders to address the guards in the Doric dialect, since the guards would not be able to see them. The result was an overwhelming victory (3.113.6). Demosthenes' sucessful surprises at Olpae and Idomene were made possible by his having accurate information about the terrain and the enemy's movements.

4.4.3 At Pylos Demosthenes used Messenians who knew the country and spoke the dialect. As in Ambracia, Demosthenes took the strongest points and used the physical features of the area to advantage (4.9-10).

4.29-36 In the assault on Sphacteria Demosthenes again employed surprise and showed a keen appreciation of the advantages and disadvantages of the physical features of the island. In addition to his experience in Aetolia, good reconnaissance and his Messenian informants undoubtedly contributed to his success. Woodcock (p. 101) suggested that the fire (4.30.2) was no accident. The Messenian general led a force around behind the Spartans (4.36).

4.42.3-4 The Corinthians were informed from Argos (*supra*, ch. 5) of the impending Athenian invasion. The Athenians managed to land by night unobserved at the Isthmus, but the Corinthians were soon informed of the fact by signals.

4.70 Brasidas, near Sicyon and Corinth, learned of the Athenian capture of the long walls at Megara. He

marched to save Nisaea, but at Tripodiscus he was informed that it had already fallen. He immediately set out for Megara at night with three hundred men before his approach should become known.

4.93.1-2 At Delium Pagondas took up a position where a hill prevented his being seen by the Athenians. However, Hippocrates obviously had scouts or lookouts, for he was informed of the approach of the Boeotians.

5.2.3 Cleon learned from deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone and the garrison there was not capable of resistance. He captured it (5.2.4-3.3).

5.3.4 Brasidas, on his way to relieve Torone, learned of its capture when he was 40 stades away. He retreated.

5.6.3 Brasidas learned of Cleon's movements and took up a position on Kerdylium for observation purposes. When Cleon advanced, Brasidas decided that his only advantage lay in a surprise attack before the Athenians learned that his army was inferior in quality (5.8).

5.58.1 The Spartan military preparations were "known from the beginning" by the Argives.

5.115.4 The Melians made a successful night raid on the Athenian lines. The Athenians had not been careful enough in keeping guard, and presumably the Melians learned this, how, we do not know.

6.34.6 Hermocrates speaks of the Athenian use of κατασκοπαῖς, spying or reconnoitring, to learn Syracusan numbers and whereabouts.

6.41.4 One of the Syracusan generals says that they will send around to the cities ἐς κατοσκοπήν, for reconnaissance or spying.

6.45.3 Information comes to the Syracusans from their men sent to reconnoitre, ἀπὸ τῶν κατασκόπων, that the Athenians are at Rhegium.

6.50.5 The Athenians reconnoitre Syracuse, the city, harbor,

and features of the land from which they would be able to make war.

6.63.3 The Syracusans employed mounted scouts to reconnoitre the Athenian base at Catana.

6.64.1 Syracusan exiles with the Athenians inform them of an area near the Olympieion where they would be able to take up a position in which the Syracusan cavalry could do them little harm. They later occupied this position.

6.75.3 The Syracusans learned that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina.

6.100.1 The Athenians kept watch on the Syracusans working on the counterwall. When the Syracusans retired to their tents at midday, and others returned to the city, the Athenians surprised and seized the first counterwall.

7.1.1 Gylippus received more correct information that Syracuse was not yet completely walled in, and that it was possible for an army to enter by Epipolae.

7.4.7 Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian ships were approaching. He sent out 20 ships to be on guard for them around Locris, Rhegium and the approach to Sicily.

7.32.1-2 Nicias learned that the Sicilian cities were sending forces to Syracuse. He arranged with the Sicels, who controlled the passes, for an ambush.

7.36.1 The Syracusans learned of the approach of Demosthenes' relief force. Therefore, they decided on attempting a battle.

7.65.1-2 The Syracusans were informed of the grappling irons which the Athenians were fitting on their ships. The Syracusans stretched hides over the prows and much of the upper parts of each ship so that the grappling irons, when thrown, would slip off without taking hold.

7.67.4 Gylippus claims to have certain knowledge of the des-

pair of the Athenians. The preparations for battle were observable, but this knowledge of Athenian morale suggests that Syracuse had sources of information in the Athenian camp.

8.27.1 Phrynichus at Miletus received accurate information from Leros about the approach of the enemy fleet. Phrynichus decided to withdraw.

8.34.3 The Athenians were informed about six Peloponnesian ships stationed at Triopium to harass merchantmen. The Athenians captured these six ships.

8.79.3 The Athenians at Mycale were informed from Miletus that the Spartans desired a sea battle. They retired to Samos.

8.79.5 The Spartans, about to advance on Samos, learned that Strombichides had arrived with reinforcements from the Hellespont. They sailed back to Miletus.

8.99-100.2 Mindarus sailed for the Hellespont from Miletus with seventy-three ships. In order to prevent his movements becoming known to the Athenians at Samos, he gave the sailing orders without any advance notice. Nevertheless, Thrasyllus soon learned that Mindarus had sailed from Miletus, and set out with fifty-five ships. He then learned that Mindarus was at Chios, and posted scouts at Lesbos and on the mainland opposite to keep watch on the enemy.

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